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Abstract
Operating plan design and execution are critical to railroads in both marketing and
operational contexts. Trip time and reliability, two dimensions of rail service quality most
valued by shippers, depend on the design and execution of the railroad's operating plan.
Railroad asset utilization and operating costs also depend on the operating plan.
Through analysis of five alternative operating strategies, this thesis tests the hypothesis
that operating plans based on sophisticated strategies for organizing classification activity
and train movements can have a major impact on service quality. Unconventional
strategies included Local Pre-Blocking, Terminal Complexes, and Tandem Humping.
Conventional strategies included ABM-Generated Routing and Improved Yard
Performance. Operating plans representing each alternative were created for CSX
Transportation's Chicago-Nashville corridor and compared to a base case representing
CSXT's November 1993 operating plan. Implementation issues associated with the
alternative strategies were considered qualitatively.
The Tandem Humping strategy provided few benefits and was exceedingly complex.
The other four strategies were each predicted to lower costs from $8 to $24 million per
year, subject to implementation considerations. Predicted savings result from reductions
in car- hours, car-miles, and car-handlings of traffic targeted by each alternative.
None of the alternatives would require major additional resource expenditures and
therefore their relatively modest benefits could justify changes in operations and service
design. Implementation of more sophisticated strategies would have to be delayed or
altered unless advanced control systems were adopted or more reliable execution of the
operating plan was achieved. Where decision support tools are used to generate operating
plans, significant benefits could result, but the quality of model input data strongly
influences the dimensions of the resulting plan.
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I Research Motivation and Background
1.1 Goal of the Research
The research presented in this thesis was undertaken with the goal of improving
service quality of carload freight movement, focusing on the key dimensions of service
quality, trip time and reliability. The research follows recent findings that carload freight
movement remains slow and highly variable [Little & Martland, 1993], and that customers
weigh trip time and reliability most heavily in choosing carriers and assigning volumes
[Vieira, 1992, and AAR-ISM, 1993].
The research addresses the railroad operating plan, which is important not only to
customer satisfaction, but also to financial performance. The design and execution of the
railroad operating plan jointly determine trip time, reliability, and also asset utilization and
operating costs. The research attempts to answer the question: Is it possible for some or
all merchandise traffic to achieve major improvements in trip time and reliability
through adoption of a significantly more complex operating plan, which stipulates new
roles for some yards and train crews?
The organizational strategy which underlies the railroad operating plan influences plan
elements such as train routes and schedules, car-to-block and block-to-train assignments,
and the yard classification plan, which in turn influence both service quality and cost.
This research investigates the effects of five alternative strategies on both service quality
and operating costs. Three of the alternative strategies incorporate unconventional
concepts for organizing classification activity and train movements. The fourth strategy
substitutes use of decision support for manual analysis in generation of car routes, while
the fifth incorporates improved yard performance. Of the five strategies, four incorporate
changes in the design of the operating plan. Only the fifth strategy assumes more effective
execution of the base operating plan.
Research into the influence of operating plan design on performance could only be
effective if carried out in cooperation with railroad. Opportunities to model strategies as
they would be applied to specific operating regions using in-house decision support tools
and to confer with service planners about the study region and matters of service planning
apparent only to practitioners were considered invaluable factors in securing a credible and
relevant result. CSX Transportation assisted the research by providing the network
modeling tools and data and the assistance of members of their Operations Research,
Technology, and Service Design staffs.
1.2 Prior MIT Research in Service Reliability
The MIT Rail Group has investigated issues in service reliability and operations
planning during two multi-year research efforts. The first such research effort lasted from
1970 through 1981, and included participation in Freight Car Utilization Program, funded
by the Federal Railroad Administration and later by the Association of American
Railroads. The second period of MIT research in service reliability took place from 1990
through 1994 with funding from the Association of American Railroads.
Both periods of research resulted from the railroads' motivation to improve operating
performance in a capital-constrained environment. New techniques for service
management, planning, and measurement were developed to improve performance while
also improving asset utilization.
During both periods of research, MIT researchers worked extensively with Class I
railroads, generating and evaluating data and preparing reports and case studies which
documented particularly effective and ineffective operating practices and recommended
analytical techniques useful in operations planning and performance measurement. Several
of the most in-depth and influential studies performed during these research periods are
summarized below.
1.2.1 Research Performed in the 1970s and 1980s
The research performed under the auspices of the FRA/AAR Freight Car Utilization
Program and its FRA-funded precursors remain among the most in-depth research into
railroad operations and economics ever performed in an academic setting. These projects
set precedents in examining operating costs using a holistic analytical framework,
illustrating tradeoffs between, for example, labor and car hire costs, train and yard costs,
and operating cost and service quality. Close relationships with Class I railroads provided
critical data and insights into operating conditions, leading to more effective
recommendations than could otherwise have been possible.
The three case studies summarized below provide a good overview of the FCUP-era
research. Common elements of the three case studies make them logical precursors to the
research described in this thesis. All provide direct methodological precedents for the
current research, in that they began with a broad audit of a railroad's existing operations,
identified operational changes geared toward performance improvement, and evaluated the
potential impacts of those changes using the Service Planning Model and other analytical
methods.
Southern Railway (1972-1974). The FRA-funded Southern Railway Case Study
noted that improvements in O/D reliability required either improvements in
reliability of local pickup and delivery operations and/or train-to-train connections,
increased consistency of O/D routing, reductions in car handlings, or reductions in
extraordinary delays caused by misroutes or bad-orders. Applying solutions based
on those conditions to reliability problems in five lanes, the research achieved
improvements in O/D reliability where its recommendations were implemented,
saving between $2,500 and $15,000 per month. In several instances where actual
improvement did not match predictions, mitigating circumstances such as failure to
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implement and unanticipated operating changes affected the study region.
[Martland, 1974].
* Boston & Maine (1978-1980). The Boston & Maine Case Study was the most
extensive of the FCUP case studies, dealing with network-wide performance levels
and operating changes, and including contributions from both operating and
marketing departments, who interacted with MIT researchers through the activities
of an interdepartmental service committee. The objective of the case study was to
assist B&M in regaining profitability by reducing switching and car-hire expense
through a combination of operating plan and car distribution strategy changes. In
the first phase of the case study, individual changes to the operating plan were
proposed, and their cost and performance impacts estimated using the Service
Planning Model. The proposed changes were then reviewed by the operating
department and the most attractive and feasible changes implemented. Actual cost
and performance impacts of the changes were measured, and unexpected issues
which arose in implementation were discussed. The changes were on the whole
extremely successful, and resulted in a 15% reduction in total car costs in 1979, a
savings of over $3 million. [Martland, Messner, and Nowicki, 1980]
* Santa Fe (1980-1981). The Santa Fe Case Study was more limited in scope than
the Boston & Maine Case Study. The final research report contained descriptions
of proposed changes to Santa Fe's operating plan for its Northern and Southern
divisions, and reported performance changes predicted by the Service Planning
Model. Because of its relatively short time frame, the Santa Fe Case Study did not
document implementation of recommendations or audit resulting performance
changes. The case study did, however, provide an extensive discussion on the
benefits and shortcomings of the Service Planning Model and a plan for integrating
the SPM into the railroad planning process. [Martland, Clappison, Van Dyke, and
Tykulsker, 1981]
1.2.2 Research in Railroad Reliability in the 1990s
Competitive pressure among railroads and from the trucking industry forced the issue
of service reliability to the forefront again in the late 1980s. Shippers indicated in surveys
and by their carrier choices that service quality was important. Accordingly, the AAR's
Research & Test department directed funding to MIT for research in service reliability.
Among the major focuses and findings of the research were:
* Audit of Reliability. The audit of railroad reliability measured several dimensions
of service reliability and operating performance, with the dual goals of
demonstrating current performance levels and isolating and ranking root causes of
service failures. The audit of reliability was performed in several dimensions,
including summarizing the trip times for a group of 93,000 car moves, performing
a root cause analysis to determine the causes of service failures, and examining
other root cause data supplied by major railroads. A major finding of the audit of
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reliability was that more than 80% of all service failures are caused by factors
subject to management control, such as power or crew shortages or missed
connections in terminals. A related study of double-stack car moves illustrated
that cars with the fewest enroute handlings exhibit the best service quality. Even
for this group of high-priority cars, however, mechanical problems and holidays
explained less than 20% of all shipment delays. [Little and Martland, 1993]
* Assembly of Terminal Performance Benchmarks. Throughout the FCUP
research of the 1970s and 1980s and through the resumption of service reliability
research in the 1990s, a database of yard performance has been assembled.
Measures of activity and performance include calibrated PMAKE functions, train
arrival and departure distributions, and, in some cases, cars handled per yard crew.
The benchmarks showed that the best-performing hump yards have yard times in
the 16-20 hour range, average-performing yards have yard times around 24 hours,
and poor-performing yards have average yard times at or above 28-30 hours.
[Martland, Little, Duffy, and Dong, 1994]
* In-Depth Study of Terminal Operations. MIT Researchers participated in a
detailed study of CSX Transportation's Radnor Yard in Nashville, TN, in October
1993. The study led to several insights about the relationships between train
arrival and departure times, yard staffing levels, cutoff lengths, and performance.
The research found that long wait times between processes like inspection,
humping, and train assembly contributed to long yard times, and that queues of
unprocessed inbound trains formed when many trains arrived when few inspectors
and hump crews were scheduled on duty. In addition, Michael Duffy applied SPC
techniques and root-cause analysis to missed connections and processing
performance at Radnor Yard. [Duffy, 1994 and Dong, 1994:2]
* Development of Insights in Service Differentiation. MIT doctoral candidate Oh
Kyoung Kwon developed a simulation model which illustrated the effects of three
strategies for prioritizing traffic for movement on trains, as could be easily
executed in high-demand intermodal operations. The strategies include a strict
priority-based assignment, assignment based on the cumulative waiting time in a
movement queue, and a hybrid strategy which assigned weights to priority and
time in the queue. The model showed that the three strategies resulted in different
trip time distributions for high-, middle-, and low-priority traffic. The model also
showed that logistics costs experienced by shippers of high-, medium-, and low-
value density traffic were significantly influenced by the train makeup rule in effect.
These findings imply that through adoption of a particular operating strategy,
railroads can choose to provide market segments with better or worse service, and
that the choice of operating strategy should be subject to knowledge of market
demand for different levels of service quality. [Kwon, 1994]
14
1.3 Other Significant Research in Railroad Operations
1.3.1 Optimization
Other academic research into design of the railroad operating plan has focused on
mathematical optimization of car-to-block assignments, block-to-train assignments, train
route and schedule creation, or tactical management problems such as locomotive- or
crew-to-train assignment or meet/pass planning. Such models usually minimize costs,
subject to coverage and capacity constraints. For compilations of work in optimization of
rail problems, see Assad (1980) and Armacost (1995).
One recent example of methodological development is Keaton's (1989) formulation of
car-to-block assignment, block-to-train assignment, and train route creation as a single
network design problem solved using Lagrangian relaxation and heuristic methods. The
formulation's strength was that it combined elements of the operating plan design problem
which had previously been solved separately, while adopting assumptions which did not
compromise the relevance of the solution. However, solution time was high even for an
very small sample network, suggesting that the methods presented could not be used for a
network the size of the CSXT merchandise network [see Section 2.3.3].
Acceptance of optimization methods for operating plan design has been limited. Lack
of interest in optimization on the part of railroads frustrates basic research, as
opportunities for feedback on independent research are limited, and independent research
often suffers from a lack of meaningful operating data. The rift between developers of
optimization methods and the potential railroad users may be explained by the fact that
simplifying assumptions made to reduce the problem of operating plan development to a
solvable core are not well accepted by rail service planners. Regardless of the cause, few
cases of implementation of optimization methods in operating plan design can be cited.
The outlook for operations research methods in the rail industry is being improved by
analysts employed by railroads, and by a small but growing cadre of software
development/consulting firms. At least four major railroads maintain operations research
staffs, some of which access dedicated programmers [see Section 2.3.2 for a discussion of
CSX Transportation's Operations Research Group]. As has happened in the airline and
telecommunications industries, new mathematical methods have arisen as by-products of
the effort to solve individual corporate problems. Unlike the work of the airline and
telecommunications industries, however, most of the methodological advances made at
railroads remain unpublished.
Development firms offer software tailored to specific rail problems such as meet/pass
planning and locomotive management. Such software promises short-term benefits for
railroads, while its sale also funds methodological development. One of the first of such
firms, ALK Associates, took over the maintenance and evolution of the ABM, TSS, and
SPM, used in this research [see Section 2.3.3], after initial development by MIT and the
AAR. Like work by internal operations research staffs, the core algorithms used in this
15
software are largely unpublished, although software manuals often describe solution
procedures conceptually.
1.3.2 Consulting Audit
Management consultants to the railroad industry have performed many detailed
analyses of railroad operations. One such report in the public domain documents railroad
terminal operating practices and performance in different regions of the country in 1977.
The report was produced by Booz, Allen & Hamilton for the FRA in fulfillment of Section
901(2) of the 4R act, in order to "identify potential economies and improvements in
performance that result from improvement in local and terminal operations." The report
studied four major terminals in different regions of the United States and developed cost
factors and work rates for terminal operations. The study then used manual analysis and
simulation to identify workload consolidation and service improvement opportunities.
At the time the report was produced, several factors hindered the service design
process from giving rise to efficient, high-performance terminal operations. First, detailed
car flow information for planning required substantial effort to generate. Second,
assignment of crews in yards was often based on historical practice rather than on
anticipated workload. Despite these barriers, the report identified major opportunities to
reduce car cycle time and yard crew requirements.
A finding relevant to the research presented in this thesis was that the majority of the
potential improvement in car cycle times was derived from improvements in execution
rather than from changes made to the terminal operating plan. This evidence reminds us
that a superior plan will not by itself provide superior performance. Research attempting
to improve performance by altering the operating plan, while by no means misguided,
should not divert attention from execution of the plan in the field, as execution appears to
influence performance most strongly.
1.4 Development of Alternative Operating Strategies
Recent audits of rail service quality [see Section 1.2.2] have identified railroad yards as
the chief culprits in causing merchandise service to be slow and unreliable. Therefore, the
alternative organizational strategies for railroad operations explored in this thesis attempt
to eliminate car handlings in yards, and render remaining yard activity more effective. The
alternative strategies would achieve this goal by reorganizing required classification
activity across facilities and in time, in an attempt to exploit critical traffic flow densities or
unused classification capacity, embodied in both trains and yards.
Three unconventional alternative operating strategies were originally articulated in an
October 1993 meeting of MIT Rail Group and Service Design personnel representing
CSX Transportation and Burlington Northern. Each alternative operating strategy takes a
different approach to meeting the goal of eliminating or improving the efficiency of car
handlings. The unconventional strategies examined in this thesis are:
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*i Local Pre-Blocking. Local trains would pre-block originating traffic. Originating
traffic would be blockswapped directly to through trains, without requiring any
additional processing in the origin terminal. Classification requirements would
decrease, allowing yard crew savings. Coordination of through and local train
schedules ("schedule sliding") would reduce trip times for originating traffic.
* Terminal Complexes. A yard would process a group of trains as at an airline
hub. Trains would arrive in a closely spaced group, then be processed on a tight,
coordinated schedule. The resulting blocks would be assembled into outbound
trains, which would depart in a closely spaced group. This coordinated processing
would occur twice per day, using the same bowl tracks.
* Tandem Humping. Two yards would operate a large-scale matrix switching
operation, building a very large number of small, finely classified blocks, destined
for individual local trains and needing no rehandling between the matrix and the
terminating local. These blocks would be pulled from the bowl in groups and
assembled into trains. Trains would swap groups of blocks repeatedly until the
blocks reached their target local trains.
Although the alternative operating strategies represent conceptual advances in the
organization of railroad operations, it was decided that the development and evaluation of
operating plans based on the new strategies should be facilitated not by developing new
network optimization algorithms, but should be facilitated instead by expert use of existing
railroad operations planning tools, in this case the ABM/TSS/SPM suite of models [see
Section 2.3.3].
Several factors made use of the ABM/TSS/SPM suite of models an obvious choice.
The strategies and their representative operating plans would appear more credible to
CSXT personnel if rendered using the ABM/TSS/SPM suite of tools. CSXT Operations
Reset staff have spent several years refining SPM data and modeling procedures, and used
the SPM successfully in an influential project in 1993 [see Section 2.3.4]. Interfaces
between CSXT train and traffic data and the models were in place, and expert SPM users
were available and interested in the research at both CSXT and MIT. Finally, there were
no insurmountable obstacles to representing the alternatives in the ABM/TSS/SPM
environment. Although the strategies embodied concepts beyond the scope of the models,
manual file maintenance and creation of artificial distinctions between certain types of
traffic enabled the strategies to be represented without compromise.
As the research and evaluation of the unconventional alternatives proceeded, a second
group of strategies arose. The second group of strategies to be embodied in hypothetical
operating plans was examined in order to test the hypothesis that there exist favorable
alternatives to existing methods of operations planning and execution which do not depart
from traditional railroad operating concepts. One such alternative offered the prospect of
improved performance through use of existing decision support tools in the plan
development process. The other alternative specifies a priori the degree of improvement
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in yard operations, then considers the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of attainment of the
specified levels of performance. The conventional alternatives to existing operations are:
* ABM-Generated Routing. The Automated Blocking Model (ABM) would be
used to generate classification tables which determine the blocks in which traffic
would move from origin to destination.
* Improved Hump Yard Performance. Hump yard performance, represented by
PMAKE parameters, would be improved. Two sets of altered PMAKE
parameters were tested. "A" parameters represented attainment of benchmark-
quality performance, while "B" parameters represented a moderate performance
improvement.
1.5 Research Chronology
The research proceeded as follows:
a. Shortly after the October 1993 meeting, CSX Transportation's Chicago-Nashville
corridor [see Section 2.2] was chosen as the network to which the alternative
strategies would be applied. A base case operating plan was readily available, and
CSXT's suite of operations planning tools could be used to create and evaluate the
hypothetical operating plans [see Section 2.3.3].
b. An initial presentation of the conceptual underpinnings of the Local Pre-Blocking,
Terminal Complex, and Tandem Humping strategies was made to CSXT Service
Design and Operations Research personnel in March 1994. Subsequent discussion
illuminated operating considerations and further refined the strategies.
c. Beginning in June 1994, hypothetical operating plans representing the Local Pre-
Blocking, Terminal Complex, and Tandem Humping strategies were developed.
CSXT's current operating plan was used as a launching pad for each alternative
plan, but considerable changes were made to the base plan in each case. Operating
plans were represented in the ABM/TSS/SPM format so that the SPM could be
used to evaluate the service and cost impacts of the changes [see Section 2.3.3].
However, because several of the strategies embodied concepts beyond the scope
of the ABM/TSS/SPM suite of tools, additional analysis of traffic flow data was
performed as a guide for plan changes. One researcher from MIT and three CSXT
Operations Research student interns were assigned to the project full-time, and the
research progress was monitored by Operations Research staff.
d. In July and August 1994, operating plans representing the Local Pre-Blocking and
Terminal Complex strategies were completed, simulated using the SPM, and
compared to the base case operating plan. Several plans representing the Tandem
Humping strategy were also simulated, but scrapped because of problems in the
plan development methodology and poor network performance.
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e. In August 1994 the results of the Local Pre-Blocking and Terminal Complex
operating plans were presented to Operations Research and Service Design staff
and group leaders. Tentative plans were made to implement Local Pre-Blocking,
but the Terminal Complex strategy was considered to radical a change to consider
in the immediate future.
f. Research continued in the fall of 1994 on the Tandem Humping, ABM-Generated
Routing, and Improved Yard Performance strategies. ABM-Generated Routing
and Improved Hump Yard Performance were represented in hypothetical operating
plans and compared to the base case in the same manner as were the
unconventional alternatives. Because the two conventional alternatives did not
depart from traditional railroad operating concepts, the process of developing the
representative hypothetical operating plans was much simpler and required little
"from-the-ground-up" analysis. For both conventional strategies, the modeled
representation of the base case provided a template for the new operating plans
which required only minor revisions. Plans representing ABM-Generated Routing
and Improved Yard performance were completed and modeled in November 1994.
g. A new method for developing the Tandem Humping operating plan was identified
in January 1995. The new method called for all traffic to be routed using the
ABM. Therefore, comparing performance of the Tandem Humping operating plan
to CSXT's historical base case would confound effects caused by the Tandem
Humping strategy and effects caused by the ABM. When the Tandem Humping
operating plan was completed in May 1995, it was compared to the ABM-
Generated Routing strategy.
1.6 Outline of the Thesis
This thesis is organized as follows:
* Chapter 2 describes CSX Transportation and its Chicago-Nashville corridor, its
companywide service design procedures, Operations Research group, decision
support capabilities, and the models used in this analysis.
* Chapter 3 describes the development and evaluation of operating plans
representing the three unconventional alternatives to current operations: Local
Pre-Blocking, Terminal Complexes, and Tandem Humping.
* Chapter 4 describes development and evaluation of operating plans representing
two additional, conventional alternatives to current operations, ABM-Generated
Routing and Improved Yard Performance.




CSX Transportation provided extensive assistance throughout the research, providing
highly detailed traffic flow and operating plan data, analytical and programming support,
and expert consultation from the Operations Research and Service Planning Groups. This
chapter provides background information about CSX Transportation's rail network, traffic
flows, service and financial performance.
2.1 Overview
CSX Transportation was formed in 1986 by a merger of the Seaboard System and
Chessie System railroads, which were themselves amalgamations of smaller railroads.
Major railroads whose routes eventually became part of the CSX Transportation network
included the Chesapeake & Ohio, Baltimore & Ohio, Western Maryland, Pere Marquette,
Seaboard Air Line, Atlantic Coast Line, Louisville & Nashville, Monon, Atlanta & West
Point, and Georgia Railroads. The series of mergers which created CSX Transportation
involved major route rationalization, but the current CSXT network still includes roughly
18,800 route miles and 32,800 track miles in 20 states, the District of Columbia, and
Ontario, Canada. Figure 2.1 shows the current CSXT rail network, with merchandise
traffic density as of November 1993.
Measured by revenue, CSXT and sister company CSX Intermodal together comprise
the largest railroad in the United States, earning a combined $5.17 billion in 1993.
Operating revenue for carload traffic has held between $4.37 and $4.49 billion between
1989 and 1993, while intermodal operating revenue has grown steadily, from $588 million
in 1989 to $793 million in 1993. The operating ratio, or operating cost divided by
operating revenue, improved from 86.7% to 82.9% from 1989 to 1993 for merchandise
traffic, and from 100% to 93.3% for intermodal traffic, indicating greater efficiency and
success of continuing efforts at cost control
CSXT serves a highly diverse customer base. While CSXT is the largest coal hauler in
the United States, CSXT also handles dense merchandise traffic throughout its network.
Figure 2.2 presents annual traffic flows by commodity for the years 1991-1993.
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CSXT Merchandise Traffic, November 1993 (434 mi)
Data Source: QBASR NOV93
Total Car Mile: 194681758 # Care: "4P74
* CARS
Figure 2.2: CSXT Coal and Merchandise Traffic Flows and Revenue, 1993*
1993 1992 1991
Carloads Avg. Rev. Carloads Avg. Rev. Carloads Avg. Rev.
Commodity (x 1,00()) per Car (x 1,00()) per Car (x 1,000) per Car
Automotive 326 $1,414 288 $1,434 265 $1,384
Chemicals 371 $1,757 356 $1,739 347 $1,692
Minerals 374 $888 345 $899 327 $887
Food & Consumer 166 $1,181 161 $1,217 164 $1,226
Agricultural Products 284 $1,151 264 $1,125 262 $1,126
Metals 258 $941 225 $973 199 $1,005
Forest Products 435 $1,()16 441 $1,016 439 $968
Phosphate & Fertilizer 423 $605 457 $586 475 $566
Coal 1,566 $870 1,760 $889 1,816 $866
Total 4,203 $1,016 4,297 $1,008 4,294 $979
Intermodal 1,14() $612 NA NA NA NA
Source: CSX Corporation Annual Report, 1993
2.2 The Chicago-Nashville Corridor
CSXT's Chicago-Nashville corridor experiences heavy traffic in most of CSXT's
merchandise commodity groups. Large volumes of grain originate on the corridor, with
harvest season providing heaviest volumes, but movements to and from storage occurring
throughout the year. Grain-related products such as fertilizer and insecticide terminate in
moderate volumes on the corridor. Industrial areas around Evansville and Mt. Vernon,
IN, including several rail/barge transloading facilities receive grain, coal, steel, and other
high-tonnage commodities.
In addition, the corridor is significant originator and terminator of manufactured
products, steel, and chemicals, again from large industrial areas near Evansville and Mt.
Vernon, IN, Lafayette and Nucor, IN, and Danville, IL. The corridor also hosts overhead
Note that revenue per car figures are not indexed by mileage. Contribution per car or per car mile should not be
inferred from the information given.
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merchandise traffic between the east and southeast and interchanges at Chicago, East St.
Louis, and Memphis. In addition to merchandise traffic, three intermodal trains between
Chicago and the southeast traverse the corridor each day, and the corridor originates and
terminates several unit coal trains each day at local mines and utilities.
Several major yards lie on the Chicago-Nashville corridor. Radnor Yard in Nashville
is a 60-track hump yard which processed between 1600 and 20()00 cars per day in 1993.
Howell Yard in Evansville is a 15-track flat yard which processed between 500 and 7()()
cars per day in 1993. Much of this traffic was originating or terminating traffic and
assembly and breakdown of unit grain trains. Brewer Yard in Danville is an 8-track flat
yard which serves as a busy industrial support yard, and is the site of several key
blockswaps between Chicago interchange trains to and from Nashville and Waycross, GA.
Additional blockswapping between and classification of corridor trains occurs at Barr
Yard in Chicago. Additional track space for car storage or blockswapping exists at
Vincennes and Terre Haute, IN.
Between the yards, mainline is primarily single track with sidings between 4,500 and
16,000 feet spaced every five to fifteen miles. Double track main line exists for
approximately 10() miles north from Nashville to Amqui, and approximately 65 miles south
from Chicago to Woodland Junction, IL, owned and operated jointly with the Union
Pacific. Total distance from Chicago to Nashville is roughly 415 miles. In addition,
distance from Chicago to Lafayette is 95 miles and Lafayette to Terre Haute is 91 miles.
Mainline signaling is CTC, while branch lines from Evansville and Danville are controlled
by DTC block authority.
Since 1993, CSXT's Chicago-Nashville corridor has been the focus of a major service
reliability drive. The vision pursued by CSXT in the service reliability drive was that if
operations adhered more closely to the operating plan each day, service reliability would
improve and operating costs would decrease. Tactical adjustments to the operating plan
were thought to increase costs and degrade service because the downstream effects of
tactical changes were not well understood. In addition, the lack of adherence to train
schedules was thought to cause inefficient and ineffective yard operations because it
forced yard managers to operate each shift without a medium or long-range planning
horizon. Section 2.3.4 describes an analysis which provided analytical backing for these
views and also provided some methodological and data groundwork for the research
presented here.
As part of the service reliability drive, a series of measurements were developed and
disseminated company-wide as the Service Reliability Report Card. Figure 2.4 illustrates a
Service Reliability Report Card. Numbers have been omitted from the report card to
protect confidential information.
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Figure 2.3: Service Reliability Report Cards, November 1994 and November 1993
START ('F REPTCARD105')27 ->
SERVICE RELIABILITY REPORT CARD
C'HICAGO - NASHVILLE CORRIDOR
WEEK ENDING: NOV 11, 1994
I THIS I LAST I I 4TH I 3RD
MEASUREMENT WEEK ! WEEK I OAL I -T-D I UARTER
SAFETY: I I
PERSONAL INJURY
DERAILMENTS I I I
TRAINS PERFORMANCE: I
()N-TIME
oN-TIME +/- HRS. I
TRAINS RELIEVED H/S I I
TERMINAL:
RIGHT CAR/TRAIN
RIGHT BLO-CK / .RDER I I I I
TERMINAL HUR- I I I
-0 HOUR CARS
SETBACK H(JR I I I
CUSTOMER: I I I I
CAR SCHED PERF. I I
CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS I I I
CUSTOMER SWITCHING I
COST: I
TE LABOR/CAR PRCESSDI I I I I
CAR EXP/CAR PROCESSEDI I I
«<<<<<<<< ENE)D F MESSA(GE 
Beginning in January 1994, CSXT began pursuing a major reengineering effort in
conjunction with Mercer Management Consulting. Again, the Chicago-Nashville corridor
was the test bed for operating changes recommended by the reengineering team, and as a
result of the reengineering effort, a team of operating officers was hand-picked to oversee
the day-to-day operation of the corridor. Regular root-cause analysis of operating
problems was instituted, and all elements of the Chicago-Nashville corridor operating plan
were subjected to detailed analysis. Service improvement and cost reduction began slowly
but are now reported to be significant. Customer response to changes has been highly
favorable, as indicated by Q1/1995 traffic volumes, which exceeded optimistic forecasts.
Because of its heavy originating, terminating, and overhead merchandise traffic, and
because of the detailed understanding of operations developed through the service
reliability and reengineering efforts, the Chicago-Nashville corridor was a logical choice
on which to model alternative strategies aimed at improving the performance of carload
merchandise traffic.
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2.3 The Service Design Process, Decision Support Tools, and Modeling
Conventions
2.3.1 Service Design and Maintenance of the Merchandise Operating Plan
CSXT's Service Design group is responsible for developing and maintaining the
elements of the operating plan that concern carload merchandise operations. These
include train routes and schedules, car-to-block and block-to-train assignments, yard
cutoffs, and customer switching assignments for local trains. Service Design personnel
also participate in unit train and intermodal planning and scheduling, but because the
alternative operating strategies discussed in this thesis are directed toward the carload
network, those functions will not be addressed here.
Train schedules are developed with customer and interchange commitments and yard
processing in mind. Service planners do not use an algorithm to determine train routes
and schedules, but instead treat each train individually, and attempt to create routes and
schedules tailored to confront issues at each yard or activity point.
Most service planners have operating backgrounds, and are responsible for the
operating plan in territory that they formerly managed as trainmasters or superintendents.
This experience gives them an intimate understanding of the operating characteristics of
their particular region, including constraints or advantages that are hard to quantify, such
as line congestion or unusual difficulties in yarding trains. However, it is the opinion of
some that this knowledge and background leads to a narrow focus on tailoring the
operating plan to mitigate individual problems at the expense of larger network
efficiencies.
CSXT's data systems for representing the operating plan are highly detailed and the
operating plan requires much manual effort to maintain. For instance, at each yard, car-to-
block assignment tables must be manually maintained, and at blockswapping locations, a
yard system with classification tables must be maintained. If a station is to be added to a
train's route, all subsequent stations must be rekeyed, and if arrival or departure times
change, all changes must be recalculated and rekeyed manually.
Because changing the operating plan is a complex task, sweeping changes to train
schedules and yard activity are rarely made except for trackwork curfews. If major
trackwork is required on a subdivision, train arrival and departure times are altered in
order to create a work window of sufficient length, usually between six and 12 hours per
day. Rerouting traffic from trains affected by the curfew to alternate trains is usually
considered only if the traffic is highly service sensitive. For other traffic, service impacts
are predicted and communicated along with the plan change.
Routine maintenance of the operating plan is performed in response to fluctuations in
traffic volume or in order to correct individual operating or service problems. A typical
change to the operating plan and the rationale for the change is shown in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.4: Sample Notices of Changes to the CSXT Merchandise Operating Plan
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Service planners do not have major decision support capability at their disposal.
Visualization tools are available through the Princeton Transportation Network Model
(PTNM) flow maps, and databases such as the Waybill Movement System (WMS) and
QBASE [Kraft, 1992] provide detailed traffic flow data organized by train, yard, origin,
destination, car type, and so on. However, these databases contain only raw data, and the
data's usefulness depends on the service planners' skill at manipulating and interpreting it.
CSXT's Operations Research group [see Section 2.3.2] has built several recommending
elements into a series of menus for manipulating QBASE data, including the Blocking
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Opportunities Report, which identifies opportunities to build bypass blocks as traffic
volumes fluctuate.
When this research began, service planners received no formal training. However, one
of the early findings of CSXT's service design reengineering effort was that there was little
common understanding of the process of maintaining the operating plan, and that a
comprehensive training program would make service planners more proficient and speed
the service design process. During the summer of 1994 a formal training program was
instituted. Current service planners were encouraged to attend, and new additions to the
service design staff would automatically receive the training.
2.3.2 Operations Research
CSXT's Operations Research Group has two primary objectives:
* To provide internal consulting and analytical support for projects in conjunction
with many CSXT departments, employing a variety of techniques from
straightforward statistical or cost analysis through advanced optimization methods.
* To create a unified framework for planning railroad operations through the
development and use of analytical and optimization models which address every
facet of railroad operations.
Analysts' time is divided between pursuit of the two objectives in roughly equal
proportions. Operations Research staff members work closely with several departments,
including locomotive planning, transportation operations planning, finance, marketing, and
service design groups. Full-time members of the Operations Research Group include an
assistant vice president, senior director, and three directors. They are supported by a
manager and eight full-time programmers from CSX Technology, CSX Transportation's
information technology affiliate. Operations Research also employs eight to fourteen
student interns at any one time, each working a minimum of 20 hours per week.
In order to provide car-move, payroll, and other types of input data from CSXT's
mainframe systems to Operations Research models, extensive effort has been devoted to
creating front-end data-preparation routines for several models including the ABM and
SPM [see Section 2.3.3]. In contrast, efforts to create post-processors which translate
model output into the control systems containing the operating plan have been far more
limited. This reflects the traditional use of Operations Research models as long-range,
broad-brush analytical tools rather than as potential generators of the operating plan. As
Operations Research experiences increasing pressure to generate concrete operating
recommendations, the development of new models or of interfaces that load model output
to real time control systems is increasing.
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System Architecture of CSXT's Operations Research Models
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Members of the Operations Research staff have recently developed several detailed
models from scratch, both in an effort to build analytic capability and in support of specific
projects. Models include a block-to-train assignment model, used in this research, a
locomotive-to-train assignment algorithm, used in development of the Chicago-Nashville
corridor operating plan, and several models for simulating and planning yard operations,
used in analyses of several major CSXT yards.
2.3.3 The ABM/TSS/SPM Suite of Models for Operating Plan Development
A number of commercially-available decision-support tools reside in the Operations
Research Group's modeling framework. Three models among these, the Automated
Blocking Model, Train Scheduling System, and Service Planning Model, were central to
the research presented in this thesis, as they served as the principal platform for creating
and evaluating the hypothetical operating plans representing each alternative strategy.
The models use a standard set of files which contain information about the railroad
operating plan. Core files used in defining the network, operating plan, and traffic flows
include:
* Node file: contains information on each yard in the network, including yard
capacity and PMAKE functions for several types of yard operations and traffic
types. Nodes which represent agglomerations of customers or junctions instead of
yards are assigned system average PMAKE functions. However, neither
classification nor blockswapping are explicitly prohibited at those yards.
* Link file: contains information on each link in the network, including line speed
and mileage, and required HP/ton.
* Traffic flow file: contains traffic flow information, including origin and destination
node, traffic type or class, average daily volume, and information about the time
distribution of traffic origination and termination.
* Block file: contains a list of all blocks built in the network, information on which
traffic classes each block may carry, traffic destinations assigned to each block, and
any trains eligible to carry the block.
* Blockswap file: contains information on all blocks swapped between trains,
including the block number, swap location, and train(s) which may pick up the
block.
* Train file: contains information on trains, including arrival, departure, and dwell
times for each node in the train's route, the days of operation of each train, and the
types of activity performed at each node.
One of the goals of the research was to identify the value of using existing,
commercially available decision-support tools for service planning. While the three
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models used in this research have existed for years as the result of an industry-wide
development effort, and were intended to be used as a suite for developing, maintaining,
and evaluating operating plans, few cases are known in which they have been applied and
their recommendations used other than in a strategic study capacity. This may be
attributable to the difficulties of model calibration and input data generation, leading to
unreliable preliminary results, or a general mistrust of abstraction of the railroad on the
part of traditional operations planners.
Therefore, rather than attempt to develop a next generation of decision support tools
for service planning, the research attempts to make fuller use of the current generation of
tools. Over the course of the research, many issues in modeling the railroad network were
identified, and discussion of the issues may serve to direct the creation and refinement of
the next generation of railroad operations planning decision support tools.
2.3.3.1 The Automated Blocking Model
The Automated Blocking Model (ABM) performs several tasks related to developing
and maintaining a railroad blocking plan. These include routing cars from origin to
destination using available blocks, and identifying cars for which complete routes cannot
be generated.
In this research, the ABM was used to assign cars to new or revised blocks that were
created for each alternative operating plan. Application of the ABM ranged from very
limited use, in developing the Local Pre-Blocking operating plan, to a complete
regeneration of CSXT's car-to-block assignments or classification tables, for the ABM-
Generated Routing operating plan. In each application of the ABM, the ABM's Manu-
Block module was used to flow cars from origin to destination over their least-cost routes,
and complete partial routes for cars whose block assignments changed under an alternative
strategy.
The Manu-Block module calculates car routing costs using costs per car mile, car
hour, and car handling. Each road or yard link has a time cost generated from the
traversal or expected handling time, while road links have an additional mileage cost and
yard links have an additional car handling cost. Traversal of this network is with a
modified version of Dijkstra's label-setting shortest-path algorithm. Block capacity is
limited in cases where traffic may be diverted to alternative routes, but if no alternate
route exists for the traffic flows using a block, then the block's capacity is relaxed. The
Manu-Block module treats yard capacity in a similar fashion, but yard capacities were not
calibrated for this research.
Several of the alternative strategies were envisioned as means of creating more blocks,
and thus reducing intermediate handling, and in some cases the creation of new blocks
required existing blocks to be eliminated. However, the ABM neither creates nor deletes
blocks in order to improve performance or reduce costs. New blocks were created and
existing blocks eliminated manually for each alternative plan, often as a result of analysis
beyond the ABM's scope. One of the directions for further study identified by this
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research is development a model capable of recommending the blocks that should be built
at each yard under a variety of operating strategies.
2.3.3.2 The Train Scheduling System
The Train Scheduling System (TSS) is the least used of the three models in the
ABM/TSS/ SPM suite. It was originally intended to perform a wide variety of functions
involving train route and schedule creation and block-to-train assignment, but its use in
this research was limited to sliding train arrival and departure times to minimize excess car
dwell time at yards.
The TSS-Times module uses a heuristic procedure to slide train arrival and departure
times to minimize excess car dwell time in yards, maintaining existing train dwell times at
stations. Given a set of trains, block volumes, and block-to-train assignments, TSS-Times
proceeds by fixing the schedules of trains with the highest to lowest connecting volumes.
Each successive train is coordinated with the trains whose schedules are already fixed, in
each case minimizing the number of car-hours expended in yards. Several iterations of this
procedure are executed, and the resulting train arrival and departure times are returned in
a revised train schedule file.
While this feature was not used in the research, users may also specify either that
existing train dwell times at stations be maintained, or that station dwell times be
determined by TSS-Times. TSS-Times generates station dwell times based on user input
parameters which reflect fixed and variable time requirements of each station stop. A
fixed amount of time is added for each station stop, while a variable increment is added for
each block that is to be picked up or set off.
2.3.3.3 The Service Planning Model
The Service Planning Model (SPM) preceded the ABM and TSS in development and
does not contain optimizing elements. The SPM distributes the flow of traffic over the
railroad network and calculates origin-destination trip times, reliability, and resources used
in the movement of traffic.
The SPM introduces variability into the movement of traffic by distributing cars among
possible outbound connections at yards according to PMAKE functions calibrated for
each yard. PMAKE functions describe the probability that cars will make connections
given an amount of time available for classification, and are discussed in more detail in
Martland (1982) and in Section 4.2. Because trip time variability is modeled in the yards,
routing traffic through better-performing yards, or changing the amount of time available
for connections will impact the SPM's representation of O/D performance. The train or
block on which traffic is carried does not impact performance unless the user alters
multipliers associated with the individual block or train.
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2.3.3.4 Current Use of the Models
At the end of each month, Operations Research runs the SPM to provide a picture of
rail service during the month. The data sources used to generate model input files include
QBASE, which provides car move data used to generate traffic flows, car-to-block, and
block-to-train assignments, the TRAIN() file, which provides data on through train routes
and schedules for the previous month, and payroll data, which provides similar data for
local trains and the few yard switchers included in the model.
Monthly simulation of CSXT's large network yields a tremendous amount of model
output and post-processed reports. A single SPM simulation of the CSXT network yields
94 MB of output reports'. Much of the information contained in SPM output files is
routine and is not reviewed on a regular basis. It is not a goal of Operations Research to
manage individual O/D pairs using the SPM simulations. Operations Research staff
members do not currently monitor the monthly model output as it is generated, or track
month-to-month changes in simulated performance. However, model output files are
frequently used for reference in relation to "what-if' studies performed by Operations
Research.
Each month, input files for the ABM and TSS are generated from QBASE and
TRAIN( data, in a process quite similar to the process which produces SPM input files.
However, the ABM and TSS models are not currently run on a monthly basis, being
reserved instead for special studies of individual terminals or line segments. Studies
performed during 1994 include estimations of the effects of generating the tag table at
several CSXT terminals using the ABM, and rescheduling train arrivals and departures at a
major terminal to eliminate excess dwell time using the TSS.
As CSXT traffic grows, and as Operations Research improves the data capture
process which builds the SPM input files, the size of the SPM simulation of operations
increases. The operating plan contains more trains and blocks, and the traffic flow file
contains more OlD pairs. Figure 2.6 illustrates the growth of the simulation between
October 1993 and January 1995. If data from 199() through 1992 were still available, the
increase in simulation size would be even more apparent. A comparison with the
simulations used in the B&M and Santa Fe case studies further emphasizes the large size
of the current CSXT simulations.
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Recent simulations of current operations are among the largest railroad simulations
ever performed. Periodically, the SPM must be recompiled with larger array bounds in
order to model the larger network, a task that sometimes requires considerable effort by a
member of the Technology support staff and uses considerable mainframe CPU time.
CSX Technology representatives have indicated that some design limits of the SPM have
been exceeded several times, and that further expansion of the SPM model size may be
infeasible. However, as traffic continues to grow, as the sophistication of the operating
plan increases, the effort required to produce the monthly simulations of the network will
continue to increase. In addition, if CSX were to merge with another railroad or
otherwise increase the size or complexity of its network, the capability of the SPM to
simulate the entire system in a single run would be exhausted.
As the network increases in size and complexity, several modeling strategies may be
pursued to overcome constraints on the SPM's simulation size. An option that would
require only minor changes to current programs is to model intermodal and coal
operations separate from grain, automotive, and general merchandise. Considerably more
effort would be required to rewrite the SPM to incorporate larger caches or dynamically-
allocated memory. If such effort is devoted to creating network modeling and decision
support tools, that effort may be more effectively directed to creating a new tool from
scratch, which maintains the SPM's strength of simulating system variability but which
incorporates advances in computing power and information presentation that have been
made since the SPM was developed.
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2.3.4 The Base Case and the Plan Integrity Project
In the current research, in order to define the benefits of adopting alternative operating
strategies, SPM simulations of each alternative strategy were compared to an SPM
simulation of a base case representing the current operating plan. The base case used
throughout the analysis represents CSXT operations in November 1993 under the
assumption that the railroad ran according to the operating plan. November 1993 was
chosen as the base month because of its heavy merchandise traffic, and because November
1993 was a point of particular success in CSXT's Chicago-Nashville service reliability
drive.
The original representation of CSXT operations as specified in the operating plan, as
well as the means of comparison and assessment of operating plan, were developed during
the Plan Integrity Project of 1993, in which this researcher participated extensively. The
goal of the Plan Integrity Project was to demonstrate the effects on cost and service that
would result if CSXT operated according to plan, and ceased to allow operating managers
to make tactical decisions to annul or consolidate trains, run extra trains, or run trains off
of their normal schedules.
The Plan Integrity Project engendered a methodological advance in simulating CSXT
operations using the SPM that was pivotal to the current research. Before the Plan
Integrity Project, Operations Research had used the SPM to simulate operations only as
they had occurred in reality during the previous month, without regard to whether
operations generally followed or deviated from the plan. Because the intent of the Plan
Integrity Project was to compare the operating plan to history, a means had to be devised
to simulate execution of the operating plan in a way that would be comparable to the
ongoing simulations of history. Likewise, the current research requires a simulation of the
operating plan as a basis for comparison of plans representing new operating strategies.
The objective of simulating the operating plan was achieved by substituting data
sources in the SPM input file creation process. In order to simulate historical operation,
O/D traffic flow and block information was taken from the QBASE file of car move data,
while train information was taken from the TRAIN() file of train movements. PMAKE
functions were calibrated from actual yard times. To simulate the operating plan, actual
O/D flows were used, but block information was taken from freight car schedules
reformatted to the QBASE data format. Train inlformation was taken from a monthly file
of train profiles, which included days operated and arrival and departure times for each
station. Finally, PMAKE functions were calibrated from the train-to-train connections at
each yard specified by the fireight car scheduling system, which were read from the freight
car schedule file as well.
Once the data gathering process was completed and tested, the comparison of the
operating plan to historical operations in moving a common set of traffic flows could be
made. Important findings from the Plan Integrity Project included the fact that, while trip
time varied little between planned and unplanned operation, traffic moved with
considerably greater reliability if the plan was executed than if tactical adjustments were
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made. The operating plan called for fewer train starts and fewer train miles than were
observed in the historical case, but certain trains in planned operations would be
overloaded on a daily basis because CSXT's freight car scheduling system does not have
the capability to consider train capacity limits.
The quantitative and qualitative assessment of the operating plan brought about by the
Plan Integrity Project was replicated in the current research both for the base case
operating plan and for the plans representing alternative operating strategies. While this
thesis spares much of the detail found in SPM output, the investigation could be extended
to assess the impact of alternative operating strategies, including the Plan Integrity
Project's example of planned vs. unplanned operation, on every individual traffic flow,
block, and train.
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3 Unconventional Alternatives to Current Operations
In October 1993 MIT researchers met with John Orrison, CSXT's AVP-Operations
Research, and Gordon Trafton, BN's GM-Network Design, for the purposes of
articulating advanced concepts in network and service design, identifying potential benefits
of operating plans based on these ideas at a conceptual level, and creating a timetable for
in-depth research into the performance impacts of advanced operating plans.
The meeting culminated in the identification of three alternative strategies for
organizing and executing operations: Local Pre-Blocking, Terminal Complexes, and
Tandem Humping. These strategies were considered unconventional because they entail
significant changes in the roles of yards and/or trains and depart from traditional methods
and current industry practices for assigning traffic to blocks and trains, for scheduling
trains, and for organizing and scheduling yard activities.
Common elements in the three strategies justify expectation of performance
improvement. All strategies intend to eliminate car handlings from the system or to
improve the speed and efficiency of those handlings that could not be avoided. The
alternative strategies also intended to minimize yard dwell time in excess of that required
for classification, through blocking changes and sliding of train arrival and departure
times.
The established decision support platform of the ABM, TSS, and SPM were used to
create operating plans based on the new strategies and compare them to a base case
representing CSXT's merchandise operating plan in November 1993. While the ABM,
TSS, and SPM were not created with the concepts represented by Local Pre-Blocking,
Terminal Complexes, and Tandem Humping in mind, these decision support tools are
sufficiently flexible to allow each strategy to be represented in an operating plan.
During the spring of 1994, discussions between Larry Shughart of CSXT Operations
Research and MIT identified and refined methods of abstracting and modeling the
alternative strategies. In the summer of 1994, modeling proceeded full-time, supported by
CSXT Operations Research facilities, data, and personnel. By the end of August,
modeling of the Local Pre-Blocking and Terminal Complex strategies was complete.
While substantial effort had been devoted to the Tandem Humping strategy, results
remained unsatisfactory. A new method for creating and evaluating the Tandem Humping
strategy was devised in the fall of 1994 and pursued until May 1995.
The remainder of this chapter describes the Local Pre-Blocking, Terminal Complex,
and Tandem Humping strategies in detail, and provides exhibits of anticipated changes in
network operations and performance. Sections devoted to each of the three strategies
explain the conceptual underpinnings of each strategy, describe the hypothetical operating




Ordinarily, originating cars are pulled from industries by local trains or yard switchers,
then returned to a serving yard, where they are switched into outbound blocks that are
picked up by through trains. Traffic typically spends between 15 and 3() hours in the
origin serving yard, as a minimum of 1()-15 hours is necessary to ensure that switching can
be completed before the traffic must depart on a through train.
The Local Pre-Blocking strategy attempts to eliminate dwell time in the origin serving
yard by dictating that local trains block cars when pulling them from industries. Cars in
blocks built by local trains would be immediately available for pickup by through trains,
and would no longer require classification at the serving yard. As a result, switching
requirements at the serving yard would decrease, possibly allowing a reduction in yard
crews, and car hours would he saved, as originating traffic would be blockswapped from
local trains directly to road trains.
When local trains build blocks, the reliability of the connection between local and road
trains is improved because originating cars no longer require processing in the origin
serving yard. However, if cars are still scheduled for 2()-30 hour dwell times at the origin
serving yard, regardless of the fact that they are no longer classified there, then O-D trip
time will not decrease, and Local Pre-Blocking will only be a means of yard crew
reduction. Therefore, in creating the Local Pre-Blocking operating plan we took the
additional step of sliding train arrival and departure times in order to reduce the
connection times between local trains and their through train connections.
Figure 3.1 presents an example of the potential impact of Local Pre-Blocking on the
time required to move a car through the origin serving yard to a connection with a through
train. Although the example is a hypothetical one, the times illustrated for the yarding,
classification, and pickup processes reflect typical time requirements at serving yards.
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Figure 3.1: Dwell Time in the Origin Serving Yard (Best Case Reduction)
Case I: No Local Pre-Blocking
Total Dwell Time: 23 Hours
Hours
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Case II: Local Pre-Blocking Without Schedule Sliding
Total Dwell Time: 23 Hours
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
1 1 1 I I I I I I I I I I
Case III: Local Pre-Blocking With Schedule Sliding
Total Dwell Time: 5.5 Hours
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24
I I I I I I I I I I I I I
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Legend 1
Time consumed in yarding Time added to ensure reliable
inbound local train connection to through train





3.1.2 Creating the Local Pre-Blocking Operating Plan
In order to create and evaluate a hypothetical operating plan which incorporated local
pre-blocking, the following steps were performed:
a. Pre-block destinations were chosen by tabulating traffic originated by local trains
working out of a serving yard by subsequent block, then choosing between three
and five of the highest-volume destinations as pre-block destinations [see Figure
3.2]. Each pre-block made by local trains working out of a serving yard
corresponded to a block that was already maintained at the serving yard, in order
to ensure that track or block-building limitations in the serving yard would not be
compromised by pre-blocking.
b. 35 blocks were added to 22 local trains at nine locations [see Figure 3.3].
Additions were made to the local pre-blocking block and blockswap files to reflect
the new pre-blocking arrangements.
c. Traffic originating at network nodes served by pre-blocking local trains was
assigned to new pre-blocks using the ABM.2
d. Pre-blocks made by local trains were assigned to connecting through trains
manually. ()ften, several local trains working out of a serving yard would make
pre-blocks for the same destinations. These blocks were each assigned to the same
through train, so that only one train per day would pick up each pre-block. Yard
congestion would be minimized because block-swapping activity would be
restricted to specified tracks. For example, at Evansville, three local trains each
make Chicago, Louisville, and Nashville pre-blocks. Each local train's Chicago
pre-block is assigned to the same Chicago-bound train, each local train's Louisville
pre-block is assigned to the same Louisville-bound train, and each local train's
Nashville pre-block is assigned to the same Nashville-bound train. At Evansville
yard, each local train could, for example, set off the Chicago pre-block in track 1,
the Louisville pre-block in track 2, and the Nashville pre-block in track 3.
e. At this point, SPM simulations were performed to demonstrate the benefits of pre-
blocking without any schedule alterations. Improvements in this case would be
attributable to more reliable connections at the serving yard, including savings of
24 hours for some traffic, and to more efficient routings generated by the ABM.
Two simulations were performed. One simulation used a traffic flow file
consisting only of the traffic targeted for improvement by local pre-blocking. This
included all traffic originating at points served by pre-blocking local trains. The
other simulation used an uncut traffic flow file. The purpose of performing two
simulations was to demonstrate percentage changes in performance for the subset
of traffic targeted for improvement by local pre-blocking, while also capturing any
ancillary benefits to traffic not targeted for improvement by the blocking changes.
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car dwell time by dictating that all train-to-train connections at yards are scheduled
for the least possible dwell time in excess of the time required for classification.
g. A second pair of SPM simulations were performed to demonstrate additional
benefits that would result from sliding of train arrival and departure times to better
coordinate pre-blocking local trains with their connecting through trains.
Improvements in this case would be attributable to more reliable connections and
reduced dwell time in serving yards, as well as more efficient routings generated by
the ABM.
3.1.3 Examples




Evansville J724 J731 J734 Total Pre-Block? Connection
LOU 30 18 235 283 Y R561
NAS 32 34 75 141 Y R591
CHGt 8 2 88 98t Yt R592
IHRCt 34 64 98t Nt
BVL 95 95 N
DAN 1 64 65 N
ATL 9 38 1 48 N
ATK 17 27 44 N
GUT 6 24 30 N
SKI 17 4 21 N
S05 17 17 N
S04 2 13 15 N
HFW 1 9 1() N
WAX 6 1 7 N
BOI 3 1 4 N
ANC 1 2 3 N
WANS 3 3 N
2 Codes 2 cars each 4 N
6 Codes I car each 6 N
Total Volume, Pre-Blocked Traffic 522
Total Volume, Unblocked Traffic 570(
*Source: CSX Transportation WMS Database, November 1993
tNote that IHRC traffic was not pre-hlocked because the traffic is delivered to an
interchange connection in Evansville, and is not handled by through trains.
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Figure 3.2 illustrates a sample form used to determine which pre-blocks would be
made by local trains working out of CSXT's Evansville yard. The highest-volume three
classifications have been designated pre-blocks, and each has been assigned to a
connecting through train.
The data in Figure 3.2 is both encouraging and frustrating from a service design
perspective. Some classifications have regular, high volume, and could receive all the
benefits of pre-blocking, but many low-volume, less predictable classifications are also
present in the data. While such incidental traffic fills trains and brings in revenue, it
confounds efforts to improve efficiency and reliability through proactive operating plan
design. In this example, less than 50)% of the cars listed are subject to pre-blocking. The
remainder will still require switching at the serving yard into a wide variety of
classifications. Of these additional classifications, few have volume sufficient to provoke
service- or efficiency-enhancing tailoring of the operating plan.
Because of concerns about added complexity due to Local Pre-Blocking, several
standards were observed in the creation of the Local Pre-Blocking operating plan. In
order to ensure that no additional track space would be required in the serving yard, local
trains would only build blocks that are already maintained at the yard. For example, all of
the block codes listed in the left-hand column in Figure 3.2 are maintained regularly at
Evansville Yard. The number of classifications maintained at any yard would not increase
due to Local Pre-Blocking. Blocks designated as pre-blocks could be assigned to easy-to-
access yard tracks, so that local trains would not cause undue disruption when yarding
their trains, even though they would have to switch pre-blocks into several tracks rather
than simply tying down the train on a single yard track.
In addition, to simplify the management of pre-blocking local trains and reduce their
impact on yard operations, all trains at a serving yard would build the same pre-blocks.
This requirement may reduce the number of cars that could avoid classification, because
each local train would not necessarily be pre-blocking the highest possible number of cars.
For example, Figure 3.2 illustrates that the top three block destinations for all
Evansville local trains combined, LOU, NAS, and CHG, have been chosen as pre-blocks.
However, the individual local trains J724, J731, and J734 would have been able to pre-
block more traffic if their pre-blocks were determined according to their individual
consists. For example, the top block codes for cars originating on J734 are not LOU,
NAS, and CHG (398 cars), but instead are LOU, BVL, and CHG (418 cars). Likewise,
the top three destinations for cars originating on J731 are not LOU, NAS, and CHG (54
cars), but instead are NAS, IHRC, and ATL (106 cars). However, it was deemed
preferable at this stage to pre-block fewer cars in order to simplify operations and
management at pre-blocking serving yards.
Figure 3.3 lists all pre-blocking local trains and the blocks assigned to each train. In
addition to the pre-blocks listed, each train can return traffic not conforming to the pre-
block destinations to the serving yard for classification, as would be done for all traffic in
the absence of pre-blocking.
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Figure 3.3: Pre-Blocks and Block-to-Train Assignments Added in the Local Pre-
Blocking Operating Plan
Local Local Train Route
Serving Yard Location Train ID and/or Activity New Pre-Blocks
Bruceton, TN M791 Bruceton-Jackson turn Memphis
M792 Br.-New Johnsonville turn Memphis-MP
M793 Bruceton-Dresden turn Nashville
Danville, IL J706 Danville switcher Chicago
J707 Danville-Terre Haute turn Decatur (J's only)
J714 Danville-Watseka turn Evansville
R593/R594 2-day Danville-Decatur Nashville
turn Waycross
Evansville, IN J724 Evansville-Atkinson turn Chicago
J73()/J731 MTh 2-day Venedy turn Louisville
J732 Wed. only Evl-Mac. turn Nashville
J734 Evl.-Mt.Vernon turn
Flora, IL J7()() Flora/Illinois sub local Vincennes
E. St. Louis (ALS)
Cincinnati
Lafayette, IN J77() Lafayette-Indy turn Chicago
J771 Laf.-Greencastle turn Evansville
R598/R599 2-day Laf.-Chicago turn Nashville
Cincinnati




Mt. Vernon, IN J7()4 Mt. Vernon switcher Same as Evansville
(blocks swapped to
J731, J732, J734)
Terre Haute, IN J7()8 Terre Haute switcher Evansville
Nashville
Vincennes, IN J7()2 Vincennes-Young turn Evansville
J7()9 Vincennes-Ft. Branch turn Nashville
J71() Vin./Illinois sub switcher Cincinnati
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3.1.4 Changes in Performance
Performance of traffic handled by pre-blocking local trains was altered in three ways:
* Classification at the origin serving yard was eliminated, as pre-blocked traffic was
blockswapped from the originating local to a through train.
· The ABM chose the least-cost routes for traffic moving in the new local pre-
blocks, improving some cars whose previous routings were inefficient.
* Changes in train arrival and departure times decreased connection time for some
traffic. Although the net effect of changing arrival and departure times was
positive, some O-D flows improved while others deteriorated. Furthermore, some
excess dwell time was eliminated at points other than at pre-blocking serving yards
because through trains whose arrival and departure times were slid were affected
over their entire routes, and not only at pre-blocking serving yards.
Figure 3.5: Changes in Trip Time, Reliability, and Activity due to Local Pre-
Blocking, With and Without Schedule Sliding
1% of Cars Car Car Car
Average Arriving Within Handlings Hours Miles
Dock-Dock +/- 24 Hours of Saved Per Saved Saved
Strategy Trip Time Average Day Per Day Per Day
Base Case 94 Hrs. 79% 0 () 0
Pre-Blocking Alone 92 Hrs. 8()% 147 864 4020
Pre-Blocking with
Schedule Sliding 90() Hrs. 82% 147 1639 40(20
Figure 3.5 contains aggregate statistics for 461 cars per day in 514 O-D pairs targeted
for improvement by Local Pre-Blocking. Dock-to-dock trip time savings are modest but
not inconsequential. While car hour savings due to trip time reduction are extremely small
as a percentage of total car hours, the dollar value of those saved car hours is substantial.
Saved car hours represent a savings of more than $23(),()()() for the targeted O/D pairs,
and more than $4,()()(),()()() when extrapolated to the entire network. Furthermore, per-car
savings would likely be larger in reality than reflected in the model, because node
aggregation causes changes to he rendered on only a subset of the targeted flows [see End
Note 2]. Figure 3.6 illustrates annual cost savings due to car miles, hours, and handlings
saved by Local Pre-Blocking.
44
Figure 3.6: Annual Cost Savings due to Local Pre-Blocking
Pre-Blocking without Pre-Blocking with
Schedule Sliding Schedule Sliding
Targeted Extrapolation to Targeted Extrapolation to
Traffic Only Entire Network Traffic Only Entire Network
Annual Value
of Saved Car $161 K $2.9 M $161 K $2.9 M
Handlings
Annual Value
of Saved Car $237 K $4.2 M $449 K $8.( M
Hours
Annual Value
of Saved Car $734 K $13.() M $734 K $13.() M
Miles
Annual Total $1.1 M $2().) M $1.3 M $23.8 M
Figures do not sum due to rounding.
Improvements in O/D reliability for pre-blocked traffic are minor. Improvements in
reliability are due to more reliable connections at origin serving yards, caused by the
replacement of a classification with a more reliable blockswap. More marked increases in
reliability did not materialize because the pre-blocked traffic was typically classified at
several more yards before reaching its destination. At each yard, the traffic encountered
variability in the classification process that served to erode O/D reliability, improvements
at the origin yard notwithstanding.
It is important to note that car mile reductions engendered by the altered operating
plan cannot be attributed uniquely to any element of the Local Pre-Blocking strategy. The
Local Pre-Blocking strategy does not at its core call for traffic to traverse different routes.
Rather, it calls for traffic to be routed via pre-blocks made by local trains where it
previously was routed to serving yards to be classified into through blocks. Traffic picked
up by pre-blocking local trains was assigned to pre-blocks using the ABM, which routed
the traffic from origin to destination, sometimes choosing new routes beyond the initial
pre-block which resulted in car mile reductions.
One issue that arises in inspection of the aggregate statistics is that the reduction in car
hours is quite small in light of the fact that car handling and car mile reductions should be
expected to cause a decrease in car hours. If all of the saved car hours not attributable to
schedule sliding were attributable to eliminated classifications, each classification
eliminated would contribute a savings of approximately 5.9 hours per car, much less than
the average yard times at pre-blocking yards. Likewise, if all saved car hours not
attributable to schedule sliding were attributable to saved car miles, then one car hour
would be saved for every 4.7 car miles saved.
One explanation for this seemingly paradoxical lack of saved car hours is that in
choosing new routes for traffic subject to pre-blocking, the ABM actually traded mileage
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savings for car hour savings in a way which actually increased car hours, and in some
cases even adding handlings. Another explanation is that replacing classification with
swapping of the pre-blocks was not guaranteed to save car hours. Blockswaps are not
1()() percent reliable, and are modeled in the ABM/TSS/SPM like classifications using
PMAKE functions. Furthermore, due to the length of time allotted for classification, a
highly reliable blockswap may replace a highly reliable classification. In the absence of
schedule sliding, train-to-train connection times in the plan change only if pre-blocked
traffic departs the serving yard on a different through train as a result of pre-blocking.
Figures 3.7a-3.7e demonstrates changes experienced by several representative traffic
flows as a result of Local Pre-Blocking. An important question is whether the changes
made in incorporating local pre-blocking into the operating plan actually contributed to
the measured savings as expected. That is, at the individual O/D pair level, did the
substitution of blockswapping for classification demonstrably reduce car hours and
improve reliability'? Did the sliding of train arrival and departure times demonstrably
eliminate excess dwell time in yards'? To answer this question, we look to the
performance of individual traffic flows targeted for changes in the Local Pre-Blocking
operating plan.
Figures 3.7a-3.7e: Examples of Performance Changes Experienced by Individual
Traffic Flows due to Local Pre-Blocking t
Traffic Flow: Cayuga, IN - Chicago Interchange Roads
0.6 cars/day to BN
0.5 cars/day to CNW
0.5 cars/day to MP
0.7 cars/day to IHB
Observations: Pre-Blocking marginally decreased trip time and increased reliability. The only significant
effects were to the MP-bound flow, which had an excessive classification time in the base case, possibly
due to the origin time distribution. Schedule sliding further reduced trip time by a minor amount, as the
gap between local train J706 and connection R592 was closed, but only from 18:45 to 17:15. Presumably,
the later pickup of these traffic flows by J706 caused the increase in origin time between the Pre-Blocking
and Schedule Sliding cases. The later pickup was reflected in reduced blockswap dwell time at Danville.
Although connection time between J706 and R592 decreased with schedule sliding, overall reliability
improved marginally for three of the four flows, presumably because the positive effect of longer origin
time on reliability outweighed the potentially negative effect of reduced blockswap time. As expected, one
classification was eliminated and one blockswap added for each traffic flow.
t In this and future presentations of performance of individual traffic flows, UL/C/B hours refers to the sum of car
hours consumed in linehaul. classification. and blockswapping. OfT hours refers to originating and terminating
hours, or the hours between release and pickup plus the hours between arrival at the final node and interchange or
delivery. UC/B is generally considered to denote serving yard-to-serving yard trip time, while the sum of L/C/B
and O/T is considered to denote full dock-to-dock trip time. In the ABM/TSS/SPM modeling context, the O/T
measure is considered somewhat dubious. because for some originating traffic, shippers determine release time
based on expected pickup time. Therefore, trying to craft schedules in response to the distribution of observed




Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
Cayuga-Danville Cayuga-Chicago Cayuga-Chicago
Danville-Chicago (swap at Danville) (swap at Danville)
Chicago-Interchange Roads Chicago-Interchange Roads Chicago-Interchange Roads
Schedule
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
J,706 J706 J706
1209 DP Cayuga 1209 DP Cayuga 1339 DP Cayuga
1430 AR Danville 1430 AR Danville 1600 AR Danville
R592 R592 R592
0915 DP Danville 0915 DP Danville 0915 DP Danville
1:300 AR Chicago 1300 AR Chicago 1300 AR Chicago
Y110 Y110 Y110
1020 DP Chicago 1020 DP Chicago 1020 DP Chicago
1130 AR BN 1130 AR BN 1130 AR BN
Y120 Y120 Y120
0900 DP Chicago 0900 DP Chicago 0900 DP Chicago
1:300 AR CNW 1300 AR CNW 1300 AR CNW
Y250 Y250 Y250
1506 DP Chicago 1506 DP Chicago 1506 DP Chicago
1524 AR MP 1524 AR MP 1524 AR MP
1530 AR IHB 1530 AR IHB 1530 AR IHB
O/D Reliability
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
55% (BN) 58% (BN) 59% (BN)
53% (CNW) 54% (CNW) 54% (CNW)
39% (MP) 55% (MP) 56% (MP)
52% (IHB) 55% (IHB) 56% (IHB)
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
LJC/B Hours 59 (BN) L/C/B Hours 55 (BN) UC/B Hours 54 (BN)
58 (CNW) 54 (CNW) 53 (CNW)
112 (MP) 52 (MP) 51 (MP)
57 (IHB) 53 (IHB) 53 (IHB)
O/T Hours 71 (BN) O/T Hours 71 (BN) O/T Hours 72 (BN)
73 (CNW) 73 (CNW) 74 (CNW)
73 (MP) 73 (MP) 74 (MP)
73 (IHB) 73 (IHB) 74 (IHB)
Miles 126 Miles 126 Miles 126
Class 2 Class 1 Class 1
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 3.7b
Traffic Flow: Mt. Vernon, IN - Chicago
1.7 cars/day to Industry
3.9 cars/day to BN
0.3 cars/day to CNW
1.6 cars/day to SOO
Observations: Pre-Blocking and Schedule Sliding each had more substantial effects on the trip time and
reliability performance of this traffic. The substitution of connecting train R592 for Q648 had a negative
effect on trip time as a result of poorer connection coordination, which was alleviated in part by schedule
sliding, except for the flow bound for BN. The extension of pre-blocking to two additional departures per
week of train J731 was beneficial to O/D reliability, because the traffic now had more opportunities to meet
connections in Evansville. Both adding additional local train departures and schedule sliding of the local
trains reduced origin time. One classification was eliminated and one blockswap added for each flow.
Blocks
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
Mt.Vernon-Evansville Mt. Vernon-Chicago Mt. Vernon-Chicago
Evansville-Chicago (swap at Evansville) (swap at Evansville)
Chicago-interchange/Local Chicago-Interchange/Local Chicago-Interchange/Local
Schedule
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
J734 J731 J734 J731 J734
1707 DP Mt. Vernon 1100 1707 DP Mt. Vernon 2000 0007 DP Mt. Vernon
2230 AR Evansville 1930 2230 AR Evansville 2330 0530 AR Evansville
Q648 R592 R592
0700 DP Evansville 2145 DP Evansville 2145 DP Evansville
2130 AR Chicago 1300 AR Chicago 1300 AR Chicago
Y110 Y110 Y110
1020 DP Chicago 1020 DP Chicago 1020 DP Chicago
1130 AR BN 1130 AR BN 1130 AR BN
Y120 Y120 Y120
0900 DP Chicago 0900 DP Chicago 0900 DP Chicago
1300 AR CNW 1300 AR CNW 1300 AR CNW
R508 R508 R508
0530 DP Chicago 0530 DP Chicago 0530 DP Chicago
0800 AR SOO 0800 AR SOO 0800 AR SOO
OlD Reliability
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
73% (Ind) 69% (BN) 84% (Ind) 81% (BN) 95% (Ind) 89% (BN)
67% (CNW) 68% (SOO) 78% (CNW) 75% (SOO) 86% (CNW) 81% (SOO)
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
L/C/B Hours 38 (Ind) UC/B Hours 44 (Ind) UC/B Hours 38 (Ind)
63 (BN) 74 (BN) 68 (BN)
71 (CNW) 73 (CNW) 67 (CNW)
69 (SOO) 73 (SOO) 67 (SOO)
O/T Hours 33 (Ind) O/T Hours 30 (Ind) O/T Hours 28 (Ind)
33 (BN) 30 (BN) 29 (BN)
37 (CNW) 35 (CNW) 28 (CNW)
33 (SOO) 30 (SOO) 29 (SOO)
Miles 291 Miles 291 Miles 291
Class 2 Class 1 Class 1
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 3.7c
Traffic Flow: Mt. Vernon, IN - Bittinger, PA
1.5 cars/day
Observations: This flow's trip time and reliability benefit from the combination of Pre-Blocking and
Schedule Sliding. Pre-blocking alone causes inexplicable degradation in origin time and reliability which
are alleviated with schedule sliding. The more reliable measure of UC/B time decreases with pre-blocking
alone and decreases further due to schedule sliding. Schedule sliding slightly degrades the connection
between local trains and R561, but improves the connection at Louisville between R561 and 0376 by
eliminating excess dwell time. Overall trip time demonstrated clearly the effects of four classifications. As
expected, one classification was eliminated and one blockswap added.
Blocks
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
Mt.Vernon-Evansville Mt. Vernon-Louisville Mt. Vernon-Louisville






Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
J734 J731 J734 J731 J734
1707 DP Mt. Vernon 1100 1707 DP Mt. Vernon 2000 0007 DP Mt. Vernon
2230 AR Evansville 1930 2230 AR Evansville 2330 0530 AR Evansville
R561 R561 R561
1300 DP Evansville 1300 DP Evansville 1900 DP Evansville
2300 AR Louisville 2300 AR Louisville 0500 AR Louisville
Q376 Q376 Q376
0500 DP Louisville 0500 DP Louisville 0500 DP Louisville
0130 AR Willard 0130 AR Willard 0130 AR Willard
Q378 Q378 Q378
0845 DP Willard 0845 DP Willard 0845 DP Willard
2315 AR Cumberland 2315 AR Cumberland 2315 AR Cumberland
R342 R342 R342
0200 DP Cumberland 0200 DP Cumberland 0200 DP Cumberland
0715 AR Hagerstown 0715 AR Hagerstown 0715 AR Hagerstown
B738 B738 B738
0410 DP Hagerstown 0410 DP Hagerstown 0410 DP Hagerstown
0413 AR Bittinger 0413 AR Bittinger 0413 AR Bittinger
O/D Reliability
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
56% 53% 73%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
UC/B Hours 195 UC/B Hours 192 UC/B Hours 187
O/T Hours 25 O/T Hours 46 O/T Hours 21
Miles 1048 Miles 1048 Miles 1048
Class 5 Class 4 Class 4
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 3.7d
Traffic Flow: Mt. Vernon, IN - Memphis, TN (SSW)
0.2 cars/day
Observations: The elimination of R557 as a connecting train seems to have mitigated the trip time
benefits of local pre-blocking and schedule sliding, although reliability was highest in the local-pre-blocking
only case. Schedule sliding reduced the connection time between the two local trains and R591 and
between R591 and 0535, noticeably degrading reliability. While schedule sliding decreased the total time
consumed in O/D movement, it did so by reducing origin time and increasing classification time. As
expected, one classification was eliminated and one blockswap added.
Blocks
Base Case Pre-Blocking Blocks Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
Mt.Vernon-Evansville Mt. Vernon-Nashville Mt. Vernon-Nashville
Evansville-Nashville (swap at Evansville) (swap at Evansville)
Nashville-Memphis (SSW) Nashville-Memphis (SSW) Nashville-Memphis (SSW)
Schedule
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
J734 J731 J734 J731 J734
1707 DP Mt. Vernon 1100 1707 DP Mt. Vernon 2000 0007 DP Mt. Vernon
2230 AR Evansville 1930 2230 AR Evansville 2330 0530 AR Evansville
R591 R557 R591 R591
1600 2300 DP Evansville 1600 DP Evansville 0330 DP Evansville
0115 0815 AR Nashville 0115 AR Nashville 1245 AR Nashville
0535 Q535 0535
0045 DP Nashville 0045 DP Nashville 0045 DP Nashville
1530 AR Memphis (SSW) 1530 AR Memphis (SSW) 1530 AR Memphis (SSW)
O/D Reliability
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only
80% 91% 87%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
UC/B Hours 71 UC/B Hours 75 UC/B Hours 78
O/T Hours 23 O/T Hours 21 O/T Hours 14
Miles 403 Miles 403 Miles 403
Class 2 Class 1 Class 1
Blockswap 0 Blockswaps 1 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 3.7e
Traffic Flow: Monon, IN -East St. Louis, IL
0.5 cars/day (two flows, 0.2 cars/day and 0.3 cars/day)
Observations: ABM routed traffic into the Monon-Evansville pre-block as expected, then chose mileage-
minimizing route, increasing time and handlings and reducing reliability. It is doubtful that the
classification called for at Lawrenceville could take place. Schedule sliding again degraded reliability
relative to pre-blocking alone by lowering connection time between R599 and R591 from 17:15 to 5:00,
connection time between R591 and R590 from 24:45 to 7:15, connection time between R590 and J710
from 19:00 to 10:00. Although a handling was saved by pre-blocking at Lafayette, total handlings
increased as handlings were added Vincennes, Lawrenceville, and Flora and removed at Louisville. If the
base case route is valid, it calls into question the cost relationships between car miles, hours, and
handlings used by the ABM.
Blocks
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-blocking + Sch. Sliding
Monon-Lafayette Monon-Evansville Monon-Evansville
Lafayette-Evansville (swap at Lafayette) (swap at Lafayette)
Evansville-Louisville Evansville-Vincennes Evansville-Vincennes
Louisville-E. St. Louis Vincennes-Lawrenceville Vincennes-Lawrenceville
Lawrenceville-Flora Lawrenceville-Flora
Flora-East St. Louis Flora-East St. Louis
Schedule
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
R599 R599 R599
2215 DP Monon 2215 DP Monon 2215 DP Monon
0100 AR Lafayette 0100 AR Lafayette 0100 AR Lafayette
R591 R591 R591
1830 DP Lafayette 1830 DP Lafayette 0600 DP Lafayette
0915 AR Evansville 0915 AR Evansville 2045 AR Evansville
R561 R590 R590
1300 DP Evansville 1000 DP Evansville 0400 DP Evansville
2300 AR Louisville 1400 AR Vincennes 0700 AR Vincennes
Q686 J710 J710
2300 DP Louisville 0900 DP Vincennes 1700 DP Vincennes
1747 AR East St. Louis 1244 AR Lawrenceville 2044 AR Lawrenceville
Q373 0373
2330 DP Lawrenceville 1130 DP Lawrenceville
0244 AR Flora 1444 AR Flora
0371 0371
1819 DP Flora 2019 DP Flora
2200 AR East St. Louis 2359 AR East St. Louis
O/D Reliability
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
80% 80% 74% 74% 68% 68%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Pre-Blocking Only Pre-Blocking + Sch. Sliding
UC/B Hours 112 (both fl.) UC/B Hours 169 (both fl.) UC/B Hours 134 (both fl.)
O/T Hours 14 (both fl.) O/T Hours 14 (both fl.) O/T Hours 14 (both fl.)
Miles 661 Miles 430 Miles 430
Class 3 Class 4 Class 4
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1 Blockswaps 1
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The O/D pairs in Figure 3.7 suggest that each of the explanations given above for the
lack of saved car hours may apply. The Monon to East St. Louis flow was routed by the
ABM to save car miles. However, trip time and handlings increased and reliability was
degraded by the new routing. For the Mt. Vernon to Chicago flow, adding pre-blocks to
trains improved trip time and reliability. However, substituting connecting trains had a
noticeable effect on the connection performance at Evansville, and reliability. For the Mt.
Vernon to Memphis flow, when schedules were slid, trip time actually increased,
presumably because schedules were ultimately driven by heavier traffic flows which
ultimately may not have even been targeted by local pre-blocking. All of the examples,
however, demonstrate an eliminated handling at the origin serving yard. These examples
clearly demonstrate that, while local pre-blocking shows promise in eliminating handlings,
network-oriented strategies for minimizing costs can have a wide variety of effects on
individual O/D performance.
Figure 3.8 gives an example of the potential of Local Pre-Blocking to reduce
switching at larger serving yards. The serving yards shown perform the bulk of through-
classification activity at all local pre-blocking serving yards, and also serve as bases for the
most extensive local train operations. It is important to note that the reduction in
switching suggested by Figure 3.8 represents only traffic originating at outlying network
nodes and first classified at a serving yard whose network node is different from the origin
node [see End Note 2]. Traffic originating within serving yard nodes may be eligible for
pre-blocking as well, but classification savings achieved for this traffic are not measured by
the SPM because all activity within the origin node is consolidated. Figure 3.8
demonstrates that a high percentage of through-classification at serving yards may be
eliminated by local pre-blocking.
Figure 3.8: Reduction in Classification at Selected Serving Yards due to Local
Pre-Blocking
Serving Yard Through-Classified Through-Classified Volume, Percentage
Location Volume, Base Case Local Pre-Blocking Change
Danville, IL 76.1 cars/day 50().8 cars/day -34%
Lafayette, IN 90.1 50.0 cars/day -44%
Evansville, IN 167.7 cars/day 98.2 cars/day -41%
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3.1.5 Implementation Issues
3.1.5.1 Designing and Implementing a Local Pre-Blocking Operating Plan
The Local Pre-Blocking strategy faces few barriers to implementation and successful
execution. This is due to the fact that the strategy may be implemented incrementally,
rather than as a one-time wholesale change to the operating plan. A railroad could choose
to implement local pre-blocking for a single block on a single train, then expand the
program based on the original demonstration. An incremental implementation plan would
smooth the demands on service planners responsible for creating new blocks in real-time
control systems and routing traffic onto those blocks.
As pre-blocks would be added gradually under an incremental implementation scheme,
the benefits to traffic and yard operations would accrue gradually as well. As smaller
initial traffic volumes would avoid classification, yard crew requirements would be
reduced more slowly. If not enough traffic is pre-blocked by local trains in the early
phases of an incremental implementation, eliminating or reassigning yard crews may not be
justified. For example, pre-blocking a single local train at a terminal might reduce a yard
crew's work from eight hours to five hours per day. However, until all of that yard crew's
classification was reassigned or eliminated as more trains and traffic are pre-blocked, no
yard crew savings would be realized.
While incremental implementation may be an advantage of local pre-blocking, schedule
sliding to eliminate excess dwell time for pre-blocked traffic poses different
implementation issues. Because new train schedules determined by a model such as TSS-
Times are generated as a group, rather than singly, incremental implementation may
ultimately increase the demands on service planners relative to batch implementation.
New train schedules require much service planning effort in implementation, including
creation of new locomotive, crew, and meet/pass plans, as well as the coding of the actual
changes into real-time control systems. Locomotive, crew, and meet/pass analysis would
only have to be performed once if slid schedules were implemented in a batch, whereas
such analyses would be required continually if slid schedules were implemented
incrementally. In less capacity-constrained corridors than Chicago-Nashville, meet/pass
management could be left to dispatchers.
3.1.5.2 Customer Cooperation in Local Pre-Blocking
Customer cooperation in loading cars in order will play an important role in reducing
the impact on local train duty time and switching requirements. When customers load cars
in block order, a local train can make a pickup in block without increasing the number of
times the train is broken or the number of times the siding must be entered. It is crucial
that the customer be made aware of the pre-blocking arrangement, so that cars are loaded
and waybills prepared in the proper order.
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The order in which cars should be spotted and loaded to facilitate pre-blocking could
be determined by a simple expert system which used data on each train's block order and
customer siding direction. If the cars were of the same type, then they would be spotted
as always. However, if cars in different pre-blocks are of several types, spotting
instructions for the empties could be generated at the time the cars were ordered. In both
cases, the customer would receive information on the order in which cars were to be
loaded at the time empties were ordered.
Customers unwilling or unable to cooperate in local pre-blocking could be handled
several ways. If there was a physical reason such as plant layout preventing cars from
being spotted and loaded in order, then this circumstance could dictate reordering the pre-
blocks on a train. If not, then the customer's cars could simply not be pre-blocked, being
pulled into the "all other" block on each local train and classified in the origin yard as was
done before pre-blocking. As the failure to pre-block a customer's cars would add cost
relative to pre-blocking, the customer could be charged a penalty or denied any discount
passed on to customers as a result of local pre-blocking savings, although punitive action
should not be considered a desirable means of resolving the situation.
3.1.5.3 Operational Contingency Planning
If a local train cannot make its designated pre-blocks within the scheduled time,
because of a surge in the train's volume that day or because heavy overhead traffic
prohibits the train from performnning necessary switching, several options are available to
operating managers:
* If locomotives, a crew, and track tim reare available, the train could be called and
dispatched early, and pre-block its cars at the expense of some overtime and
additional locomotive usage.
* If a change in schedule is not feasible, the local train could run on its original
schedule and pre-block less traffic or no traffic. Local trains could be directed to
make only the largest of several pre-blocks, only the most time-sensitive of the
pre-blocks (the block with the least connection time before pickup by a road train),
or only the pre-blocks which could be made without interfering with through trains
on the line. The local train could also make all pre-blocks, but put only priority
traffic into the pre-blocks, gathering everything else by the quickest means
possible, to be switched at the serving yard. Yard switchers would switch
additional cars not pre-blocked by the local train, at the expense of some
disruption at the serving yard, and/or missed connections for the pre-blocked
traffic with the tightest connection times.
* Time-constrained local trains pull only loads from customer sidings, putting off
empty car gathering until it can be done without putting undue time pressure on
pre-blocking.
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While the contingency plans discussed here may place some traffic at risk of missing
first connections to through trains, disruption to local pre-blocking activity, and also
disruption caused by local pre-blocking activity, is local in nature and minor in scope. The
impacts on yards caused by heavy traffic or delayed local trains are little different under
pre-blocking than under conventional operations, with the exception that yard switchers
will sometimes he called upon to switch traffic that arrives at the serving yard pre-blocked
on good days.
3.1.6 Conclusions for the Local Pre-Blocking Strategy
Local Pre-Blocking provides modest benefits to O/D trip time by eliminating excess
dwell time and switching at serving yards. Local Pre-Blocking may require additional
local train starts, in order to balance workload between trains, and it may require
individual trains runs to be lengthened. However, these potential costs are balanced by
cost reduction opportunities in the serving yard. Because switching requirements are
reduced, yard switchers may be eliminated or reassigned to other duties.
In addition, the potential exists for many carload customers to assist the railroad in
executing Local Pre-Blocking by following simple loading instructions and communicating
shipment destinations in advance of release. Such cooperation on the part of customers
could eliminate many of the operating problems imposed on local trains.
Local Pre-Blocking by itself does not significantly impact dock-to-dock reliability.
Because Local Pre-Blocking effects a process change only at the origin yard, it is often the
case that Local Pre-Blocking strategy cannot eradicate more than one-third or one-fourth
of the total variability imposed by yards on an O/D traffic flow. For this reason, Local
Pre-Blocking may be viewed as a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
achievement of high levels of network reliability. Paired with other operating innovations,
Local Pre-Blocking could be instrumental in contributing to a highly reliable service.
Local Pre-Blocking faces few barriers to implementation, as incremental
implementation moderates service planner workloads and the required operating plan
maintenance is relatively minor. Schedule sliding, while providing additional benefits to
targeted traffic and eliminating excess dwell time in yards, is less amenable to incremental
implementation and should probably be delayed until the majority of planned pre-blocking
activity has been instituted. In the event that local train schedules cannot be slid because
of committed switching times at customers, schedule sliding can still be performed with
the local train schedules fixed. It is likely that the benefits of schedule sliding would be
diminished but not eliminated if local train schedules remained fixed.
All in all, the benefits of Local Pre-Blocking and the lack of significant barriers to





Hump yards generally operate as continuous, FIFO processing facilities. Queues of
unprocessed inbound trains exist, and average yard time is inflated by time spent waiting
between processes such as inbound inspection, humping, assembly, outbound inspection,
and the outbound brake test. The Terminal Complex strategy attempts to circumvent
queues before and between processes by identifying a group of inbound and outbound
trains which may be processed separately in a scheduled, expedited fashion.
The goal of the Terminal Complex strategy is to drive down the average yard time and
increase reliability for a large portion of traffic at a hump yard by scheduling processing, as
well as arrivals and departures, for a group of inbound trains and outbound trains which
exchange a large volume of traffic. Reliable train-to-train connections would take place in
as little as eight hours, with average yard times for traffic processed in the complex
dropping to 11-12 hours.
Twice a day, a group of trains would arrive at the yard at one-hour intervals. The
trains would be inspected and humped on schedule, resulting in a set of blocks in the bowl.
The blocks would then be assembled into outbound trains and inspected, and would
depart, again on an expedited schedule.
The Terminal Complex strategy offers several other advantages. Because of expedited
processing, blocks built in a complex remain in the bowl between 9 and 12 hours at a time.
If a complex is operated in two directions each day, for northbound and southbound
trains, for example, both sets of blocks could be built on the same bowl tracks. The use of
a large number of bowl tracks to build two blocks per day frees other bowl tracks for new
blocks, significantly increasing the yard's ability to build blocks.
The Terminal Complex strategy has two major pitfalls:
* Tolerance for poor execution is very low. Over-the-hump connections are
scheduled for as little as eight hours, and complex blocks exist on bowl tracks for
only 12 hours at a time. The adverse effects of a late-train arrival or behind-
schedule processing could cascade for several days.
* Because most complex blocks occupy bowl tracks during a 12-hour window, they
can only receive traffic which arrives on inbound complex trains. Therefore, traffic
which otherwise would have been classified into complex blocks but entered
Nashville on ineligible trains must be redirected. Some traffic is directed onto
inbound complex trains, some utilizes alternate outbound blocks, and other traffic
avoids Nashville entirely. If the previous routes for this traffic were highly
efficient, then rerouting cars around the terminal complex may increase car hours,
car miles, and/or car handlings, and neutralize many of the system-level benefits
achieved by the complex.
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3.2.2 Creating the Terminal Complex Operating Plan
In order to create an operating plan representing operation of northbound and
southbound complexes at Nashville, these steps were performed:
a. The maximum possible number of trains that could be processed in the complex
was determined using process times for inspection, humping, and assembly
measured during the Nashville yard study [Duffy 1994]. The complex could
feasibly process four inbound trains and four outbound trains, each carrying an
average of four blocks, twice a day [see Figure 3.9]. Appendix I presents a
detailed description of the methods used to arrive at the size of the complex.
b. Trains [see Figures 3.11 and 3.12] and blocks [see Figure 3.10] to be processed in
each complex were chosen by selecting the set of inbound trains and outbound
blocks which maximized the number of cars processed in the complex. Inbound
blocks were simply those blocks carried by the inbound complex trains, and in
almost all cases were simply blocks destined for Nashville. Outbound trains were
those trains which carried the most complex outbound blocks. Some reassignment
had to be performed to ensure that all outbound blocks were carried on the four
outbound complex trains in each direction, and that those trains were not
overloaded. Several high-volume blocks were chosen in both the northbound and
southbound complexes. Appendix 1 presents a detailed description of the methods
used to choose the complex inbound trains and outbound blocks.
c. Arrival and departure times for inbound and outbound complex trains were slid to
create northbound and southbound complexes [see Figures 3. 11 and 3.12].
Schedules were slid to minimize the difference between the complex schedules and
the previous schedules, but no algorithm was used.
d. Because 22 of the complex blocks would be built on 11 bowl tracks, 11 bowl
tracks were freed for additional blocks. 11 new blocks destined to hump yards and
large flat yards were created [see Figure 3.14]. Destinations for new blocks were
chosen by reviewing a list of CSXT's yards and building blocks to the busiest
carload traffic (non-coal, non-phosphate) yards which did not have direct service
from Nashville.
e. Before running the ABM to redirect traffic, the complex blocks were altered to
reflect the complex's faster processing. PMAKE multipliers were attached to each
complex block which resulted in a complex-block-specific PMAKE function of
T50 = 7, T9() = 1, PMAX = 100), ensuring that traffic departing on the outbound
complex blocks would connect reliably in Nashville due to coordinated processing
in the complex, even with connection times as short as eight hours. Section 4.2
and Martland (1982) contain expanded discussions of PMAKE functions.
f. The ABM was used to redirect cars which otherwise would have been classified
into complex blocks, but entered Nashville on ineligible trains. Some cars were
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directed onto inbound complex trains, others utilized alternate outbound blocks,
and still others avoided the Nashville terminal entirely.
g. To ensure that benefits to trip time achieved in the complex were not eroded by
downstream dwell time increases, schedules of local and through trains connecting
to complex trains were slid using TSS.
h. The SPM was used to simulate operation of the northbound and southbound
complexes at Nashville.
3.2.3 Examples
Figure 3.9 illustrates the processing schedule conceived for the terminal complex at
Nashville. The northbound and southbound complexes would be processed one after the
other on a continuing basis. Process times used to create the processing schedule include
two hours for inbound inspection, one hour for humping, two hours, 45 minutes for
assembly, one hour 30 minutes for outbound inspection. Varying amounts of time were
allotted for the brake test in order to space departures, with a minimum allotment of 3()
minutes. An important issues for the terminal complex is the constraint that certain
activities may not overlap. Only one train at a time may be humped, and only two trains at
a time may be assembled. If the bowl is not cleared by the previous complex before the
next complex begins humping, humping could be disrupted as tracks are closed out and
the earlier complex' cars removed. Assembly would also be delayed as each track would
contain traffic in two complexes which would have to be cut, possibly causing additional































Processing Schedule for the Northbound and Southbound Complexes
at Nashville
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Bowl occupied by first
complex from start of
humping to end of
assembly: from Hour 2 to
Hour 11.5
Bowl occupied by second
complex from start of
humping to end of
assembly: from Hour 14
to Hour 23.5
Figure 3.10: Blocks Built in the Terminal Complex at Nashville
Terminal Block-to-Track
Yard Block Complex Assignment for Terminal Block Categories Under
Track Destination Direction Complex Terminal Complex
1 Birmingham Southbound AM: Birmingham AM: South Complex
PM: Chicago PM: North Complex
2 Atlanta Southbound AM: Atlanta AM: South Complex
PM: Peavey PM: North Complex
3 Chattanooga Southbound AM: Chattanooga AM: South Complex
PM: Evansville PM: North Complex
4 Pensacola Southbound AM: Pensacola AM: South Complex
PM: Danville PM: North Complex
5 Decatur, AL Southbound AM: Decatur, AL AM: South Complex
PM: Lafayette PM: North Complex
6 Bruceton/KW Southbound AM: Bruceton/KW AM: South Complex
PM: Camden PM: North Complex
7 Hamlet Southbound AM: Hamlet AM: South Complex
PM: Decatur, IL PM: North Complex
8 Milan Southbound AM: Milan AM: South Complex
PM: Chicago/SOO PM: North Complex
9 Bruceton Southbound AM: Bruceton AM: South Complex
PM: CEI Grain PM: North Complex
10 Waycross Southbound AM: Waycross AM: South Complex
PM: Bowling Green PM: North Complex
11 Cincinnati Southbound AM: Cincinnati AM: South Complex
PM: New Johnsonville PM: North Complex
12 Louisville Built in Each Louisville North and South
Direction Complexes
13 Memphis Built in Each Memphis North and South
Direction Complexes
14 Memphis/IC Built in Each Memphis/IC North and South
Direction Complexes
15 Memphis/SP Built in Each Memphis/SP North and South
Direction Complexes
16 Memphis/MP Built in Each Memphis/MP North and South
Direction Complexes
17 Chicago Northbound Available for New Block
18 Peavey Northbound Available for New Block
19 Evansville Northbound Available for New Block
20 Danville Northbound Available for New Block
21 Lafayette Northbound Available for New Block
22 Decatur, IL Northbound Available for New Block
23 Chicago/SOO Northbound Available for New Block
24 CEI Grain Northbound Available for New Block
25 Bowling Green Northbound Available for New Block
26 N. Johnsonville Northbound Available for New Block
27 Camden Northbound Available for New Block
28-60 Unchanged - Tracks Not Affected by Complex
Figure 3.1() shows complex block destinations and the alteration of block-to-track
assignments that would accompany implementation of the terminal complex in order to
free space for new blocks. Bowl tracks I through 11 hold two blocks per day, one each in
the northbound and southbound complexes. Because the blocks on tracks I through 11
reside there for only 12 hours at a time, access to these blocks is restricted. The only
traffic that may be scheduled to these blocks is that which arrives at Nashville on the four
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inbound trains in each complex. Bowl tracks 12 through 16 hold the five high-volume
blocks that are dispatched twice per day, from both the northbound and southbound
complexes. These blocks reside on their bowl tracks continuously, and thus can receive
traffic from any train classified at Nashville. The blocks that originally occupied tracks 17
through 27 were designated complex blocks and paired with the blocks on tracks 1
through 11. Tracks 17 through 27 are now available for reassignment of new blocks.
The block-to-track assignments shown do not reflect actual block-to-track
assignments. Complex blocks would probably be assigned to the longest bowl tracks to
avoid disruptive class track overruns, regardless of whether those tracks were previously
occupied by northbound or southbound blocks. In addition, assembly of complex trains
would be assisted if complex blocks were distributed among several trim leads to reduce
the delays caused by several yard switchers waiting for the same trim lead.
Figures 3.11-3.13 illustrate train schedule and blocking changes made in creating the
terminal complex at Nashville. While almost all outbound complex trains carry more
blocks when the complex is in operation, blocks built in each complex are smaller because
they contain only traffic which entered Nashville on the complex inbound trains. Traffic
originally assigned to complex blocks which entered Nashville on complex trains was
altered in one of three ways: diverted onto a complex train and processed in the complex,
diverted to a non-complex block at Nashville, or diverted to a route which does not
include classification in Nashville.
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Figure 3.11: Original and Revised Schedules and Blocking of Trains Processed in
the Northbound Terminal Complex at Nashville
Inbound Trains
Figure 3.12: Original and Revised Schedules and Blocking of Trains Processed in
the Southbound Terminal Complex at Nashville
Inbound Trains
Train Symbol R573 0595 R532 R591
Route Cincinnati-Nashville Chicago-Nashville Memphis-Nashville Lafayette-Nashville
Original Schedule DP Cin 1330 DP Chi 0330 DP Mem 0700 DP Laf 1830
AR Nas 0600 AR Nas 0430 AR Nas 1930 AR Nas 0115
Revised Schedule DP Cin 2130 DP Chi 1400 DP Mem 0400 DP Laf 1015
AR Nas 1400 AR Nas 1500 AR Nas 1600 AR Nas 1700
Outbound Trains
Train Symbol R674 R534 R521 Q531
Route Nashville- Nashville-Louisville Nashville-Pensacola Nashville-Memphis
Hamlet
Original Schedule DP Nas 0130 DP Nas 1200 DP Nas 0300 DP Nas 0400
AR Ham 1145 AR Lou 2100 AR Pen 1100 AR Mem 1900
Revised Schedule DP Nas 0100 DP Nas 0200 DP Nas 0300 DP Nas 0400
AR Ham 1115 AR Lou 1100 AR Pen 1100 AR Mem 1900
Original Blocks Chattanooga Bowling Green Pensacola Memphis/MP
Bridgeport Louisville
Revised Blocks Chattanooga Louisville Decatur, AL Memphis







Train Symbol R673/R675 0684 R582 Q520
Route Hamlet- Waycross- Atlanta- Pensacola-
Nashville Nashville Nashville Nashville
Original Schedule DP Ham 1930 DP Way 1800 DP Atl 1800 DP Pen 2300
AR Nas 0215 AR Nas 0330 AR Nas 0730 AR Nas 0830
Revised Schedule DP Ham 1915 DP Way 1730 DP Atl 1430 DP Pen 1930
AR Nas 0200 AR Nas 0300 AR Nas 0400 AR Nas 0500
Outbound Trains
Train Symbol Q526 R533 Q648 R590
Route Nashville-Louisville Nashville-Memphis Nashville-Chicago Nashville-Lafayette
Original Schedule DP Nas 0400 DP Nas 0930 DP Nas 2000 DP Nas 1600
AR Lou 1300 AR Mem 0330 AR Chi 2130 AR Laf 2359
Revised Schedule DP Nas 1300 DP Nas 1400 DP Nas 1500 DP Nas 1600
AR Lou 2200 AR Mem 0815 AR Chi 1700 AR Laf 2359
Original Blocks Louisville Camden No Pickups at Lafayette
Memphis Nashville (carries Terre Haute
N. Johnsonville Wax-Chicago)
Revised Blocks Louisville Memphis Chicago Lafayette
Bowling Green Memphis/MP Chicago/SOO Terre Haute
Memphis/SP Danville Peavey
Memphis/IC Decatur, IL CEI Grain
N. Johnsonville Evansville
Camden Mt. Vernon















































R59-1 - Southhbound Complex Train
Q64- 8 Nollhhound Complex Train
Non-complex trains arriving and depating
Nashville have been omitled.
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Figure 3.14 lists new blocks created at Nashville on howl tracks freed by the complex.
New block destinations were chosen by reviewing major CSXT yards which did not
receive direct blocks from Nashville. Blocks to other hump yards were chosen first,
followed by blocks to large flat yards and blocks to medium flat yards. Not all of the new
blocks chosen were appropriate to the traffic flows through Nashville, as the low volumes
of some blocks attest. If CSXT were to create a terminal complex operating plan for
implementation, a more substantial analysis would illustrate block destinations which
would receive more volume.
Figure 3.14: New Blocks Built on Class Tracks Freed by the Terminal Complex
Block Destination Yard Type Daily Volume Using Block per ABM
Cayce Medium Flat 2 cars/day
Cumberland Hump 2 cars/day
Dayton Medium Flat 1() cars/day
Detroit Large Flat 3 cars/day
Florence Large Flat 3 cars/day
Jacksonville Large Flat 10) cars/day
Monroe Medium Flat 2 cars/day
Montgomery Large Flat 25 cars/day
Rocky Mount Large Flat 9 cars/day
Tampa Large Flat 2 cars/day
Willard Hump 6 cars/day
Bob Coppinger of CSXT Service Design pointed out that certain newly created blocks
might be successful as complex blocks, as they are highly oriented to either northbound or
southbound traffic flows (blocks from Nashville to Dayton and Jacksonville, for example).
If new blocks such as Dayton and Jacksonville were included in the complex, some
destinations would be bumped out of the original set of complex block destinations.
Blocks bumped out of the complex would be able to occupy bowl tracks continuously,
and less traffic would have to be rerouted away from those blocks. Traffic volume
processed in the complex might decline, as the original set of complex block destinations
were chosen in order to maximize the amount of traffic processed in the complex [see
Appendix 1]. However, the original complex blocks were chosen from blocks already
built at Nashville, and the effect of new block destinations on the choice of complex
blocks was not considered.
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3.2.4 Changes in Performance
The following types of performance changes were noted as a result of the Terminal
Complex strategy:
* Traffic on the complex trains experienced large decreases in yard time as a result
of expedited, reliable processing in the complex.
* A moderate amount of traffic took advantage of the 11 new blocks built on freed
bowl tracks at Nashville. This traffic improved by using a bypass block to avoid
one or several downstream handlings. While railroads prefer that blocks
maintained at a yard have a minimum of 1()-15 cars per day, not all newly created
blocks reached the minimum level, as the ABM did not select them as superior to
current routes. This suggests that better destination choices for new blocks may
allow further exploitation of the additional block-building capacity provided by the
complex.
* Because the ABM was given considerable latitude to reroute cars which were
ineligible for the complex, some of these cars also experienced performance
improvements. Some were rerouted onto complex trains, but others traversed
equivalent or superior routes which did not include Nashville. Overall, traffic
classified at Nashville decreased 24% as a result of rerouting around the complex.
* The Terminal Complex strategy strongly improved performance of the yard at
Nashville, as average yard time dropped from 3() hours to 17 hours.
Aggregate statistics for 1422 cars per day in 2109 O/D pairs targeted for improvement
by the Terminal Complex are shown in Figure 3.15. Car hours decreased by 4% for the
targeted traffic, which includes both traffic processed in the complex and traffic diverted
from it. Figure 3.16 shows the annual dollar value of car hour, mile, and handling savings
generated by the Terminal Complex strategy. At more than $12 million annually for the
network, saved car hours represent the largest single source of savings, as expected.
Although distributed differently, the savings generated by the Terminal Complex strategy
are of the same magnitude as those generated by the Local Pre-Blocking strategy.
Figure 3.15: Changes in Trip Time, Reliability, and Activity due to the Terminal
Complex at Nashville
Average %, of Cars Car Car Car
Dock-to- Arriving Within Handlings Hours Miles
Strategy Dock +/- 24 Hours of Saved Saved Saved
Trip Time Average Per Day Per Day Per Day
Base Case 123 80% () ) 
Terminal
Complex 118 82%, 2()4 7977 773()
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Figure 3.16: Annual Cost Savings due to the Terminal Complex
Targeted Traffic Only Extrapolation to Entire Network
Value of
Saved Car $().2 M $1.2 M
Handlings
Value of
Saved Car $2.1 M $12.5 M
Hours
Value of
Saved Car $1.4 M $8.1 M
Miles
Annual Total $3.8 M $21.9 M
Figures do not sum due to rounding.
Like the Local Pre-Blocking strategy, the Terminal Complex strategy offered only
marginal gains in O)/D reliability, presumably for similar reasons. The Terminal Complex
strategy instituted more reliable processing at a single facility, leaving even traffic
processed in the complex vulnerable to disruption at other system points. At the
individual flow level, however, improvements were often quite significant. The network-
wide effects on reliability of new blocks built on freed bowl tracks were modest because
relatively little traffic took advantage of the new blocks, and the prospect of eliminated
handlings that they offered. Furthermore, as one of the example flows in Figure 3.17 will
show, even when the new blocks do serve to eliminate handlings, the impact on reliability
can be negative, contrary to expectations.
The impact of using the ABM to find alternate routes for traffic diverted out of the
complex cannot be overemphasized, and is demonstrated by the highly unexpected result
that car miles decreased significantly even though large volumes of traffic received new
routes. If diverted traffic passed through Nashville as part of its shortest or least-cost
route, this traffic would be expected to perform more poorly when rerouted around the
complex. However, both at the system level and at the individual flow level, the wide
variety of routing options within the same physical corridor made the addition of mileage
unlikely. The least-cost alternatives chosen by the ABM for traffic rerouted around the
complex were in most cases as good as previous routes in terms of trip time and reliability.
In fact, some "rerouting" of cars around Nashville was performed not because a car was
ineligible for processing in the complex, but instead because an alternate route was
superior even to processing in the complex.
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Figures 3.17a-3.17g: Examples of Performance and Routing Changes to Individual
Traffic Flows due to the Terminal Complex Strategy
Traffic Flow: Chicago - Gallatin, TN
0.2 cars/day
Observations: This flow was classified at Nashville into a non-complex block. Although the flow did not
take advantage of the expedited processing of the complex, it experienced an ancillary benefit, a reduction
in average classification time of 11 hours. This was the result of sliding the schedule of Q595 to fit the
southbound complex, and reassigning the Nashville-Gallatin block to Q526. The combination of these
actions replaced the 31.5-hour connection time at Nashville with a 19-hour connection time. The
difference, largely excess, was eliminated from O/D trip time.
Blocks




Base Case Terminal Complex
Q595 0595
0330 DP Chicago 1700 DP Chcago
0430 AR Nashville 1800 AR Nashville
R534 0526
1200 DP Nashville 1300 DP Nashville
1715 AR Gallatin 1700 AR Gallatin
O/D Reliability
Base Case Terminal Complex
79% 79%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Terminal Complex
UC/B Hours 60 UC/B Hours 49
O/T Hours 45 O/T Hours 45
Miles 449 Miles 449
Class 1 Class 1




Traffic Flow: Cantonment, FL - East St. Louis
0.9 cars/day
Observations: One would have expected this flow to be routed through the northbound complex and
placed in the Louisville block, given the superior processing performance of the northbound complex.
However, the ABM's choice of classification at Montgomery over complex classification at Nashville is
explained by Montgomery's PMAKE function of T50 = 0, T90 = 20, PMAX = 100. Average yard time is
largely determined by T50, and Montgomery's T50 is less than 7, the complex T50. Montgomery is a
relatively low-volume flat yard which classifies primarily local traffic. Although its PMAKE function is not
entirely unreasonable in this context, such processing performance could not necessarily be expected for
newly added through-classification. This routing artifact suggests that a set of PMAKE functions
representing expected or desired yard performance instead of the performance embodied in car schedules
may be useful for studies such as this.
Although the new route improves on the base case performance, its improvement stems largely from
factors not considered by the ABM in the routing process. For example, the ABM does not consider train
routes and schedules when routing cars. Therefore, the routing process considered neither the
Montgomery-Louisville block's time-consuming blockswap at Birmingham, nor the fact that in the base
case the flow was required to wait 14 hours at Birmingham for Q520's reclassification.
Blocks
Base Case Terminal Complex
Cantonment-Nashville Cantonment-Montgomery
Nashville-Louisville Montgomery-Louisville
Louisville-East St. Louis (swap at Birmingham)
Louisville-East St. Louis
Schedule
Base Case Terminal Complex
0520 0520
0030 DP Cantonment 2030 DP Cantonment
0830 AR Nashville 0530 AR Montgomery
Q526 R658
0400 DP Nashville 1800 DP Montgomery
1300 AR Louisville 0100 AR Birmingham
0686 0572
2300 DP Louisville 1000 OP Birmingham
1800 AR East St. Louis 0130 AR Louisville
Q686
2300 DP Louisville
1800 AR East St. Louis
O/D Reliability
Base Case Terminal Complex
88% 97%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Terminal Complex
UC/B Hours 118 UC/B Hours 101
O/T Hours 16 O/T Hours 12
Miles 906 Miles 906
Class 2 Class 2




Traffic Flow: Chicago - Montgomery, AL
0.2 cars/day
Observations: This flow utilized the new Nashville-Montgomery block. By doing so, it gained 23 hours in
trip time, 10 percentage points in reliability, and skipped a handling at Birmingham.
Blocks





Base Case Terminal Complex
0595 0595
0330 DP Chicago 1700 DP Chicago
0430 AR Nashville 1800 AR Nashville
R527 0649
2030 DP Nashville 1500 DP Nashville





Base Case Terminal Complex
63% 73%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Terminal Complex
UC/B Hours 92 UC/B Hours 69
O/T Hours 61 O/T Hours 61
Miles 728 Miles 728
Class 2 Class 1
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0
Figure 3.17d
Traffic Flow: Chicago - Augusta, GA
0.3 cars/day
Observations: This traffic flow was rerouted by the ABM to replace handlings at Nashville and Waycross
with handlings at Atlanta and Greenwood, effecting large decreases in time and mileage but avoiding the
complex. It is not clear why the flow did not take this route in the base case. While classification into the
Waycross complex block at Nashville may have been faster and more reliable than classification at
Atlanta, mileage considerations outweighed the processing advantage of the complex.
Blocks





Base Case Terminal Complex
Q595 Q647
0330 DP Chicago 0700 DP Chicago
0430 AR Nashville 0215 AR Atlanta
Q649 R685 R662
0500 1930 DP Nashville 0800 DP Atlanta
1530 2330 AR Waycross 1530 AR Greenwood
Q690
1400 DP Waycross 0001 DP Greenwood
0300 AR Augusta 0345 AR Augusta
OlD Reliability
Base Case Terminal Complex
62% 68%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Terminal Complex
UC/B Hours 153 UC/B Hours 109
O/T Hours 50 O/T Hours 50
Miles 1214 Miles 928
Class 2 Class 2
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0
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Figure 3.17e
Traffic Flow: Memphis - Dayton, OH
3.2 cars/day
Observations: This flow utilized the new Nashville-Dayton block, saving handlings at Louisville and
Cincinnati and 36 hours of trip time. The tight, 4-hour blockswap connection at Cincinnati is a likely
contributor to the decrease in reliability between the base case and the terminal complex routing. What is
more surprising about the decrease in reliability, though, is that the base case reliability is 89% even with
three classifications. This may be traced in part to the originating time distribution, but also to the
available times for classification at Nashville and Cincinnati in the base case. At both of these yards,
traffic moves on only one connection, rather than being spread over several connections, because the time
available for classification, 32.5 hours in Nashville and 18 hours in Cincinnati is greater than T50 + T90 at
each yard.
Blocks
Base Case Terminal Complex
Memphis-Nashville Memphis-Nashville
Nashville-Louisville Nashville-Dayton
Louisville-Cincinnati (swap at Cincinnati)
Cincinnati-Dayton
Schedule
Base Case Terminal Complex
R532 R532
0800 DP Memphis 0730 DP Memphis
1930 AR Nashville 1900 AR Nashville
Q526 R270
0400 DP Nashville 1345 DP Nashville
1300 AR Louisville 1045 AR Cincinnati
0730 DP Louisville 1445 DP Cincinnati





Base Case Terminal Complex
89% 76%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Terminal Complex
UC/B Hours 108 UC/B Hours 72
O/T Hours 45 O/T Hours 45
Miles 607 Miles 607
Class 3 Class 2
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 3.17f
* It is worth noting that the schedule information for this traffic flow reflects a fundamental mistake in the design of
the tenninal complex operating plan. Train R591is a complex train and train R557 is not. Therefore, they cannot
both carry the Evansville-Nashville block. Allowing traffic in the Evansville-Nashville block to have access to
southbound complex blocks is predicated on the requirement that the Evansville-Nashville block arrives at
Nashville on a complex train. If R591 carries the block, fine-traffic is processed in the complex. If R557 carries
it, fine too-but the only complex blocks that traffic may access are the Louisville and Memphis blocks.
Restricting the block to one train or another represents an enror of omission, although it does not affect the
performance of this traffic flow because it is classified into a Memphis block at Nashville.
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Traffic Flow: Mt. Vernon, IN - Memphis, (SSW)
0.2 cars/day
Observations: This flow was processed in the complex. Reliability increased by 13 percentage points
and trip time decreased by 20 hours. The impact of the complex on this traffic flow may be even greater
than reflected by the O/D improvement, because the connection times between J734 and R591 and R557
cause the creation of excess dwell time at Evansville, counterbalancing the positive effects of the complex.
Blocks
Base Case Terminal Complex
Mt. Vernon - Evansville Mt. Vernon - Evansville
Evansville-Nashville Evansville-Nashville
Nashville-Memphis (SSW) Nashville-Memphis (SSW)
Schedulet
Base Case Terminal Complex
J734 J734
1707 DP Mt. Vernon 0107 DP Mt. Vernon
2230 AR Evansville 0630 AR Evansville
R591 R557 R591 R557
1600 2300 DP Evansville 1045 1630 DP Evansville
0115 0815 AR Nashville 2000 0145 AR Nashville
~~~~~~0535 0531 R533
0045 DP Nashville
1530 AR Memphis (SSW) 1900 0815 AR Memhis (SSW)
O/D Reliability
Base Case Terminal Complex
80% 93%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case Terminal Complex
UC/B Hours 71 UC/B Hours 53
O/T Hours 23 O/T Hours 17
Miles 403 Miles 403
Class 2 Class 2
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0
Example Ol/D pairs shown in Figure 3.17 include both northbound and southbound
traffic flows through the complex, as well as traffic rerouted around the complex. Some
rerouted traffic remained on existing lines, with no increase in mileage, due to multiple
available blocks traversing the same physical mainlines. As an example, figure 3.18
illustrates selected multiple routes through the Chicago-Nashville corridor. Other
rerouted traffic was flowed by the ABM at minimum cost, with the same varying results as
in the Local Pre-Blocking strategy. In all examples, which represented a wide variety of
routing changes and scheduling considerations, the routing changes decreased trip time
markedly, and in all but one case, reliability increased significantly. In fact, finding a
traffic flow which deteriorated in any way proved surprisingly difficult.
Route mileage, processing performance at alternate yards, and the sheer number of
required handlings influenced the ABM's routing decisions for traffic removed from
Nashville. Given routes with equivalent mileage and handlings, the ABM routed traffic
through the yards which would process the traffic fastest. In the base case, flat yards on
CSX's Chicago-Nashville corridor perform little through classification, and traffic
classified in flat yards experiences relatively short dwell time. Hump yards are generally
much more highly capacitated, and the resulting queues serve to lengthen cutoff times and
increase PMAKE parameters.
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Traffic diversion to selected alternate yards is shown in Figure 3.19. The data shown in
Figure 3.19 indicate that the original hypothesis that traffic excluded from processing in
the complex would be diverted to flat yards on the Chicago-Nashville corridor is false. It
is true that yards gaining classification volume are generally smaller flat yards which
previously processed little or no through traffic. However, most such yards lie southeast
of the corridor. The concern that ABM-generated routing through small flat yards could
be problematic if flat yards become overloaded with through-classification activity remains
valid.
Five of the last seven yards which increase in classification are yards which receive a
new direct block from Nashville built on a freed complex bowl track. This indicates that
many of the traffic flows utilizing the new blocks do not terminate locally, but instead are
through-classified, with the new direct block constituting part of a new minimum-cost
route. While the volumes of the direct blocks were disappointingly low, the effects on
individual long-distance flows were exactly as intended.
The only corridor yards represented are Vincennes, IN and Lawrenceville, IL whose
volume increases may he traced to the ABM's mileage minimizing actions, first noted in
the Local Pre-Blocking example flows in Figure 3.7.
Interestingly, the yard with the greatest increase in classification volume, Bruceton,
TN on the Nashville-Memphis line, acts as a staging area for trains bound for the complex.
Of the three daily Memphis-Nashville trains, only R532 is processed in the complex. The
other two trains, R53() and Q536 carry Bruceton as well as Nashville blocks. Previously,
the Bruceton blocks contained only locally terminating traffic, but when the complex was
created, the ABM routed complex-bound traffic into these blocks, intending for it to be
classified, picked up by R532 and processed in the complex. Unfortunately, in exchange
for expedited processing in the complex, this traffic must undergo an extra handling
upstream from the complex.
Nashville experienced the largest increase in blockswap volume. This effect has two
causes. First, in order to ensure that inbound complex trains carried traffic intended for
processing in the complex, blocks bypassing Nashville were reassigned from complex to
non-complex trains, leaving the complex trains to carry as much complex-bound traffic as
volume limits would allow. As a result of these changes, high-volume bypass blocks such
as the Waycross to Chicago block were swapped at Nashville, while in the base case, they
moved on direct trains. Thus the roster of blocks swapped at Nashville grew, but the
volume in those blocks also grew, from 72 cars per day in the base case to 1()5 cars per
day in tenninal complex operation. This increase was comprised of traffic rerouted
around the complex, and also traffic which was classified at Nashville but should not have
been, as it had failed to take advantage of existing bypass blocks. While the increase in
blockswapping and decrease in classification at Nashville would appear to correspond, and
tell the story that much traffic was not taking advantage of existing bypass blocks, there is
in fact relatively little direct correspondence.
75
Figure 3.19: Traffic Diversion due to the Terminal Complex Strategy
Node JCity/State I Base Cars/Day| Complex Cars/Day| Difference
Yards with Classification Volume Increases Greater than 5 Cars per Day
612 Bruceton TN 0 24.2 24.2
495 Erwin TN 1.8 20.8 19
780 Augusta GA 0 18.3 18.3
746 Bridgeport AL 0.2 17.5 17.3
782 Greenwood SC 12.4 25.3 12.9
400 Cincinnati OH 69.2 78.5 9.3
950 Baldwin FL 32.7 42 9.3
663 Dothan AL 3.2 12.4 9.2
174 Vincennes IN 6 14.7 8.7
216 Lima OH 5.9 13.9 8.0
650 Montgomery AL 58.9 66.3 7.4
214 Dayton OH 0.7 7.6 6.9
173 Lawrenceville IL 1.5 7.6 6.1
493 Kingsport TN 0 5.9 5.9
920 Jacksonville FL 0.3 5.8 5.5
833 Cayce SC 1.2 6.4 5.2
Yards with Classification Volume Decreases Greater than 10 Cars per Day
615 Nashville TN 702.6 567.1 -135.5
902 Waycross GA 310.9 223.7 -87.2
440 Louisville KY 287.7 214.4 -73.3
100 Chicago IL 157.8 131.9 -25.9
640 Birmingham AL 128.0 104.8 -23.2
845 Hamlet NC 35.8 14.8 -21
Yards with Blockswap Volume Increases Greater than 5 Cars per Day
615 Nashville TN 7.9 105.3 97.4
902 Waycross GA 2.1 42.4 40.3
640 Birmingham AL 4.2 41.2 37
440 Louisville KY 1.2 31.7 30.5
100 Chicago IL 1.5 25.7 24.2
400 Cincinnati OH 20.3 42.2 21.9
152 Danville IL 2.4 21.8 19.4
782 Greenwood SC 8.7 26.2 17.5
168 Evansville IN 0.9 13.1 12.2
700 Atlanta GA 4.5 16.1 11.6
At other yards such as Louisville with apparently colTesponding increases in
blockswap volume and decreases in classification, the number of blocks swapped there
also increased as a result of the addition of the new bypass blocks built at Nashville on
freed complex howl tracks, although this fact explains relatively little of the
correspondence.
More of the correspondence is likely due to traffic utilizing existing bypass blocks as a
result of ABM routing. However, data problems which were individually addressed in and
around the Chicago-Nashville corridor but subjected to less scrutiny elsewhere in the
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network may have caused spurious bypass blocks to appear in the base case. To the
extent that this is true, reductions in classification due to reroutings made for the terminal
complex operating plan are overstated. The degree of error is minor relative to the sum of
the savings from all terminal complex changes, especially for the target traffic, which
typically traversed the corridor where errors had been eliminated. The error is difficult to
estimate without checking the validity of every block and the flows it carries, yet will have
to be addressed before operating plans developed using this modeling framework are
directly implemented.
3.2.5 Implementation Issues
3.2.5.1 Designing the Terminal Complex Operating Plan
In developing a Terminal Complex operating plan, use of decision support tools
cannot be avoided. The sheer number of OlD flows which must be rerouted calls for
automation of the process and algorithmic accuracy.
Several of the example O/D flows discussed in Section 3.2.4 illustrated modeling data
idiosyncrasies which affected the dimensions of the operating plan. In addition, because of
the difficulties of translating car move data to the modeling environment, not all traffic
flows were modeled, and it is unclear whether traffic classified in the complex represented
proportionately more or less than would be seen if all traffic flows were modeled. These
circumstances confirm the fact that the Terminal Complex operating plan created in this
analysis is not implementation-ready.
In order to create a new Terminal Complex operating plan, service planners and model
users must first collaborate in the calibration of the ABM/TSS/SPM suite of models,
reaching general agreement that models represent costs, constraints, and the operating
plan in a sufficiently realistic way. Although the scope of plan changes makes use of
decision support tools unavoidable, the bright sides of this circumstance are that ongoing
verification of model accuracy would require much less effort than the initial calibration
effort, and that once calibrated, such tools could speed operating plan development
considerably.
With a calibrated ABM, TSS, and SPM, it would be possible to create an
implementation-ready Terminal Complex operating plan. However, the task of loading an
operating plan created using the ABM/TSS/SPM platform into real-time control systems
would be quite significant, given the volume of changes to train schedules and car routes
called for by the new operating plan. Automated translation of ABM/TSS/SPM car
routes, blocks, and trains to real-time control systems appears to be a prerequisite to
implementation of a Terminal Complex operating plan at a major yard.
Creation of additional elements of the operating plan such as locomotive- and crew-to-
train assignments and meet/pass plans would also require major effort. Although these
elements of the operating plan have traditionally been left to locomotive and crew planners
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and dispatchers to be solved "on the fly", the many schedule changes called for in the
Terminal Complex operating plan could produce operational chaos if activated without
sufficient warning and guidance.
Additional planning methods will probably have to be generated in order to address the
issue of control of complex block volumes. In the operating plan evaluated here, only one
inbound and one outbound train had unacceptably large average volumes. The problem of
trains being overloaded all the time can be dealt with easily by culling ()/D pairs whose
performance suffers the least when rerouted out of the complex. However, the weekly
cyclicality of carload volumes could cause many trains bound for the complex to leave
traffic behind on heavy days. This is to some degree unavoidable, as the constraint that
the complex can process no more than four trains in each direction is firm. The issue
becomes one of differentiation of traffic within, for example, the Waycross-Nashville or
any other complex block. Several questions demand consideration: Would it be
operationally feasible to maintain both complex and non-complex versions of the
Waycross-Nashville block'? How would traffic he segregated by the carl scheduling
system'? Do certain ()/D flows move only on heavy days, exacerbating the cyclicality
problem, and can these be handled outside of the complex'?
3.2.5.2 Phased Implementation for the Terminal Complex
The Terminal Complex strategy, again unlike the Local Pre-Blocking strategy, cannot
be implemented one block at a time, but it is possible to reduce the workload associated
with designing the plan and the disruption of implementation. A terminal complex may be
implemented in two phases.
The first phase would involve designation of the complex trains and blocks, schedule
sliding to create the complex, and creation of a yard operating plan for the complex.
During the first phase, no bowl tracks would be doubled, and no new bypass blocks would
be built at the complex terminal. This would minimize or eliminate the disruption of many
initial implementation problems, such as trains arriving off schedule, complex processing
taking longer than planned, and tonnage blowups on complex trains for the simple reason
that the requirement that the bowl turn over once every twelve hours does not exist until
bowl tracks are doubled.
During the first phase, execution can proceed as it did before the complex. The hump
yard can act as a continuous process facility, with bowl tracks holding mid-process queues
of cars waiting for outbound trains, with the knowledge that schedules of certain inbound
and outbound trains have been coordinated due to the large amount of volume transferred
between them. Along those lines, while the makeup of the complex blocks is being
refined, schedules could be slid into the complex arrangement in steps, gradually closing
the interval between arrival of the inbound trains and departure of the outbound trains. As
mentioned in Section 3.1.5, however, sliding schedules periodically over time may create
much more analytical work for service planners than would sliding schedules all at once.
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During the second phase, performance data would be reviewed, and schedules, car-to-
block assignments, and block-to-train assignments adjusted as necessary to maximize
connection reliability and consistent volume. As performance becomes more regular,
individual class tracks could be doubled. At each doubling, a new bypass block could be
built, and its effects on the composition of traffic in the complex reviewed. Finally, when
all possible bowl tracks host two complex blocks in a 24-hour period, the complex will be
fully implemented.
3.2.5.3 Operational Contingency Planning
Once the phased implementation of a terminal complex has demonstrated initial
success, the move to tighten connection times and double blocks on bowl tracks will be
inevitable. The complex will then be operating at its full design potential, and in this mode
will be most vulnerable to disruption by schedule and volume irregularities. In such cases,
varied options remain available to operating managers.
3.2.5.3.1 Complex Trains Off Schedule
If a complex train arrives early, it may simply be held in the receiving yard until its
scheduled hump time. However, if one or several complex trains arrive late, several
contingencies are available to help cars recover:
* Yard managers could choose to hump a late train immediately upon its arrival,
with or without skipping the inbound inspection process. Humping a train without
inspecting it raises the likelihood that bad-order cars will have to be switched out
of the train before departure. However, if skipping the inbound inspection process
would allow many cars to be included in blocks which would otherwise have been
pulled from the bowl by the time the train was humped, then skipping the inbound
inspection may be a favorable option.
* If several trains are delayed moderately, the assembly and inspection schedule for
the connecting outbound trains in the complex could be extended to accommodate
the delayed trains. Same-day train-to-train connections in the complex would be
maintained, although that day's complex outbound trains would depart late. To
delay assembly of a complex's outbound trains would not necessarily impact the
processing of the next complex. As designed, each complex's processing schedule
requires 9.5 hours between the time the first train is humped and the last block is
pulled from the bowl [see Figure 3.9]. Thus, a 2.5-hour buffer exists between the
time the last bowl track is scheduled to be pulled and the time the first train of the
following complex is scheduled to be humped.
* A single train which arrives far behind schedule, during the wrong 12-hour
window, could be humped as if it were a non-complex train. Cars for the
Louisville and Memphis blocks would experience no blocking changes, but would
be 12 hours behind the original schedule for each missed block departure. Cars for
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other complex destinations could he rescheduled to different outbound blocks, or
humped to a designated rehump track, and rehumped during the proper window,
24 hours behind the original schedule. In order to avoid disrupting the scheduled
complex operation, rehumping could be performed during the 2.5-hour buffer
between complexes.
3.2.5.3.2 Heavy Traffic on Complex Trains and Blocks
Heavier than expected traffic can interfere with the routine execution of complex
processing in two ways: by causing class track overruns, and by causing complex trains to
exceed maximum tonnage. Both of these problems can be predicted well in advance using
existing information systems, and that advance knowledge can be used by yard
management to plan modifications to complex processing necessary to maintain yard
fluidity and connection performance.
Except for those blocks built in hoth complexes, complex blocks are less subject to
short-notice volume changes than are other yard blocks, because they receive cars only
firom the inbound complex trains. As the complex trains originate, initial volume
information would be available to the yard, and adjusted as complex trains pick up at
intermediate stations enroute to Nashville.
Isolated class track overruns should cause at most minor disruption to complex
processing. If a complex block is expected to overrun its class track, then humping of
complex trains may be halted fo)r a short period, during which the cars already on the track
could be pulled from the bowl to the departure yard, in effect beginning the assembly
process early as a result of heavy volume in a particular block. Of course, this
contingency presumes an available departure track and a yard switcher on call in advance
of the regular start of assembly. I these are not available, complex cars could be
temporarily humped into a free bowl track. Assigning complex cars to a spare bowl track
is relatively safe, as the cars will be in the track for no more than a few hours before being
pulled to the receiving yard. If no bowl tracks are free, and if humping is nearly complete,
then it may be possible to include overrun cars in a track whose block will not receive any
more cars. Several relatively low-volume complex blocks in each direction receive most
of their cars from two or three inbound trains, and could provide useful additional space to
counter class track overruns.
If an outbound complex train exceeds tonnage limits, serious problems could arise.
Excess traffic often is not sufficient to warrant an extra, but will cause congestion if left in
the yard. Traffic in most complex blocks cannot be left in the bowl because the class
tracks holding the blocks must be reassigned every 12 hours. Leaving excess complex
traffic in the departure yard may compromise the fluidity of assembly operations for both
complex and non-complex trains. ()ptions available for flushing excess complex traffic
from the yard include:
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* Placing excess traffic from a complex block on a non-complex train which
traverses the same route as the heavy complex train. The non-complex train
obviously must have capacity available for the excess traffic, but if capacity is
available, the only operational changes necessary are a setoff of the excess traffic
at block destination or at an appropriate blockswap point. The traffic may or may
not be delayed as a result of this action, but yard fluidity will be maintained.
* Reassigning complex traffic to other complex or non-complex blocks, not
necessarily traversing the exact route as the original target train. Reassigned traffic
might incur delays or expenses in the form of added mileage or handlings, even if
reassigned to another complex block. However, clearing the bowl tracks after
processing of each complex is crucial for continuing operation. Rather than simply
cascading into future periods, leftover cars in the bowl negate the possibility of
processing the next group of complex trains and blocks.
3.2.6 Terminal Complex Strategy
To "dive right in" with a full implementation of a plan similar to the plan evaluated in
this section would be unwise on several grounds. Decision support tools crucial to the
development of the plan have not been reviewed in detail by service planners, and may not
reflect real-world conditions important to operating plan development but less relevant to
the models' previous strategic study roles. Even if the decision support tools were ready
to go, links between the tools and real-time control systems are still in the development
stages. Finally, even if a plan could generated and loaded to real-time control systems
immediately, execution breakdowns at the train and yard level and the inability to predict
and address volume fluctuations would quickly break down the complex processing
schedule.
Nevertheless, the nature of the performance changes generated by implementation of
the terminal complex is extremely promising. Average yard time at Nashville dropped by
41 %, and the improvement to individual traffic flows as a result of expedited processing
was often substantial. While traffic diverted from the complex was expected to experience
wholesale performance declines, those expectations were not substantiated by individual
flow data, although yard volumes must be reviewed further to ensure that rerouted traffic
is classified at appropriate points. Several of the bypass blocks built at Nashville were
highly successful in diverting traffic and reducing handlings. Overall, the Terminal
Complex strategy provided performance improvements to targeted traffic which were in
line with expectations, while decreasing performance of other traffic far less than
expected.
Extrapolation of cost savings to the entire network implies creation of complexes at
other CSXT yards. This is justified by the fact that traffic at many yards, both major and
minor, lends itself to complex-style coordinated processing. In fact, smaller yards at the
midpoint of a single trunk line may support even more efficient operations. Less traffic
would have to be diverted, as the match between inbound and outbound trains would be
cleaner than at Nashville, where traffic has many directional choices.
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The prospect of phased implementation provides a major safety net to implementation
of terminal complex schedules and coordinated processing. The schedule adherence
required when bowl tracks are turned twice per day can be learned, rather than adopted or
abandoned in a trial by fire. Given this safety net, the benefits demonstrated in this
evaluation dictate that implementation of the terminal complex strategy at a geographically
advantageous yard should proceed, accompanied by refinement of the planning tools and





Presently, most traffic is classified between three and five times over the course of a
trip. Each yard can build only a limited number of blocks, and therefore cannot guarantee
that a particular car will be blocked directly to its destination with no further rehandling.
One means of increasing the number of blocks that can be built at a yard is matrix
switching. Matrix switching involves humping cars to a group of tracks, then pulling each
track back and rehumping, resulting in finer blocks on each track. If three tracks are
matrix-switched at a yard, nine blocks can be built, with four tracks enabling 16 blocks,
and so on.
Figure 3.2() illustrates the two sorts performed in matrix switching. In the illustration,
the two cuts of unsorted cars would be humped into four tracks, upper track first, sorted
by only the number of the letter/number destination code. After the first hump, the four
resulting cuts are pulled back over the hump, with the topmost track at left, bottom track
at right, and so on. Next, the cuts are humped again, sorted by the letter of the
letter/number destination code. The first sort guarantees that the cars are also in
numerical order, resulting in sixteen blocks on four tracks.
Matrix switching has not enjoyed wide acceptance at North American hump yards
because it poses several problems that conventional hump operations avoid. Matrix
switching requires cuts of cars to be dragged back over the hump between the two sorting
stages, thus occupying the hump and hump engine in seemingly non-productive activity
and increasing the hump's exposure to potential mishaps. Routes from the bowl to the
receiving yard which avoid the hump can be used, but such movement often disrupts other
yard activities and is very time consuming.
In response to these problems, the Tandem Humping strategy was conceived.
Rehumping at a single facility would be avoided, as a large-scale matrix switching
operation would be created involving two hump yards. The goal of the strategy is to
create direct blocks to as many destinations as possible, so that cars processed in the
matrix would move in blocks destined directly to their terminating local trains without
further classification. Traffic flows moving in matrix blocks would save between one and
three handlings per trip, saving yard resources and time.
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Figure 3.2(): Matrix Switching
The Tandem Humping strategy differs from previous implementations of matrix
switching in two important ways:
The two passes over the hump occur at different yards, rather than a single yard.
Traffic entering the first yard is humped onto matrix tracks. Several times a day,
cuts on those tracks are assembled into trains and moved to the next facility, at
which they are humped a second time onto another set of matrix tracks, creating
finely-classified matrix blocks.
* The size of the matrix envisioned in the Tandem Humping strategy is much larger
than would be feasible if matrix switching were performed at a single facility. At a
single facility, cuts must be pulled back over the hump between the two passes
over the hump, a practice that could disrupt hump operations. Whereas a large
single-yard matrix might involve four tracks, the Tandem Humping strategy does
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not require cuts to be pulled back over the hump, and could support matrices as
large as 10 tracks by 10 tracks.
The two matrices envisioned in the Tandem Humping strategy would be operated
northbound and southbound at CSX's Louisville and Nashville hump yards, which are
approximately 19() miles apart and connected by a high-density route for merchandise and
automobile traffic.
Traffic in the northbound matrix would be humped at Nashville, move to Louisville,
and be humped a second time. At this point, it would be in one of up to 1()() fine blocks
destined directly for a local train. Traffic in the southbound matrix would travel the
reverse route, being humped first at Louisville, then at Nashville. Traffic mu.ist pass
through both yards to be included in the matrix blocks.
At each yard, up to 20 bowl tracks would be devoted to the matrix, up to 1() for a
northbound matrix and 1() for a southbound matrix. This requirement would cause certain
blocks to be eliminated at each yard, although some blocks could be replaced by
equivalent blocks processed in the matrices.
Each matrix would result in up to 1() tracks holding up to 10)() finely classified blocks.
If class-track overruns are to be avoided, the size of each block must be sharply limited, to
an average of 2.5 to 3 cars per day. The Tandem Humping strategy stretches the
conventional definition of a block, as standard yard blocks whose average volume falls
below 15 cars per day are viewed by CSXT as candidates for elimination.
If the very small matrix blocks were handled as individual blocks, the amount of
additional handling that would be required would negate the positive effects of fine
classification in the matrix. Therefore, handling clusters of matrix blocks as if each cluster
were a single, standard yard block is pivotal to the success of the strategy.
Matrix blocks would be assigned to yard tracks based on geographic proximity of
destinations. Bowl tracks containing matrix blocks would be pulled and the cars
assembled into outbound trains as if the tracks contained standard yard blocks. A train
leaving a matrix yard might have several clusters of matrix blocks, 5 to 2() blocks in all,
pulled from one or two bowl tracks. In order to reach their destinations, clusters of
blocks would undergo standard blockswapping.
As an example, Train A might leave Louisville with 2() matrix blocks pulled from two
tracks. At Cincinnati, Train A would swap 6 blocks to Train B, which would distribute
the blocks to several serving yards. At Dayton, Train A would set off three blocks at the
serving yard. At Lima, Train A would set off four blocks at the serving yard. At Fostoria,
Train A would swap the remaining seven blocks to Train C, which would distribute them
to several serving yards.
Such frequent blockswapping might seem to require additional resources, but
swapping of standard blocks takes place with similar frequency. Tandem Humping
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changes operations in that cars leaving matrix yards on matrix blocks need no additional
classification, only blockswapping, in order to reach their terminating local train. Matrix
blocks which arrive at serving yards may he placed on local trains without further
rehandling.
The principal drawbacks of the Tandem Humping strategy include:
* Elimination of yard blocks at Louisville and Nashville may force large amounts of
traffic to less efficient routings. Traffic which passes through one of the two yards
and whose block is eliminated may be classified into a different block, may move
out of route to the other yard in order to be processed in the matrix, or may avoid
both yards.
* While blocks processed in the matrix may have average volumes near 3 cars per
day, there is no guarantee that this volume appears regularly. For this reason, any
cluster of matrix blocks may overflow its howl track with little advance warning.
While block order can be maintained easily during bowl track overflows if an
empty track is available, Without examining every traffic flow, anticipation and
reaction to volume fluctuations would be difficult.
* If a matrix is to produce 1()() blocks in the proper order in the bowl, cuts must be
humped in a strict order in the second stage of the matrix, eliminating some
flexibility at the second-stage yard.
* Local trains would generally not receive all traffic via matrix blocks. Therefore,
the local train might have to take time to cut non-matrix traffic into its matrix
blocks.
3.3.2 Creating the Tandem Humping Operating Plan
The process of creating a Tandem Humping operating plan is complex. Matrix blocks
must be geographically proximate in order to facilitate blockswapping, and must also have
appropriate volume. In addition, the choices of blocks to eliminate at matrix yards, trains
carrying clusters of matrix blocks, and cluster blockswapping points are also challenging
problems for which few methodological precedents exist.
In the absence of quick, proven methods for creating such an operating plan, many
decisions were made manually using situation-specific criteria. In order to create an
operating plan representing tandem humping at Louisville and Nashville, these steps were
performed:
a. In order to represent the tandem humping matrices in modeled form, blocking
networks were modified. To reflect the northbound matrix, blocks were added
between Louisville and all CSXT network nodes, to reflect the possibility of a
matrix block from Louisville to any destination. At the same time, all blocks
destined to Louisville were eliminated except for the block from Nashville. The
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effect of these changes was that any traffic flow utilizing a northbound matrix
block at Louisville would have to pass through Nashville before passing through
Louisville. At Nashville, the traffic would be classified in the first stage of the
matrix and at Louisville classified in the second stage of the matrix.
b. A separate block tile was modified to reflect the southbound matrix. Blocks were
added between Nashville and all CSXT network nodes, to reflect the possibility of
a matrix block from Nashville to any destination. At the same time, all blocks
destined to Nashville were eliminated except for the block from Louisville. Thus,
in order to utilize a southbound matrix block at Nashville, traffic would have to
pass through Louisville first. At Louisville, traffic would be classified in the first
stage of the matrix and at Nashville classified in the second stage of the matrix.
c. Traffic was flowed over the two modified block files separately using the ABM. If
routing a traffic flow through the matrix was less costly than requiring that flow to
avoid the second-stage yard, then the ABM routed that flow via the northbound or
southbound matrix. Northbound flows were routed to Nashville, then Louisville,
then on a matrix block to the flow destination. Southbound flows were routed to
Louisville, then Nashville, then on a matrix block to the flow destination. If no
traffic destined for a particular node would benefit from processing in the matrix,
then no traffic would be assigned to the matrix block destined for that node. The
ABM routed traffic to 63 northbound matrix blocks, of which 15 already were
built at Louisville, and 26 southbound matrix blocks, of which 14 already were
built at Nashville [see Figures 3.21-3.26].
d. Traffic processed in the northbound and southbound matrices was identified using
ABM output reports and differentiated from non-matrix traffic through creation of
additional traffic classes representing northbound and southbound matrix traffic.
e. Matrix blocks which received no traffic were eliminated from the block files,
leaving only active matrix blocks.
f. Existing destinations receiving matrix traffic were eliminated from the matrix,
leaving a northbound matrix containing 48 new block destinations and a
southbound matrix containing 12 new block destinations. The decision to process
only new block destinations in the matrix was made for several reasons. If
processed in the matrix, blocks to existing destinations would not save any
downstream classifications, but would require all traffic on the blocks to pass
through both matrix yards, at the expense of considerable additional mileage for
some traffic. In addition, volumes on some matrix blocks to existing destinations
such as the Louisville-East St. Louis block were large enough to disrupt matrix
processing by threatening regular class track overruns at both matrix yards.
g. Matrix blocks chosen by the ABM were assigned to trains. Initially, the CSXT
Operations Research Block-to-Train Assignment Model was run, and the output
was modified to ensure that through trains departed Nashville and Louisville with
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groups of matrix blocks, and blockswapped matrix blocks to terminating local
trains at a single point [see Figures 3.27 and 3.28].
h. In order to make room for the matrix, other, non-matrix blocks were eliminated at
Louisville and Nashville. The northbound and southbound matrices chosen by the
ABM required only 1() tracks at Louisville and 11 tracks at Nashville rather than
the 2() tracks envisioned for two l()xl() matrices. Furthermore, not all merchandise
blocks at Nashville and Louisville were represented in the block file because of
node aggregation. Therefore, rather than eliminating 2() or even 1 I blocks at each
yard, blocks were eliminated according to the proportion of block destinations
represented in the block file at each yard. Seven of 31 base case blocks were
eliminated at Nashville. Two of the six blocks were reinserted into the matrix.
Eight of 37 base case blocks were eliminated at Louisville. Blocks were chosen
for removal manually, and were chosen in a way that minimized out-of-route
mileage and additional classification that displaced traffic would experience [see
Figure 3.29].
1. The ABM was used to create alternate routes for non-matrix traffic at Louisville
and Nashville whose original blocks had been deleted to make room for the matrix.
j. Blocks and traffic flows representing the matrices were combined with the non-
matrix operating plan and flows and evaluated in the SPM.
3.3.3 Examples
Figure 3.21 lists blocks chosen by the ABM for inclusion in the northbound and
southbound matrices. Blocks built at Louisville or Nashville in the base case are identified
as existing, while blocks added to the file to create the Tandem Humping operating plan
are identified as new blocks. To transfer base case blocks to the matrices does not save
car handlings, as no new, direct block is added. Building base case blocks in the matrix
offers the advantage of allowing several blocks to be built on one bowl track, but creates
the disadvantage of requiring all traffic using those blocks to be routed through both
matrix yards, even where this is highly inefficient.
Figure 3.22 summarizes classifications saved by matrix blocks between the second
matrix yard (Louisville northbound and Nashville southbound) and the destination. "New
Routing" refers to situations where no traffic moved to the matrix block destination via the
second stage yard in the base case. Note that this information does not represent the net
decrease in handlings for traffic flows which move the matrix blocks, because some traffic
flows using the matrix blocks must undergo additional classification in order to reach the
first matrix yard, negating handling savings achieved downstream from the matrix.
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E] North Matix Blocks South Matix Blocks 
Figure 3.23-3.26 summarize volumes assigned to matrix blocks. Figures 3.23 and
3.24 show existing and new block volumes in the northbound matrix, and Figures 3.25 and
3.26 show existing and new block volumes in the southbound matrix. In both directions,
existing blocks are much larger than new blocks, and contain a higher percentage of traffic
terminating at their respective nodes.
Figures 3.27 and 3.28 list block-to-train assignments for matrix blocks. Original
assignments were generated with a mileage- and capacity-based block-to-train assignment
model developed by Yen Slhan and Janmes Rinker of CSXT O)perations Research. In one
of its first major trials, the model performed extremely well in assigning groups of matrix
blocks to relatively few trains from Nashville and Louisville, and in minimizing block
mileage. However, some revisions were made to lessen the number of setouts made by
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Figure 3.27: Original and Revised Train Assignments
Blocks
for Northbound Matrix
Destination Model-Generated Train Assignment Revised Train Assignment
Lou isville/SOO Q375 Y336
Tiffin, OH 0376 0376 (to Willard/R635)
Warwick, OH 0376 Q376 (to Willard/D712)
Akron, OH 0376 0376 (to Willard/D712)
New Castle, PA 0376 N/C
Wilmington, DE Q376 0376 (to Willard/Q396)
Jessup, MD 0376 0376 (to Cumberland/R346)
Brunswick, MD Q376 0376 (to Cumberland/R346)
Hancock, WV 0376 0376 (to Cumberland/R342)
Demmler, PA 0376 0376 (to New Castle/B712)
Hamilton, OH 0376 0376 (to Middletown/D744)
Middletown, OH 0376 N/C
Emory Grove, MD Q376 (to Baltimore/B739) N/C
Richmond, VA 0376 (to Jessup/Q405) Q376 (to Baltimore/Q405)
Williamsburg, VA Q376 (to Jessup/Q405) 0376 (to Baltimore/Q405)
(to Richmond/H770) to Richmond/H770
Bittinger, PA Q376 (to Martinsburg/R342) Q376 (to Cumberland/R342)
(to Hagerstown/B738) (to Hagerstown/B738)
Lester, OH Q376 (to Sterling/R354) 0376 (to Willard/R354)
Parma, OH 0376 (to Sterling/R354) 0376 (to Willard/R354)
Cleveland, OH 0376 (to Sterling/R354) 0376 (to Willard/R354)
Philadelphia, PA 0376 (to Wilmington/Q396) 0376 (to Willard/Q396)
Russell, KY 0512 (to Cincinnati/H788) N/C
Huntington, WV 0512 (to Cincinnati/Q316) N/C
Washington, WV Q512 (to Cincinnati/Q316) N/C
Apple Grove, WV 0512 (to Cincinnati/Q316) N/C
Shelby, KY 0512 (to Cincinnati/Q691) N/C
Columbus, OH 0512 (to Cincinnati/R314) N/C
Washington Ct Hs, OH 0512 (to Cincinnati/R314) N/C
Taylor, OH Q512 (to Cincinnati/R314) N/C
(to Columbus/H783)
Mauzy, IN 0512 (to Cincinnati/R361) N/C
Indianapolis/CR 0512 (to CincinnatVR361) N/C
Washington, IN 0686 N/C
Dayton, OH R514 N/C
Lima, OH R514 N/C
Defiance, OH R514 R514 (to Lima/R516)
Fostoria, OH R514 N/C
Plymouth, Ml R514 R514 (to Lima/R516)
Port Huron, MI R514 (to Flint/R330) N/C
Sarnia, ON R514 (to Flint/R330) N/C
Vauces, OH R514 (to Fostoria/R635) N/C
Carey, OH R514 (to Fostoria/R637) N/C
Detroit, Ml R514 (to Plymouth/R516) R514 (to Lima/R516)
Fargo, ON R514 (to Plymouth/R514) R514 (to Lima/R516)
(to Detroit/R320) (to Detroit/R320)
Midland, MI R514 (to Saginaw/R331) R514 (to Flint/R331)
Frankfort, KY R547 N/C
Berea, KY R547 (to Patio/R549) N/C
E. Burnstadt, KY R547 (to Patio/R549) N/C
Corbin, KY R547 (to Patio/R549) N/C
Gatliff, KY R547 (to Patio/R549) N/C
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Figure 3.28: Original and Revised Block-to-Train Assignments for Southbound
Matrix Blocks
Destination Model-Generated Train Assignment Revised Train Assignment
Bainbridge, GA Q543 N/C
Live Oak, FL Q647 (to Waycross/Q605) N/C
Green Bay, FL Q647 (to Waycross/R441) N/C
Agrock, FL Q647 (to Waycross/R453) N/C
Savannah, GA Q676 (to Greenwood/Q691) R674 (to Greenwood/Q691)
Hybart, AL R521 (to Brewton/M730) N/C
Pace, FL R521 (to Goulding/M736) N/C
Chattahoochee, FL R521 (to Goulding/M736) N/C
Stilesboro, GA Added to matrix, manually routed R674
Elizabeth, GA R583 R674
Calhoun, GA R674 N/C
Cullman, AL Added to matrix, manually routed R685
Blue Creek, AL R685 N/C
Gaston, AL R685 N/C
The data in Figures 3.27 and 3.28 make it appear as though final delivery of matrix
blocks is performed by through trains, inefficiently duplicating work performed by local
trains and lengthening through train schedules. For example, because train Q376 is the
last train to handle the New Castle, PA matrix block, one might assume that train Q376
distributes the block's cars to customers. This situation would not occur in reality, and is
tolerated in the modeling environment because of node and train aggregation in the CSXT
network. Many local trains work in areas aggregated into a single ABM/TSS/SPM node,
and therefore do not appear in the model. In reality, local trains D746, D747, and D763
serve New Castle-area customers4 , and would pick up the matrix block in the New Castle
yard and distribute its cars after it was set out by Q376.
In order to make room for the matrices in the Louisville and Nashville bowls, blocks
were eliminated at both yards. Figure 3.29 lists blocks changed at each yard. Fewer
blocks were eliminated than the matrix requires because not all blocks are represented in
the files because of node consolidation and abstraction.5 Decisions on blocking changes
were tailored to minimize the negative impacts of the matrices on the set of modeled
traffic flows. Selecting blocks for elimination forces the researcher to confront a dilemma
caused by the inaccuracy of abstraction of the rail network in to the modeling
environment. The choice was between eliminating blocks which would have an
unrealistically minor impact on performance because the model fails to illustrate real-world
conditions, or failing to design an operating plan demonstrating the best possible network
performance of the Tandem Humping strategy.
In designing the Tandem Humping operating plan, the researcher chose the former
option. Note that all blocking changes at Louisville and half of the blocking changes at
Nashville listed in Figure 3.29 are "non-events" in that they cause no negative impact to
any modeled traffic. This does not reflect real-world conditions, but instead only reflects
the failure of the model to represent real-world conditions. For example, CSXT typically
interchanges more than 2() cars per day with Illinois Central in Memphis. However,
because of idiosyncrasies in the conversion of waybill records to QBASE records to an
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SPM flow file, these flows terminate at node 600) (Memphis local) rather than 604
(Memphis/IC), leaving the 615-604 block (Nashville-Memphis/IC) empty, and a good
candidate for deletion.
While this may seem to be poor analysis, the alternative is equally poor. The same
factors that make some vital blocks empty in the model also make other blocks
unrealistically large, or cause other blocks and traffic flows to not be represented.
Therefore, eliminating blocks to make room for the matrix based on the criterion of a
close match between the model and reality has the effect of overemphasizing the negative
impacts of to diversion.
Figure 3.29: Blocking Alterations to Create Space for Matrices at Louisville and
Nashville
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Location I Block Destination I Description I Comment I
of Change
Moved into All cars on the Lou-Nas block can be
Matrix classified in the first stage of the matrix
Louisville East St. Louis/MP Eliminated Zero volume in the base case
Louisville Brooklyn Jct, WV Eliminated Zero volume in the base case
Louisville Mauzy, IN Eliminated Zero volume in the base case
Louisville Bardstown Jct, KY Eliminated Zero volume in the base case
Louisville Paris, KY Eliminated Zero volume in the base case
Louisville Goulding, FL Eliminated Zero volume in the base case
Louisville Wauhatchie, TN Eliminated Zero volume in the base case
Nashville Louisville Moved into All cars on the Nas-Lou block can be
Matrix classified in the first stage of the matrix
Nashville Memphis/IC Eliminated Zero volume in base case
Nashville Edgemoor, TN Eliminated Zero volume in base case
Nashville Natco, TN Eliminated Zero volume in base case
Nashville Etowah, TN Eliminated 1.7 cars/day in base case; traffic diverted
to Atlanta
Nashville Cullman, AL Moved into 3.6 cars/day in base case; traffic not
Matrix moving via matrix diverted to
Birmingham or classified north of
Nashville
Nashville Stilesboro, GA Moved into 6.3 cars/day in base case; traffic not
Matrix moving via matrix diverted to Calhoun or
Wauhatchie
While not necessary to model the performance of the Tandem Humping strategy,
block-to-bowl track assignments are an important aspect of the Tandem Humping
operating plan, as the efficiency of train assembly and swapping of matrix blocks depends
highly on the order of matrix blocks in the bowl.
Figure 3.30 illustrates potential bowl track assignments for the northbound matrix
blocks at Louisville, the second stage yard. Blocks departing on the same outbound train
are grouped on the same track to the greatest extent possible. However, blocks departing
on train R514 were assigned to three tracks rather than two because no more than seven
blocks can be assigned to a single track.
Within a track, blocks are ordered according to the assumed sequence in which they
will be set out. As no yard layout diagrams were available when the northbound matrix
bowl track assignments were created, it was assumed that all trains departed with engines
toward the right side of the figure, in the same direction as the pullout, both at Louisville
and at subsequent yards at which blocks are swapped between trains. A train's departure
direction determines the order of blocks in each bowl track because blocks should be
ordered with the first block(s) to be set off closest to the engines. If actual train directions
were opposite those assumed here, the order of blocks carried by each train would be
reversed on each track.
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Figure 3.30: Block-to-Track Assignments for Northbound Matrix Blocks
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Figure 3.31 illustrates potential bowl track assignments for the southbound matrix
blocks at Nashville. The blocks on the 'A' track have been ordered such that Q543's block
may be trimmed from the track before its departure at 13:15, while R685's three blocks
wait for its 19:30 departure. Block ordering is also determined by each train's departure
direction. Train R674 departs Nashville in with engines toward the right side of the figure
while the other trains carrying multiple blocks depart Nashville with engines toward the
left side, including Q647 which picks up at a separate blockswapping yard rather than
from the departure yard. Blocks are ordered so that the next block to be set off is closest
to the engines. Had the matrix blocks been larger, block ordering may have been changed
to even the number of cars on each track at each matrix yard to minimize the likelihood of
a class track overrun.
In both directions, block order on bowl tracks and trains could also be influenced by
train makeup issues, such as placement of loads and empties in a train, regular presence of
hazardous materials in a block, or long car/short car placement issues. The issue of train
makeup is discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.5.
Figure 3.31: Block-to-Track Assignments for Southbound Matrix Blocks
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3.3.4 Changes in Performance
Performance of traffic routed through the northbound or southbound matrices due to
the Tandem Humping strategy changed in several ways:
* Traffic routed via the matrices underwent fewer handlings downstream from the
matrices, as was the intent of the strategy. Such traffic experienced corresponding
decreases in trip time, although blockswapping served to increase trip time relative
to movement on a through train.
* Traffic routed via the matrices sometimes experienced increases in handling and
trip time upstream from the matrices.
* Traffic routed via the matrices experienced both increases and decreases in
mileage.
* Traffic diverted from blocks eliminated to make room for the matrix experienced
increases in handlings and trip time relative to original routings. Notably, this
traffic did not increase in mileage.
Figure 3.32 lists traffic flows affected by the Tandem Humping strategy. Despite the
fact that matrix blocks from Nashville and Louisville to every network node were
originally offered as options to standard routing, only a very small fraction of the traffic
flows utilized the matrices. Whereas the volume of traffic diverted to make room for the
matrix is also quite small in absolute terms, it is large relative to volumes processed in the
matrix, and the negative impacts of diversion of this traffic have a large overall effect on
the results.
Figure 3.32: Traffic Flows Affected by the Tandem Humping Strategy
Description O/D Pairs Cars per Day
Northbound Matrix 92 66.4
Southbound Matrix 31 16.2
Diverted Traffic 20 13.2*
*3.5 cars/day of the diverted traffic was diverted to the southbound matrix, and is included
in the row above.
Figure 3.33 shows impacts on traffic performance due to the Tandem Humping
strategy. Effects are broken out by matrix direction because the original operating plan
creation process created new traffic classes to distinguish matrix and non-matrix traffic at
the matrix yards.
Note that the base case to which the Tandem Humping strategy is compared is not the
base case to which the Local Pre-Blocking and Termn.inal Complex Strategies were
compared. Instead, the basis for comparison is the ABM-Generated Routing strategy.
The ABM-Generated Routing strategy is one of two conventional strategies for improving
performance evaluated in this thesis. The ABM-Generated Routing strategy involves no
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changes to operating paradigm. Instead, it involves using the ABM to generate car
routes. The strategy is discussed in detail in Section 4.1.
It was necessary to compare the Tandem Humping strategy to the ABM-Generated
Routing case rather than CSXT's historical base case because the process of routing traffic
through the matrices caused the ABM to generate routes for all traffic, whereas only a
small proportion of that traffic was processed in the matrix. To compare the Tandem
Humping operating plan to the historical base case would have attributed effects to
Tandem Humping which in reality were caused by the ABM.
The issue of the influence of the ABM also arose in the Local Pre-Blocking and
Terminal Complex strategies. Because only a small number of traffic flows were routed
using the ABM for these strategies, the results could be taken at face value. However, use
of the ABM to route all flows in the Tandem Humping strategy created an impact too
large to ignore, necessitating use of the ABM-Generated Routing strategy as the basis for
financial and operating comparison.
Use of the ABM-Generated Routing case as the base case also allows us to consider
the question of whether savings over and above the ABM-Generated Routing strategy
justify the additional complexity of the Tandem Humping strategy.
Figure 3.33: Performance Changes due to the Tandem Humping Strategy
% of Cars
Change in Arriving Car
Average Within +/- Car Hours Car Miles Handlings
Dock-Dock 24 Hours of Saved Saved Saved
Strategy Trip Time Average Per Day Per Day Per Day
North Matrix Traffic: 66.4 cars/day
ABM-Gen. 161 Hrs. 79% () NA
Tand. Hum. 158 Hrs. 80% 209 (2,730) NA
South Matrix Traffic: 16.2 cars/day
ABM-Gen. 151 Hrs. 71% () () NA
Tand. Hum. 144 Hrs. 80% 115 (670) NA
Diverted Traffic: 9.7 cars/da 
ABM-Gen. 106 Hrs. 69% () NA
Tand. Hum. 120 Hrs. 64% (130) () NA
All Affected Traffic: 92.3 cars/day
ABM-Gen. 153 Hrs. 77% 0 () 0
Tand. Hum. 152 Hrs. 79% 196 (3,400)) 48
The dominant effect on performance due to the Tandem Humping strategy is an
increase in car miles relative to standard routings generated by the ABM. This is due to
the fact that in routing traffic via the matrix, the ABM was forced to choose between
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routing traffic through both matrix yards, or avoiding the second-stage yard entirely. If
traffic was processed in a matrix, then routing via both matrix yards was superior to
routing avoiding the second-stage yard, but was not necessarily superior to the base case
routing. Traffic originating near the matrix yards was particularly hard-hit by this
phenomenon, as it sometimes had few alternatives to routing via a second-stage yard. To
remove traffic increasing in mileage from the matrix would require examination of
individual flow performance and is not feasible at this time.
Other effects on performance are consistent with expectations in direction if not in
magnitude. Car hours and classifications decreased for matrix traffic, increased for
diverted traffic, with a slight overall decrease. Reliability changes due to the Tandem
Humping strategy are notably small for northbound matrix traffic and notably large for
southbound matrix traffic, with expected deterioration in diverted traffic and a slight
overall increase in reliability.
Figure 3.34 shows cost impacts of the Tandem Humping strategy relative to ABM-
Generated Routing. The effects on targeted flows were not extrapolated to the entire
network because traffic for which a matrix routing was evaluated and rejected is not
included in the tally of performance changes, thus making the set of targeted flows
deceivingly small, and the resulting extrapolation deceivingly large.
Figure 3.34: Additional Costs Saved (Generated) by the Tandem Humping
Strategy Compared to the ABM-Generated Routing Strategy
Period Value of Car Value of Car Value of Car Total
Hour Changes Mile Changes Handling
Changes
Per Day $0.1 K ($1.7 K) $0.1 K ($1.4 K)
Per Year $54 K ($621 K) $53 K ($514 K)
Figures do not sum due to rounding.
Examination of individual traffic flows may shed additional light on the Tandem
Humping strategy's failure to outperform the ABM-Generated Routing strategy. Figures
3.35a-3.35d illustrates operating changes experienced by individual traffic flows in the
Tandem Humping operating plan. Comparisons are shown between the Tandem Humping
strategy, the historical base case and the ABM-Generated Routing strategy.
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Figures 3.35a-3.35d: Performance and Routing Changes to Individual Traffic
Flows due to the Tandem Humping Strategy
Traffic Flow: Gallatin, TN - Berea, KY
1.1 cars/day
Observations: Traffic between Gallatin and northern points must travel via Louisville. Therefore, the
requirement that traffic to northern matrix destinations either pass through both Louisville and Nashville or
avoid Louisville leaves this flow and others originating at Gallatin with a single option, causing an increase
in mileage and trip time relative to the other cases. Thus, the cost of moving this flow increases
considerably as a result of the Tandem Humping operating plan. On the bright side, reliability increases
significantly for this flow because of the added departure between Nashville and Louisville and the
substitution of a blockswap for a classification at Patio.
Blocks






Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
R534 R534 R573
1730 DP Gallatin 1730 DP Gallatin 0430 DP Gallatin
2100 AR Louisville 2100 AR Louisville 0600 AR Nashville
R547 R547 0526 R534
1900 DP Louisville 1900 DP Louisville 0400 1200 DP Nashville
0200 AR Patio 0200 AR Patio 1300 2100 AR LouIsville
C703 C703 R547
0630 DP Patio 0630 DP Patio 1900 DP Louisville





Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
74% 74% 89%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
L/C/B Hours 68 UC/B Hours 68 UC/B Hours 96
O/T Hours 25 O/T Hours 25 O/T Hours 20
Miles 301 Miles 301 Miles 343
Class 2 Class 2 Class 2
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 3.35b
Traffic Flow: Memphis - Port Huron, Ml
1.8 cars/day
Observations: The Tandem Humping strategy works exactly as intended to improve this flow relative to
both the historical and ABM-Generated routes. Addition of a second daily departure between Nashville
and Louisville and substitution of a blockswap for a classification at Flint provide a considerable increase
in reliability and decrease in average trip time. The favorable performance of this flow is representative of
many flows between Memphis and northern matrix destinations. These flows were able to enjoy the
downstream benefits of the matrix without increases in mileage and handlings upstream from the matrix.
Blocks
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
Memphis-Nashville Memphis-Nashville Memphis-Nashville
Nashville-Louisville Nashville-Louisville Nashville-Louisville
Louisville-Flint Louisville-Flint Louisville-Port Huron
Flint-Port Huron Flint-Port Huron (swap at Flint)
Schedule
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
R532 R532 R532
0700 DP Memphis 0700 DP Memphis 0700 DP Memphis
1930 AR Nashville 1930 AR Nashville 1930 AR Nashville
Q526 Q526 Q526 R534
0400 DP Nashville 0400 DP Nashville 0400 1200 DP Nashville
1300 AR Louisville 1300 AR Louisville 1300 2100 AR Louisville
R514 R514 R514
2200 DP Louisville 2200 DP Louisville 2200 DP Louisville
0400 AR Flint 0400 AR Flint 0400 AR Flint
R330 R330 R330
1600 DP Flint 1600 DP Flint 1600 DP Flint
1827 AR Port Huron 1827 AR Port Huron 1827 AR Port Huron
OlD Reliability
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
75% 75% 97%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
UC/B Hours 144 UC/B Hours 144 UC/B Hour 118
O/T Hours 34 O/T Hours 34 O/T Hours 34
Miles 949 Miles 949 Miles 949
Class 3 Class 3 Class 2
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 3.35c
Traffic Flow: Memphis (SSW) - Stilesboro, GA
0.4 cars/day
Observations: When the Stilesboro block was added to the matrix because of bowl space requirements
at Nashville, this flow was left without a route. Movement to Louisville and back for processing in the
matrix was not an option because of the extreme mileage addition. Instead, classifications at Bridgeport
and Calhoun were added with no increase in mileage but considerable degradations in reliability, trip time,
and operating costs. This flow is representative of the nearly 10 cars per day diverted from the Cullman,
Stilesboro, and Etowah blocks at Nashville.
Blocks






Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
Q536 Q536 Q536
1800 DP Memphis 1800 DP Memphis 1800 DP Memphis
1100 AR Nashville 1100 AR Nashville 1100 AR Nashville
R589 R589 R674
1500 DP Nashville 1500 DP Nashville 0130 DP Nashville








Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
78% 78% 66%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
UC/B Hours 61 UC/B Hours 61 UC/B Hour 96
O/T Hours 50 O/T Hours 50 O/T Hours 50
Miles 473 Miles 473 Miles 473
Class 1 Class 1 Class 3
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0
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Figure 3.35d
Traffic Flow: Gadsden AL - Russell, KY
1.3 cars/day (two flows, 0.2 cars/day and 1.1 cars/day)
Observations: This flow was initially improved by an ABM-generated route which eliminated the
classification at Ragland. Although the Tandem Humping strategy replaced a classification with a
blockswap downstream from the matrix at Cincinnati, a classification was added at Nashville, and trip
time rose and reliability suffered relative to the ABM-generated route. This flow is characteristic of several
northbound flows which incurred an additional classification upstream from the matrix in order to save a
classification downstream from the matrix. In such cases, performance was often quite similar to
performance on the ABM-generated route, except where the saved classification downstream from the
matrix was replaced with a relatively lengthy blockswap, as was the case here. The long blockswap time
at Cincinnati suggests that schedule sliding to shorten blockswap times would improve the Tandem
Humping strategy.
Blocks





Cincinnati-Russell (swap at Cincinnati)
Schedule
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
M770 M770 M770
1158 DP Gadsden 1158 DP Gadsden 1158 DP Gadsden
1351 AR Ragland 1600 AR Birmingham 1600 AR Birmingham
M771 Q572 Q520
2322 DP Ragland 1000 DP Birmingham 2130 DP Birmingham
0300 AR Birmingham 0130 AR Louisville 0830 AR Nashville
Q572 R518 Q526R534
1000 DP Birmingham 0730 DP Louisville 0400 1200 DP Nashville
0130 AR Louisville 1700 AR Cincinnati 1300 2100 AR Louisville
R518 R220
0730 DP Louisville 1100 DP Cincinnati 05121745 DP Louisville1700 AR Cincinnati 1800 AR Russell 0130 AR Cincinnati
R220
1100 DP Cincinnati H788
1800 AR Russell 1830 DP Cincinnati
0030 AR Russell
O/D Reliability
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
64% 77% 67%
55% 66% 62%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Historical Base Case ABM-Generated Routing Tandem Humping
L/C/B Hours 125 UC/B Hours 107 UC/B Hour 125
125 107 125
O/T Hours 49 O/T Hours 49 O/T Hours 49
39 39 39
Miles 741 Miles 741 Miles 741
Class 4 Class 3 Class 3
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1
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The example flows illustrate that, for traffic flows which meet very strict conditions,
matrix processing and movement via direct blocks can provide benefits above and beyond
routings generated by the ABM. The conditions include:
* Movement in a single block between the origin and the first stage of the matrix
* No increase in mileage due to matrix routing
* ABM-generated route also stipulates handling at both Nashville and Louisville
* As little blockswapping as possible downstream from the matrix
For traffic flows which do not meet these conditions, the Tandem Humping strategy
appears to provide few benefits. Classification points are re-shuffled, but not
fundamentally reduced relative to standard ABM-generated routes, and routing via the
matrix sometimes causes trip mileage to increase.
In addition to the effects on traffic classified in the matrices, the Tandem Humping
strategy has significant effects on traffic diverted to make room for the matrices at
Louisville and Nashville. Although the Nashville-Stilesboro and Nashville-Cullman blocks
were available in the matrix, less than half of the traffic that moved in those blocks in the
ABM-Generated Routing operating plan was routed via the matrix, and even this traffic
saved no classifications relative to standard routes generated by the ABM. Traffic in these
blocks not processed in the matrix incurred additional classification as a result of the
Tandem Humping strategy.
3.3.5 Implementation Issues
The following discussion of implementation issues assumes that, through more careful
selection of O/D traffic flows and block destinations for matrix processing, the Tandem
Humping strategy can provide improvements in service reliability and operating costs
beyond those demonstrated by the ABM-Generated Routing strategy. If the Tandem
Humping strategy is ever to be implemented, the issues described below will have to be
considered.
3.3.5.1 Designing a Tandem Humping Operating Plan
Of the three sophisticated alternatives, the dimensions of the Tandem Humping
operating plan are influenced most strongly by the presence, absence, and volume of
individual traffic flows. Presence of individual O/D pairs can dictate the inclusion of
blocks in the matrix. If a consignor sends traffic to a different destination, then the matrix
block designated for that traffic may no longer be justified. Conversely, if an O/D pair
experiences a large increase in volume, it may justify creation of a new, direct block,
which would surpass the efficiency of the matrix because the traffic would have to
undergo even fewer handlings than if moved through the matrix.
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Because of its inherent sensitivity to individual O/D pairs and volumes, a Tandem
Humping operating plan would require constant updating, requiring much service planning
effort. A system which predicts traffic flows either through forecasting methods or early
visibility of customer consignments would provide more current traffic flow information
than used in this analysis.
In the absence of a new system for generating traffic flow data, current methods will
suffice, with some considerations. While raw waybill data was used to determine local
pre-blocks, and QBASE connection volume data was used to determine the blocks and
trains to be included in the terminal complex, the Tandem Humping operating plan is
based solely on information in ABM/TSS/SPM files. Attempts to ensure that data used to
develop the plan is accurate must focus not only on the waybilled moves in the WMS file,
and their translation into more compact QBASE records, but also on the routines which
build ABM/TSS/SPM files from QBASE data.
Presently, the community of users of ABM/TSS/SPM files at CSXT is tiny compared
to the community of users of QBASE and WMS data. Accordingly, relatively little
attention has been paid to the integrity of ABM/TSS/SPM data. Before a production
version of a Tandem Humping operating plan can be built, the ABM/TSS/SPM files and
file creation process will have to be reviewed for accuracy and completeness by service
planners as well as operations research analysts.
An unanswered analytical question which may further condemn or vindicate the
Tandem Humping strategy is the presence of empty cars of common types in the matrix.
It may be the case that the fine classification and direct delivery called for by the Tandem
Humping strategy could also be achieved without a matrix, simply through the methods
and timing with which individual empty cars are matched to customer demands.
Another empty car issue concerns the set of empty car O/D pairs. Whereas empty
flows appear in the SPM exactly as do loaded flows, the set of individual O/D pairs
generated by empty redistribution will be somewhat arbitrary in a given month. For
example, empty grain cars released south of Nashville are classified at Nashville and
distributed to Evansville, Danville, Lafayette and other points on and off the Chicago-
Nashville corridor every day. While the set of empty car release and demand points are
fixed, the resulting O/D matchups depend on magnitude and timing of demand and fluidity
of the yards that classify the cars. To use this set of historic O/D pairs as the basis for the
Tandem Humping operating plan implies that individual moves will be repeated.
3.3.5.2 Operating Instructions in the Field
The Tandem Humping strategy is complicated. If the matrix switching and
coordinated blockswapping called for by the strategy are to be successfully executed, the
representation of the plan to train crews, yard crews, and yardmasters must be as simple
and transparent as possible.
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Yardmasters are responsible for assigning blocks to bowl tracks, whether the blocks
are standard yard blocks or part of a matrix. Control of a three- or four-track matrix using
current yard systems does not pose a substantial management problem. However, as the
matrix grows in size, the amount of information and number of decisions the yardmaster
must make will increase exponentially. Superficially complex decisions concerning matrix
block-to-track assignment and train assembly may distract yardmasters, and should be
made by decision-support systems to the greatest possible extent.
Examples of details which can be made invisible include any instances when a group of
matrix blocks can be treated as a single unit. During assembly, when several tracks of
matrix cars are added to a single train, the yardmaster should not have to say, think, or
add to a switch list an instruction like, "Pull the A, B, C, D, E, F, and G blocks from track
B23 and shove into track D7." If the Tandem Humping operating plan is operating
smoothly and is well represented in an information system, the fact that there are 48
blocks on 7 tracks in the northbound matrix should be obvious to no one, except perhaps
local train crews who must dissect setouts of matrix blocks left by road trains.
Paradoxically, however, in the event that a car is misclassified and must be inserted
into a string of matrix blocks, a yardmaster must have the detail available in order to direct
the proper placement of the car. Likewise, if the matrix tracks are assembled in the wrong
order at the first stage yard, block order in the second stage bowl will change, and
yardmasters will have to respond with altered instructions to yard crews. Blocks normally
on the ends of tracks would be buried within tracks and vice versa, and yardmasters would
have to be capable of generating instructions to cherry-pick blocks during assembly.
Operating plan maintenance causing addition or removal of individual blocks will
impact processing at Nashville and Louisville relatively little as long as matrix track
requirements remain stable, but will impact the trains which swap matrix blocks and local
trains which receive them, especially if swap trains or setoff points are continually added
or removed from the plan. Communication of plan changes to the relevant personnel will
also be a key factor in the success of the Tandem Humping strategy.
3.3.5.3 Operational Contingency Planning
The Tandem Humping strategy is unlike the Local Pre-Blocking and Terminal
Complex strategies in that it does not require greater schedule adherence than in
traditional operations. Because the matrices at Nashville and Louisville are operated in a
continuous process, hump and assembly schedules for matrix trains may be varied in
response to trackwork curfews or other operational contingencies.
The lack of tightly scheduled connections allows additional flexibility in executing a
Tandem Humping operating plan. In response to light volume, yard managers could elect
to move cars between the two matrix yards on one train rather than two. As long as the
cuts were ordered properly on the train, second-stage processing could proceed normally.
Likewise, heavy volume could prompt an extra train between stages with no adverse
effects on the second stage.
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The issue of in-train car placement may burden the Tandem Humping strategy.
Ordinarily, cars requiring special placement such as dangerous loads, long cuts of empty
cars, and cuts of extra long or short cars are switched into proper position away from the
engines or at the rear of the train before departure. In such cases, the integrity of large
blocks can often be maintained.
Individually placing cars within trains is time-consuming and sometimes causes train
delays but does not unduly complicate switching at downstream yards because single-
stage switching does not require cars to be in a preset order. In the Tandem Humping
strategy, however, cars which are switched out of block order after the first stage of the
matrix must either be put back in order before the second stage of the matrix or humped
to alternate tracks and individually placed in matrix blocks after second stage humping is
complete. Furthermore, such cars may require reswitching after the second stage of the
matrix as well, potentially complicating the task of cluster blockswapping because small
matrix blocks cannot easily be kept together when their cars require special placement.
While it is possible to exclude some 'problem cars' such as dangerous loads, from
processing in the matrix, other car patterns requiring reswitching may arise unexpectedly
due to grouping in the matrix. The extent of this problem is not known, but could be
determined through simulation, or ignored until reported by field personnel.
3.3.6 Conclusions for the Tandem Humping Strategy
Even after extensive development and analysis, the Tandem Humping strategy is far
from refined, and this lack of refinement undoubtedly contributes to the poor financial and
operating performance exhibited by the strategy. However, even if it is assumed that
financial performance can be improved by returning poor-performing flows to their base
case or ABM-generated routes, the Tandem Humping strategy still suffers from three
undeniable weaknesses:
* The strategy is exceedingly complex both from an analytical/service design
standpoint and from an execution standpoint. The process of creating a Tandem
Humping operating plan is long and confusing. Simple depiction of the plan to
those who must execute it would require alterations to information systems, as
well as extensive instruction. In addition, the dimensions of the operating plan are
very sensitive to the presence and volume of individual traffic flows. An effective
plan will need constant revision, and the ability to predict individual traffic
movements. Every revision to the plan will require alterations in execution in the
field. While such alterations would be minor at the matrix yards, individual trains
could be significantly impacted.
* The strategy aids an extremely small set of traffic flows. This weakness can be
remedied through further design activity. Inclusion of existing block destinations
in the matrices will free bowl tracks for other uses, better utilize the matrix bowl
tracks, and create more logical groupings of blocks. The drawback of including
existing block destinations in the matrix is that traffic in these blocks must pass
1(9
through both matrix yards, or be excluded from the block. Destinations served
only from the matrix yards, like New Albany, IN from Louisville, or the Memphis
interchange blocks from Nashville, will remain poor matrix candidates because
out-of-route mileage caused by routing traffic through both Louisville and
Nashville overwhelms savings from avoided classification.
Matrix switching across two hump yards duplicates costly, time consuming, and
reliability-degrading yard processing functions. In exchange for avoiding pullback
from the bowl to the receiving yard for rehumping, inbound and outbound
inspection and train assembly are replicated. The effects of this are evident in the
performance of individual traffic flows for which there is no net decrease in
classification, but merely movement of classification to Louisville or Nashville
from other yards.
At this juncture, analytic and operational complexity and lack of benefits render the
Tandem Humping strategy non-viable. CSXT's many traffic flows over a dense network
increase the amount of rerouting and excess mileage required to flow through both matrix
yards. For this reason, the future success of the Tandem Humping strategy in the study
region is unlikely even if all analytical and operating issues are addressed.
The Tandem Humping strategy's lack of success in the study region does not
necessarily imply that the strategy could never provide benefits. If Tandem Humping were
applied to a linear network in which most traffic passed through both yards in the base
case and local traffic inclusion was minor, the rerouting and mileage drawbacks of the
Tandem Humping strategy would diminish. The ability to achieve net decreases in
classification is doubtful even for a linear network, however, as the bowl space required to
build matrix blocks could be used to build blocks to many linear-network points.
The Tandem Humping strategy's lack of success in no way indicts matrix switching at
a single facility, as the mileage, handling, and traffic inclusion problems of the Tandem
Humping operating plan would largely disappear if matrix traffic did not have to pass
through both Nashville and Louisville.
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4 Conventional Changes to the Operating Plan
Modeling the Local Pre-Blocking and Terminal Complex operating plans illustrated
several issues related to network performance. In each case, use of the ABM to create
origin-destination routes for traffic using new blocks provided benefits that defied
expectations. In the case of the Terminal Complex strategy, the overall effects of
rerouting traffic from the complex to alternate routes were positive rather than negative.
In both the Local Pre-Blocking and Terminal Complex strategies, some cars were routed
in ways which increased trip time and car handlings, but which remained superior on a
cost basis because of the countervailing effects of large decreases in car mileage. In
addition, the Terminal Complex strategy illustrated that a high-performance yard,
represented by sharply reduced PMAKE parameters, can significantly reduce O/D trip
time and increase reliability for the traffic it processes.
These observations led to the creation of two additional alternative strategies. These
strategies are conventional in that they do not call for changed roles for yards, crews, or
trains. Instead, the ABM-Generated Routing strategy presumes a change in the service
design process, as the ABM is used to generate car-to-block assignments and classification
tables. The Improved Yard Performance strategy calls for benchmark-level performance
at Radnor Yard in Nashville, classification hub of the Chicago-Nashville corridor.
The question that the two conventional alternatives attempt to answer is no longer that
of whether alternative strategies of operational organization can yield significant reliability
and cost benefits. Rather, each conventional alternative answers an individual question.
Analysis of the ABM-Generated Routing strategy addresses the question, "Can railroads
make significant improvements in reliability and cost without an operational paradigm
shift, by adopting decision support in the service design process?" Analysis of the
Improved Yard Performance strategy addresses the question, "What is the extent of the
effect of benchmark-level performance at a yard on O/D reliability and operating costs?"
4.1 ABM-Generated Routing
4.1.1 Description
The premise behind the ABM-Generated Routing strategy is simple. Currently,
classification tables holding car-to-block assignments at each yard are maintained by
CSXT Service Design staff, and updated as necessary, usually in conjunction with a
change to the block destinations maintained at a yard. Traffic routing efficiency is
stressed-every attempt is made to avoid overhandling cars, moving cars out of route, and
embedding yard dwell time in car routes. However, car routes are seldom mathematically
checked to determine whether the tradeoff between handlings, mileage, and time is
appropriate to the unit costs CSXT has calculated for car miles, car hours, and car
handlings.
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The ABM Manu-Block module is designed to produce a set of car-to-block
assignments, essentially classification tables, which make the tradeoff between car miles,
hours, and handlings in a cost minimizing way. Given O/D traffic flows, a list of blocks
built at each yard, line and yard information, and cost parameters, the ABM flows traffic
over the available blocks using a valiant of Dijkstra's label-setting shortest path algorithm.
In the absence of capacity constraints, the problem is "NP-easy", meaning that the exact
least-cost solution can be found by a simple linear program in minimal computation time.
If blocks or yards reach capacity, however, the problem becomes "NP-hard", Because
the simple shortest-path algorithm does not heed capacity constraints, more advanced
mathematical methods such as mixed integer programs are required, and computation time
required to find the exact least-cost solution increases exponentially. In practice, the two
approaches which arise to address capacity constraints are to use heuristic solution
methods to avoid constraint violations, or to ignore the constraints and use the model to
locate and estimate the size of operational bottlenecks, and not to generate actual
operating instructions.
In creating an operating plan based on ABM-generated car routings, yard and block
volume constraints were ignored, for several reasons. Yard volume constraints were
ignored because they were static. Many yards can handle additional volume if it arrives
during hours that are otherwise relatively idle. If a continuously busy yard is called on by
the ABM to handle more traffic, a more effective solution than diverting traffic and
causing time and mileage expense may involve manipulating the list of block destinations,
a related but separate service design activity. Block volume constraints were considered
artificial, as they do not consider the possibility of multiple block dispatches. Finally,
flowing traffic over the blocks using the ABM was not expected to cause major volume
shifts between lines. Those block volume changes that did occur would cause
corresponding changes in volumes of individual trains, but it was thought that these
changes could be dealt with largely by manipulating block-to-train assignments, and
without a net increase in train service.
Thus to create an operating plan representing the ABM-Generated Routing strategy,
the ABM was used in an almost cursory fashion to recreate blanked classification tables.
No block destination lists were manipulated, no trains rescheduled, and no blocks
reassigned to different trains. Even within the ABM itself, many of the cost parameters
which could be varied individually, such as the cost per car mile on a link, were treated as
global, as they were for the other strategies.
Before the strategy was modeled, there was limited understanding of the issues and
effects that ABM-generated car-to-block assignments would raise. Therefore, to expend
large amounts of effort at calibration of individual cost parameters and constraints would
have diverted attention from the primary objective, which was to determine whether such
effort could ever be justified in the use of decision support in the operating plan
development process.
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4.1.2 Changes in Performance
Generation of car-to-block assignments using the ABM caused each O/D pair to be
reviewed to detennrmine whether it moved on its minimum cost route. If a routing change
was warranted., it generally took one of the following forms:
* Any cars which did not utilize existing bypass blocks in the base case were
rerouted onto those blocks, saving a classification.
* Some but not all cars which moved on greater-than-minimum-distance routes in
the base case, usually to save time or classifications, were transferred to lower-cost
routes which eliminated mileage but which often increased trip time and
classifications and decreased reliability.
To understand changes made by the ABM, one must be aware of the cost relationships
driving the selection of routes. The ABM used costs of $3.()00 per car handling, $0.75 per
car hour, and $0().5() per car mile in determining the cost of potential car routes. Thus, one
car handling = four car hours = six car miles. Alternately, if classification at a given yard
requires an average of 2() hours, then one handling + handling time = 24 car hours = 36
car miles.
In an average trip, a car will generate between five and ten times as many miles as
hours, and more than 100 times as many miles as handlings. Long node-to-node distances
create large discrete units of cost, made up of car mileage costs and costs of time required
to traverse the route. For these reasons, the ABM tends to minimize car miles at the
expense of additional time and handlings. The costs used by the model in this analysis
confirm the historical emphasis on maximizing profit by minimizing costs, in this case the
costs of car and train miles. However, the costs of time and handlings may be unnaturally
low, as they account only for car ownership and direct switching costs, but fail to account
for the cost, in terms of lost business or inability to charge higher rates, that may result
from slow or unreliable service.
Network-letvel car mile, hour, and handling savings due to the ABM-Generated
Routing strategy are shown in Figure 4.1. Unlike the other strategies, the ABM-
Generated Routing strategy was tested on the entire CSXT network rather than a
subnetwork such as the Chicago-Nashville corridor. Figure 4.1 reflects changes to all
8171 cars per day in the network, and is not extrapolated.
Car mile reductions are by far the largest source of savings, and represent a savings of
approximately 2.6% of network car miles. The numbers in Figure 4.1 reflect aggregate
savings. Individual traffic flows may have experienced increases in one or several
categories, such as car hours and car handlings, if the corresponding mileage savings
resulted in a lower total cost.
It appears to have often been the case that traffic flows suffered increases in trip time
or handlings in exchange for car mile savings. One car hour was saved for every 9.5 car
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miles saved. 9.5 miles per hour is considerably slower than CSXT's point-to-point line
speeds, which range between 20 and 40 miles per hour. Therefore, much time saved on
the line was spent in yards, although car hour savings still remained positive due to other
factors such as increased use of existing bypass blocks.
Figure 4.1: Changes in Car Hours, Miles, Handlings, and Reliability due to
ABM-Generated Routing Strategy
% of Cars
Arriving Car Car Car
Average Within Handlings Hours Miles
Dock-Dock +/- 24 Hours Saved Per Saved Saved
Strategy Trip Time of Average Day Per Day Per Day
Base Case 86 Hrs. 84% 0 0 0
ABM-Generated
Routing 85 Hrs. 85% 6()8 8,254 78,400
Annual cost savings due to the changes total more than $17 million, of which more
than $14 million is attributable to reductions in car miles. Daily and annual cost savings
due to the ABM-Generated Routing strategy are shown in Figure 4.N2.
Figure 4.2: Annual Cost Savings due to the ABM-Generated Routing Strategy
Value of Value of Value of
Saved Car Saved Car Saved Car
Period Handlings Hours Miles Total
Per Day $1.8 K $6.2 K $39.2 K $47.2 K
Per Year $0.7 M $2.3 M $14.3 M $17.3 M
Figures do not sum due to rounding.
Individual traffic flows experienced a variety of performance improvements and
degradations due to the ABM-Generated Routing strategy. Figures 4.3a-4.3f show
representative examples of changes to traffic flows.
114
Figures 4.3a-4.3f: Performance and Routing Changes to Individual Traffic Flows
due to the ABM-Generated Routing Strategy
Traffic Flow: Monon, IN - Bittinger, PA
1.5 cars/day
Observations: This traffic flow experienced mild decreases in trip time and reliability as a result of its
ABM-generated route. However, the increase in mileage experienced by this traffic flow appears to
outweigh the car hour and car handling savings. Given the cost relationships used by the ABM, with 125
miles added and two handlings saved, the total trip must be shortened by 85 hours to 'break even'. Even
if the 23-hour blockswap time at Emory Grove were eliminated, car hour savings would not approach those
necessary to reduce costs. The reason for this flow's departure from cost minimization is that the ABM
determines block mileage based on the minimum-distance route, rather than the route actually taken by
the train carrying the block. Thus, the ABM assumed that the Louisville-Baltimore block would move
across the coalfields of West Virginia, incurring fewer car miles than the actual route via Cincinnati,
Willard, New Castle, and Cumberland. The issue of actual vs. computed block mileage arises in several
subsequent example flows, and is a serious issue in routing cars using the ABM.
Blocks (Read down, then across)
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing




(swap at Emory Grove)
Schedule (Read down, then across)
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
J734 Q378 J734
1707 DP Mt. Vernon 0845 DP Willard 1707 DP Mt. Vernon
2230 AR Evansville 2315 AR Cumberland 2230 AR Evansville
R561 R342 R561
1300 DP Evansville 0200 DP Cumberland 1300 DP Evansville
2300 AR Louisville 0715 AR Hagerstown 2300 AR Louisville
Q376 B738 0376
0500 DP Louisville 0410 DP Hagerstown 0500 DP Louisville
0130 AR Willard 0413 AR Bittinger 0600 AR Baltimore
B739
0920 DP Baltimore
1304 AR Emory Grove
B737
1202 DP Emory Grove
1425 AR Bittinger
O/D Reliability
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
56% 51%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
L/C/B Hours 195 UC/B Hours 179
O/T Hours 25 O/T Hours 25
Miles 1048 Miles 1173
Class 5 Class 3
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 4.3b
Traffic Flow: Defiance, OH - Memphis (SSW)
2.3 cars/day
Observations: This flow gains considerably in trip time and reliability due to elimination of handlings by
the ABM. A key element of the new route is dubious, however. The existence of a Defiance-Nashville
block, swapped at Walbridge suggests that R509 or possibly an unmodeled serving local or yard switcher
pre-blocks originating traffic at Defiance for Nashville. Since no blocks were added to the base case block
list, this block existed in the base case, but was not utilized by the traffic flow. BASE information for
traffic originating at Defiance in November 1993 indicates that most originating traffic was taken to
Walbridge to be switched. Therefore, the existence of the Defiance-Nashville block can probably be
attributed to a technical error in the process which creates flow, block, and blockswap files from the
QBASE database. This error was discovered relatively early in the analysis, but was deemed
uncorrectable in the short term. Blocks between points in the Chicago-Nashville corridor were altered
individually, but many instances of the error remain in the block list.
Blocks
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
Defiance-Walbridge Defiance-Nashville





Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
R509 R509
0915 DP Defiance 0915 DP Defiance
1200 AR Walbridge 1200 AR Walbridge
Q507 R515
0400 DP Walbridge 1400 DP Walbridge
2359 AR Cincinnati 2100 AR Nashville
R313 R519 Q535
0430 0200 DP Cincinnati 0045 DP Nashville






1530 AR Memphis (SSW)
O/D Reliability
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
83% 94%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
L/C/B Hours 168 UC/B Hours 139
O/T Hours 32 O/T Hours 32
Miles 832 Miles 830
Class 4 Class 1
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 4.3c
Traffic Flow: Middletown, OH - New Albany, IN
1.0 cars/day
Observations: The ABM-generated route results in a modest gain in reliability and a substantial reduction
in trip time and elimination of a handling compared to the base case. This route also is problematic, but
this time because of oversight on the part of the researcher. R221 is one-half of a pair of trains dedicated
to a single customer. While it may appear that this train carries a general purpose Middletown-Cincinnati
block, it is unclear whether traffic from other customers or destined for other points is allowed into this
block, or even whether this traffic flow originates at the customer served by R220/R221. A general
purpose Middletown-Cincinnati block carried by a different train may exist, but the block file creation
process designated the most prevalent single train as carrying the Middletown-Cincinnati block. If
assignment of a Middletown-Cincinnati block to R221 is accurate, then the composition of the block
should be restricted, but this was not manually checked before routes were regenerated.
Blocks






Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
D743 R221
2000 DP Middletown 0430 DP Middletown
2129 AR Lima 0700 AR Cincinnati
Q507 R313 R519
2230 DP Lima 0430 0200 DP Cincinnati
2359 AR Cincinnati 1330 1100 AR Louisville
R313 R519 J772
0430 0200 DP Cincinnati 0800 DP Louisville
1330 1100 AR Louisville 1129 AR New Albany
J772
0800 DP Louisville
1129 AR New Albany
O/D Reliability
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
67% 74%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
L/C/B Hours 98 UC/B Hours 68
O/T Hours 29 O/T Hours 33
Miles 155 Miles 155
Class 3 Class 2




Traffic Flow: Louisville - Nucor, IN
6.1 cars/day
Observations: The ABM-generated route requires more time, is less reliable, and is physically longer
than the base case route. Again, the cause for the failure of the ABM to improve on the base case is that
the ABM does not consider block-to-train assignments when calculating block mileage. Rather, the ABM
incorporates the assumption that all blocks traverse the shortest series of links between origin and
destination. The ABM calculated a lower mileage for the Louisville-Lafayette block than could have been
possible. Using the south end of the Monon route through now-abandoned node 144, the distance
between Louisville and Nucor via Lafayette is 229 miles. Via Evansville, the distance is 329 miles, hence
the ABM's choice of Lafayette as the classification location. This error is the fault of the researcher for not
keeping the node and link files up to date, but the issue of the ABM's failure to use assigned train routes to
determine block mileage again emerges as a modeling issue.
Blocks
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
Louisville-Evansville Louisville-Lafayette
Evansville-Nucor (swap at Evansville)
Lafayette-Nucor
Schedule
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
R560 R560
1330 DP Louisville 1330 DP Louisville
2330 AR Evansville 2330 AR Evansville
R590 R590
1600 DP Evansville 1600 DP Evansville





Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
77% 71%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
UC/B Hours 41 UC/B Hours 67
O/T Hours 39 O/T Hours 39
Miles 329 Miles 387
Class 1 Class 1
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 1
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Figure 4.3e
Traffic Flow: Nucor, IN - Mt. Vernon, IN
8.5 cars/day (two flows, 6.4 cars/day and 2.1 cars/day)
Observations: With virtually no change in reliability, trip time and mileage decrease and one handling is
eliminated as a result of a new route created by the ABM. The new route calls for southbound traffic at
Nucor to be picked up by southbound R591 rather than its northbound counterpart R590. Handled this
way, southbound traffic avoids Lafayette yard and the mileage required to get there. The questions of
whether Nucor can or will segregate northbound and southbound traffic or whether car release timing is a
factor are largely irrelevant because it appears that R590 and R591 perform work at Nucor simultaneously
or in short succession. If during switching, R590 makes a block for R591 rather than dragging the tonnage
to Lafayette for switching, the trip time savings will likely be achieved.
Blocks





Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
R590 R591
2230 DP Nucor 2300 DP Nucor
2359 AR Lafayette 0915 AR Evansville
R591 J734
1830 DP Lafayette 1130 DP Evansville
0915 AR Evansville 1652 AR Mt. Vernon
J734
1130 DP Evansville
1652 AR Mt. Vernon
O/D Reliability
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
68% 69%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
UC/B Hours 66 UC/B Hours 37
O/T Hours 16 O/T Hours 20
Miles 246 Miles 188
Class 2 Class 1
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 0
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Figure 4.3f
Traffic Flow: Decatur, IL - Baltimore
3.6 cars/day
Observations: The new route generated by the ABM improves significantly over the base case in trip
time, reliability, and handlings. However, both the base case route and the updated route are highly
idiosyncratic. The profile of train R594 is unusual among CSXT road-switchers in that it is profiled to
make many pre-blocks on its run from Decatur to Danville, including Chicago and Chicago-Eastbound.
There is no explanation for why Decatur traffic is not included in this pre-block in the base case.
Furthermore, Cayuga is not a yard but a siding and what 'classification' could go on there would have to
be done by R594 or J706. Once picked up by J706, the traffic logically proceeds in the base case. The
new route utilizes R594's profiled pre-blocks, but becomes inexplicable east of Chicago, save for the
consideration that the route might be the result of a heuristic work-around of a capacity constraint of some
sort. New Castle and Demmler do not have major classification capability, and carrying a through car on
local B712 makes little sense.
Blocks
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
Decatur-Cayuga Decatur-Chicago






Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
R594 R594
2120 DP Decatur 2120 DP Decatur
2230 AR Cayuga 2230 AR Cayuga
J706 R592
1209 DP Cayuga 0730 DP Cayuga
1430 AR Danville 1300 AR Chicago
R592 Q384
0915 DP Danville 0700 DP Chicago
1300 AR Chicago 2312 AR New Castle
Q384 B712
0700 DP Chicago 1800 DP New Castle
1230 AR Cumberland 2158 AR Demmler
0378 R352
0115 DP Cumberland 0445 DP Demmer





Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
45% 67%
Car Hours, Miles, Handlings
Base Case ABM-Generated Routing
L/C/B Hours 186 L/C/B Hours 155
O/T Hours 25 O/T Hours 25
Miles 1038 Miles 1034
Class 4 Class 3
Blockswaps 0 Blockswaps 2
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Figures 4.3a-4.3f would be well subtitled "A Comedy of Errors", as the individual O/D
flows described there demonstrate the wide range of circumstances that can arise when the
parameters and data driving a decision support system are not adequately verified.
However, before the results are tossed out summarily, it should be noted that
approximately 82% of the savings generated by the ABM-Generated Routing strategy are
derived from car mile reductions. In no error case described above would mileage
reductions be negated if the base case route were used over the ABM-Generated route.
This is the case for the majority of the problems with this strategy. The problem of
unsanctioned blocks in the file, by far the most widespread problem, is of the general form
that legitimate blocks from A to B and B to C have been illegitimately combined to form
an A to C block, often with a blockswap at B. The result of eradicating this problem:
extra hours and handlings, but no extra miles.
Thus, this first run of the ABM to generate classification tables provides a caution but
not a deterrent to use of the general method. But what about the network-level savings?
How many flows are affected by the problem'? It is impossible to tell without examining
every flow, but a reasonable estimate can be made from looking at aggregate statistics on
the ABM-Car Routing strategy's effects on all traffic flows.
Figure 4.4 presents a tally of the effects of ABM-Generated Routing on individual
traffic flows. If a traffic flow appears in the "Faster trip time > 1 day" row, then its ABM-
Generated Routing trip time was more than one day faster than its base case trip time, and
so on. The figure shows that although almost 10% of traffic flows experienced trip time
changes of one day or more, very few traffic flows experience major changes in O/D
reliability. More minor performance changes, especially to O/D reliability, are masked
somewhat by the broad central boundaries in this CSXT standard scenario comparison
report.
Even if every car which gained a day or more as a result of an ABM-Generated route
rode on an invalid block, and if every car was forced to undergo an additional
classification and 20 extra hours of O/D trip time, aggregate handlings would still
decrease, and aggregate car hours would break even. The strategy would still produce
more than $14 million annually in car mile savings. While the errors might seem glaring,
they are far from fatal, suggesting that examining other concerns regarding the unbridled
use of decision support systems are in order.
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Figure 4.4: Trip Time and Reliability Scenario Comparison Report for the Base
Case and ABM-Generated Routing Strategy
'-SX TRANSPORTATION
ID SUMMARY REPORT
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One concern regarding use of the ABM to generate car-to-block assignments is that
classification would be shifted to yards which have superior PMAKE functions but no
physical capacity to handle the surge in classification requirements. Figure 4.5 shows the




Volume Increases due to the ABM-Generated Routing
Classifications
Classifications, ABM-Generated
Node City State Base Case Routing Increase
237 New Castle PA 27 100.1 73.1
351 Demmler PA 21.5 84.4 62.9
495 Erwin TN 96.2 144.1 47.9
174 Vincennes IN 5.6 46.6 41
173 Lawrenceville IL 1.8 39.5 37.7
780 Augusta GA 6.4 40.8 34.4
499 Bostic NC 12.9 40.7 27.8
782 Greenwood SC 79 106 27
320 Jessup MD 0 26.6 26.6
493 Kingsport TN 0 21.9 21.9
458 East Bernstadt KY 0 21.2 21.2
650 Montgomery AL 166.9 186.3 19.4
It is unfortunately true that the yards experiencing the greatest increases in











correctable oversight, no yards were considered off-limits to classification, and if local
blocks were directed to those yards from two directions, an ad-hoc through route was
created with a classification point in the center. The ABM indiscriminately located
classification activity at such points in a further attempt to reduce car hours, miles, or
handlings.
Like the errors that arose in individual flows, redemption for this error is available as
well. Those yards with the largest increases in classification volume tell a more strategic
story about traffic flow. In particular, the swelling of activity at Vincennes and
Lawrenceville indicates that traffic originating on the Chicago-Nashville does not, because
of mileage costs, want to go to Louisville. New Castle and Demmler probably tell a
similar story having to do with time or mileage costs, but the details remain unclear even
after examining the Decatur-Baltimore traffic flow. Bostic, Greenwood, and Augusta
indicate that more merchandise traffic wants to move on the Clinchfield railroad through
western North Carolina, probably also for mileage reasons.
Some of these recommendations will be beneficial, while others will not. A new block
from Evansville to St. Louis would probably alleviate the demands on Vincennes and
Lawrenceville, and save additional handlings as well. On the other hand, the Clinchfield is
mountainous, slow, and challenging to operate, and this physical geography imposes
additional operating costs of motive power, crews, and track maintenance. Yet, additional
car mile costs associated with the Clinchfield that would have counteracted the mileage-
saving incentive to flow cars over the route were not included in the link file, again purely
an oversight.
Finally, the concern that ignoring block volume constraints would create severe,
immediate shifts and imbalances in train tonnage was not supported by train length data.
In fact, generating car-to-block assignments using the ABM actually had a very slight
moderating effect on train lengths. Figure 4.N4 shows a graph of all trains whose length
changed by more than five cars per run between the base case and the ABM-Generated
Routing operating plan. In the base case, five trains average more than 1()()00 cars per day,
while the ABM-Generated Routing operating plan calls for only three such trains. The
most overloaded train links in the ABM-Generated Routing case are on Q648 between
Nashville and Evansville, 125 cars per day, and Evansville and Chicago, 137 cars per day.
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4.1.3 Implementation issues
Two barriers stand in the way of immediate implementation of the ABM-Generated
Routing strategy:
* Data anomalies in the base case and the models cause the ABM to generate car
routes that do not conform to real-world conditions.
* At the time this research was performed, an interface between the ABM and real-
time control systems was in the earliest developmental stages.
Removal of these barriers will require concerted effort and interdepartmental
cooperation at CSXT. The model itself is maintained by CSXT's Operations Research
Group and OR Technology Support, but its success as a decision support tool depends on
factors outside the purview of Operations Research:
* Network cost data was originally formatted for the ABM as a one-time project,
but if the ABM is to be used to generate classification tables regularly, costs
should be regularly updated. Network cost data is generated by CSXT's Cost &
Economic Analysis group. A simple interface to C&EA databases would be a







straightforward programming project, but would first require a common
understanding of the meaning and use of cost information. A more challenging
project would be the creation of a series of expected or desired costs to drive the
model.
* Currently, the cost of traversal of a link is based on link mileage alone, and difficult
operating conditions such as helper districts or capacity constraints are not
considered. Recognition of such constraints is important to the ABM's ability to
generate dependable results. Identification and quantification of these constraints
by CSXT's Service Planning and Transportation departments is a necessary part of
the calibration effort.
* Operating plan data used by the model must be verified for accuracy and
completeness by Service Planning before the ABM can be used to route cars over
the network. Specifically, general agreement that blocks and block-to-train
assignments reflect reality is needed.
* As the operating plan is represented differently in CSXT's real-time control
systems than in the ABM, consultation between Service Planning, the maintainers
of the real-time control systems, and OR Technology Support is necessary to
create a quick means of translating ABM-generated classification tables to real-
time systems.
If the ABM is to be an effective car routing tool, commitment on the part of several
CSXT groups is needed. It is not unreasonable to assume, however, that several months
of intensive effort by a team assembled for the purpose of preparing the ABM could
accomplish the necessary tasks. From that point forward, the ABM could have an
immediate impact on car routing and operating costs. Continuing efforts to maintain
calibration would be required, but would be minimal compared to the initial period of
activity.
Even after classification tables were regularly generated by the ABM, alteration of
other elements of the operating plan would provide a continuing role for the ABM. For
instance, no block destinations were altered in this analysis. Substitution of alternative
block destinations may provide additional car handling, time, or mileage savings, and the
ABM could provide analytical support for such changes.
In the long term, modeling problems inherent in the ABM will necessitate development
of a new decision support system. While several of these problems can be overcome
through model calibration efforts, other problems will forever impede the ABM from
being used "worry-free" for car route development. These include the ABM's inability to
calculate block mileage based on train mileage and inability to calculate connection time in
a yard based on schedules of the connecting trains, and the lack of a direct linkage to real-
time control systems for input file generation as well as translation of model output.
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As an example of additional changes that could be accomplished with a new decision
support system, consider the case where average yard time is estimated based on
scheduled connections rather than merely estimated from PMAKE functions. For many
O/D pairs, there are several routes which have equivalent mileage and classifications.
Classifications, however, take place at different yards and involve different train-to-train
connections. If classification time is determined solely by the average yard time implied by
a yard's PMAKE function, then all cars on a route will be routed via the yard with the
lowest average yard time, regardless of the timing of the connection at that yard. If
estimates of connection time are instead based on scheduled train-to-train connection
times, traffic will be distributed between yards and trains recognizing both yard processing
capability and connection timing in a way that minimizes excess dwell time caused when
connection time exceeds time required for classification.
4.1.4 Conclusions for the ABM-Generated Routing Strategy
The ABM should be used to generate classification tables for two reasons. First, using
the ABM to generate classification tables appears to result in moderate annual cost
savings, primarily in the form of car mile reductions, but with additional savings from car
hour and handling reductions. Second, using the ABM to generate classification tables
would be an important first step towards full use of decision support tools for service
design.
Investigation of the ABM's effects on individual traffic flows calls many routes into
question, as faulty data creates blocks and classification points whose existence no CSXT
service planner would vouch for. Yet, discoveries of faulty data don't indict the major
portion of the savings generated by the strategy, nor the ABM itself. They merely suggest
that the appropriate next step is not to attempt to implement the ABM's current
recommendations. In the short term, the costs, distances, blocks, and trains that the ABM
considers as it flows traffic over the network should be policed, while a simple interface
between the ABM and real time control systems is built. A period of use of the ABM to
generate classification tables could follow after these steps have been taken.
In the long term, modeling issues will have to be addressed, such as the ABM's
inability to value reliable service and inability to use train routes and train-to-train
connection times as the bases for block mileage and yard time estimates. To incorporate
such changes in the ABM would require a major overhaul. In the long term, creation of a
new decision support system which performs the same functions as the ABM but is more
integrally linked with CSXT's real time block, train, and cost information would be
superior to continuing with the ABM platform.
Short-term data verification and long-term adoption of advanced decision support for
operating plan development will be effort-intensive measures requiring input from Service
Design, Operations Research, Cost & Economic Analysis, and Transportation. Only the
committed attention of representatives of all these groups will cause decision support tools
to contribute tangible savings to CSXT's merchandise operations.
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4.2 Improved Yard Performance
4.2.1 Description
The Terminal Complex strategy demonstrated that expedited yard processing played a
significant role in reducing trip time. In response to this finding, the Improved Yard
Performance strategy was devised to investigate the effect of improved processing
performance, modeled using PMAKE functions as in the Terminal Complex strategy,
independent of other possible changes to the operating plan. If the benefits of expedited
yard processing were found to be comparable to the those shown by the Terminal
Complex strategy then the complexity, maintenance effort, and performance requirements
of the Terminal Complex operating plan could be avoided without sacrificing benefits.
The models used in this analysis are not intended to indicate what changes to yard
operations are needed to raise performance to benchmark levels. Rather, they
demonstrate the impacts of improved yard performance on operating costs and reliability.
Therefore the scope of the investigation of the Improved Yard Performance strategy will
be limited to an estimation of the benefits to reliability and car time that improved yard
performance would be expected to yield.
To create a hypothetical operating plan representing the Improved Yard Performance
strategy, two changes was made to the base case operating plan. Two sets of improved
PMAKE parameters were substituted for the base case parameters at Nashville. "B"
parameters were intended to represent above-average performance, while "A" parameters
represented benchmark performance at Nashville. Figure 4.6 lists base case, "B", and "A"
parameters used at Nashville.
Figure 4.6: PMAKE Parameters Used at Nashville
Strategy T50 T90 PMAX
Base Case 18 8 100
Improved Yard Performance "B" 10 () 100
Improved Yard Performance "A" 6 4 100
Nashville's new PMAKE functions were derived from two sources. The "A"
parameters were adapted from benchmark PMAKE parameters compiled in AAR/MIT
Working Paper 94-3, Benchnmarks for Humnp Yard Performannce, and originally were to be
the only parameters examined. Upon consultation with Larry Shughart and Dharma
Acharya of CSXT Operations Research, "B" parameters were created to represent a ten-
hour cutoff for all train-to-train connections at Nashville. A ten-hour cutoff was thought
to be a more reasonable goal, as it was half of the base case cutoff time and would itself
cause a significant improvement in processing performance and reduction in car time spent
at Nashville. The benchmark PMAKE parameters, it was thought, were unreasonable
because attainment would require cars to move early whenever possible, eroding right-
car/right-train discipline [see Section 4.2.3].
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No car routes or train schedules were altered in the Improved Yard Performance
operating plans. It was important to the researchers to be able to attribute performance
changes strictly to changes in yard processing performance, rather than to a different mix
of train-to-train connections which may have added or removed excess dwell time.
4.2.2 Changes in Performance
The only changes in performance that occurred as a result of the Improved Yard
Performance strategy were reductions in time spent at Nashville. Because of Nashville's
improved processing capability, some traffic was able to depart on earlier trains in the
Improved Yard Performance operating plan than in the base case. Because no car routes
were regenerated and no train schedules were slid, no changes in car miles or handlings
were noted. Figure 4.7 shows the Improved Yard Performance strategy's effects on
performance, and Figure 4.8 translates performance changes to annual cost savings.
Figure 4.7: Performance Changes due to Improved Yard Performance at
Nashville
Average % of Cars Arriving Car Hours
Dock-Dock Within +/- 24 Hours of Saved Per
Strategy Trip Time Average Day
Base Case 123 Hrs. 80 % 0
Improved Yard Performance "A" 116 Hrs. 81 % 10610
Improved Yard Performance "B" 119 Hrs. 83 % 5582
Figure 4.8: Annual Cost Savings due to Improved Yard Performance
Improved Yard Performance "A" Improved Yard Performance "B"
Targeted Extrapolation to Targeted Extrapolation to
Traffic Only Entire Network Traffic Only Entire Network
Annual Value
of Saved Car $2.9 M $16.7 M $1.5 M $8.8 M
Hours
Figures rounded.
Interpretation of car hour savings attributable to Improved Yard Performance should
be discussed. In the modeling environment, traffic is distributed across a set of possible
connections at Nashville and all yards according to PMAKE parameters. As PMAKE
parameters improve, two forces are at work. First, less traffic misses connections and
moves on later trains, thus tightening yard time distributions by eliminating peaks to the
right of the first-connection peak. Second, tight connections which originally were
unavailable are made in a small but increasing percentage of trials, decreasing trip time,
but also spreading yard time distributions by moving some traffic to the left of the
previous first-connection peak. Thus most traffic classified at the improving yard will
experience one of the two effects as a result of improvements in PMAKE.
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The yard time distributions parameterized by PMAKE accurately represent actual yard
time distributions, but do not necessarily represent the wishes of service planners or the
car scheduling system. Train-to-train connections embedded in car schedules are
determined by cutoffs at each yard. For any car at any yard, if the time between arrival of
Train A and departure of Train B on day 1 is less than the cutoff, then the car will be
scheduled to connect from Train A of day 1 to Train B of day 1. Otherwise, the car will
be scheduled between Train A of day 1 and Train B of day 2. In the planning environment
in which car schedules are created and compared, regardless of the actual cutoff and train-
to-train connection times, no cars move early and no cars move late, implying the absence
of a distribution to yard time for individual traffic flows.
Correspondence between car hours saved in a modeling environment incorporating
yard time distributions and car hours saved in a planning environment lacking distributions
can be assumed. This is because, in the modeling environment, the spread of each
individual flow's yard time distribution is determined by the T90 parameter, while the total
time spent by all cars in the yard is determined by the T50 parameter. As T90 decreases,
time saved by making early connections and time lost by avoiding late connections
decreases in approximately equal proportion, with no net effect on average yard time. As
T50 decreases, time saved by making early connections increases, while time lost by
avoiding late connections decreases, both effects decreasing average yard time.
The difference between the modeling environment and the car scheduling environment
is that the decrease in average yard time is allocated to different sets of traffic. In the
modeling environment a drop in T50 causes all cars' yard time distributions to shift
slightly to the left. In the car scheduling environment, the same drop in average yard time
and total car hours spent in the yard would be allocated to a small subset of traffic flows.
The set of improving flows would include all flows whose previous first- or second-
connection time was shorter than the old cutoff, but longer than the new cutoff.
Therefore, while car hours saved by the Improved Yard Performance strategy are
dependable, improvement to individual traffic flows will not correspond to improvements
in car schedules generated using cutoffs. In the car scheduling environment, 24% or 62%
of all cars could be scheduled 24 hours earlier if yard performance matched the "B" or "A"
parameters respectively.
Unlike thb;oter strategies, the Improved Yard Performance strategy caused no traffic
to move more slowly. At worst, traffic would advance to an earlier train at Nashville, then
drop back to its original schedule at a downstream yard because no earlier train was
available there. At best, gains made at Nashville carried through to the destination and
total trip time was reduced. Figures 4.9a-4.9c demonstrates examples of traffic flows
affected by the Improved Yard Performance Strategy.
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Figures 4.9a-4.9c: Changes in Performance of Individual Traffic Flows due to
the Improved Yard Performance Strategy
Traffic Flow: Mt. Vernon, IN - Memphis, TN (SSW)
0.2 cars/day
Observations: This flow's average trip time decreases by approximately 10 hours due to improved
processing performance at Nashville. In all strategies, 23'30" is available between R591 and Q535, while
16'30" is available between R557 and Q535. In the base case, these two AVAIL times would lead to
probabilities of making the first connection of .78 between R591 and Q535 and .43 between R557 and
Q535. In both of the improved cases, the probability of connecting from either R591 or R557 to the first
Q535 is 1. The reason for the slight drop in reliability that accompanies the improvement in trip time is not
immediately apparent, but could result from interaction between the arrival and final yard distributions and







1707 DP Mt. Vernon
2230 AR Evansville
R591 R557
1600 2300 DP Evansville
0115 0815 AR Nashville
Q535
0045 DP Nashville
1530 AR Memphis (SSW)
OlD Reliability
Base Case Improved Yard Perf. "A" Improved Yard Perf. "B"
80% 78% 78%
Car Hours
Base Case Improved Yard Perf. "A" Improved Yard Perf. "B"
UC/B Hours 71 UC/B Hours 61 LUC/B Hours 61
OfT Hours 23 O/T Hours 23 OfT Hours 23

















Base Case Improved Yard Perf. 'A' Improved Yard Perf. 'B'
UC/B Hours 64 L/C/B Hours 55 UC/B Hours 64
64 55 64
O/T Hours 53 O/T Hours 53 O/T Hours 53
33 33 33
Miles 571 Class 1 Blockswaps 0
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Traffic Flow: Chlcago-Bruceton, TN
0.7 cars/day (two flows, 0.2 cars/day and 0.5 cars/day)
Observations: This flow improved only when Nashville performed at the 'A' parameter level. Only five
hours is available between Q595's arrival and R533's departure. Therefore, in both the base case and with
the 'B' parameters, no traffic ever connects from Q595 to the first R533, but all traffic connects to the
second R533. With the 'A' parameters, however, 5 hours of AVAIL time lead to a probability of .4 that a
connection is made to the first R533, with remaining traffic connecting to the second R533. Although
average trip time decreases by nine hours with the 'A' parameters, reliability drops because the flow's yard
time distribution changes from having a single peak at 29 hours to having two peaks at 5 and 29 hours.
Blocks
Figure 4.9c
Traffic Flow: Port Huron, MI - Memphis
2.0 cars/day
Observations: This traffic flow improves slightly with 'B' parameters, and experiences greater
improvement with 'A' parameters. Only three hours are available between R573 and R533, forcing traffic
in the base case to connect to the second R533 (29 hours) with probability of .95 and to the third R533 (53
hours) with probability .05. The 'B' parameters eliminate the connection to the third R533, and average
trip time consequently decreases by one hour. The 'A' parameters create a probability of .2 that the traffic
connects to the first R533, with remaining traffic again connecting to the second R533. Reliability is
improved between the base case and the 'B' parameters, as all traffic makes a single connection. Like the
base case, the 'A' parameters cause the flow to have a two-peaked distribution at Nashville, with
equivalent effects on reliability. Because the flow undergoes three handlings and two blockswaps between
origin and destination, the overall effect on reliability of improved performance at Nashville is minor.
Blocks
Port Huron-Flint
Flint-Louisville (swaps at Walbridge and Cincinnati)
Louisville-Nashville
Nashville-Memphis
Schedule (Read down, then across)
R331 Q517 R573
0648 DP Port Huron 1030 DP Walbridge 2000 DP Louisville
0930 AR Flint 2015 AR Cincinnati 0600 AR Nashville
Q513 R519 R533
0245 DP Flint 0200 DP Cincinnati 0930 DP Nashville
1130 AR Walbridge 1100 AR Louisville 0330 AR Memphis
O/D Reliability
Base Case Improved Yard Perf. 'A Improved Yard Perf. B'
68% 68% 72%
Car Hours
Base Case Improved Yard Perf. A' Improved Yard Perf. 'B'
UC/B Hours 172 L/C/B Hours 166 UC/B Hours 171
O/T Hours 19 O/T Hours 19 O/T Hours 19
Miles 945 Class 3 Blockswaps 2
A not unexpected finding at the network level and for individual traffic flows is that
the "B" parameters produced greater reliability than the "A" parameters, by 83% vs. 81%
of network traffic arriving in a two-day window. This is due to the fact that yard
distributions for each traffic flow are modeled according to the yard's PMAKE function.
If a yard's PMAKE function has a flat slope, as indicated by a high T90 value, the yard
time distribution for traffic processed there will take on a wider spread. Among the
modeled parameter sets, the base case parameters include the highest T90 value and on
average yield the widest distributions, followed by the "A" parameters, and then the "B"
parameters, which do not create distributions for individual traffic flows because T90 is 0.
Figure 4.10 graphically illustrates the PMAKE functions, showing the slopes of the base
case and "A" parameters and the non-sloped cutoff of the "B" parameters.
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Figure 4.10: PMAKE Functions Used in Modeling the Improved Yard
Performance Strategy
e0.8- .
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Hours Between Train Arrival and Train Departure
"A" Puameters: Benchmark PMAKE (6/4/100)
--- "B" Pruneters: Above-Average PMAKE (10/0/100)
...... Base Case: NLhville's November '93 THS PMAKE (18/8/100)
In the modeling environment, the effects of the individual PMAKE functions on yard
time distributions are influenced both by T90 and by train-to-train connection times. The
base case PMAKE function will produce a single-peaked distribution for a traffic flow if
the first outbound train is daily and departs Nashville between four and eight hours after
the inbound train arrives. If connection time is less than four hours, then processing time
will be less than (T50+T90) * 1.1 = 28 hours, and some traffic will miss the second
outbound train, spreading the distribution to the right. However, if connection time is
greater than eight hours, then some traffic will make the first outbound train, spreading the
distribution to the left. The "A" parameters will produce a spread distribution for a traffic
flow if the time between arrival and first departure is between two and eleven hours, while
the "B" parameters produce no spread distributions.
Although not illustrated by the example flows in Figure 4.9, one issue that arose in
assessing the results was that earlier movement from Nashville might cause some traffic to
dwell longer at a downstream yard due to less than daily train service at that yard, or avoid
excess dwell time for the same reason. If lengthened downstream dwells were more
prevalent than shortened downstream dwells, then trip savings achieved at Nashville
would be eroded at the network level, and vice versa. Modeling the Improved Yard
Performance strategy demonstrated that, at the network level, trip time savings achieved
at Nashville were neither enhanced nor eroded by the effects of non-daily train service at
other locations. Figure 4.11 demonstrates the similarity between car hours saved at
Nashville and throughout the network.
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Figure 4.11: Car Hours Savings at Nashville and Throughout the Network
Strategy Average Yard Average Yard Daily Car Hour Daily Car Hour
Time, All Time, Through- Reduction at Reduction over
Traffic Classified Nashville Entire Network
Traffic Only
Base Case 26.5 Hrs. 29.7 Hrs. 0 Hrs. 0 Hrs.
Improved Yard
Perf. "A" 16.0 Hrs. 17.5 Hrs. 10,584 Hrs. 10,610 Hrs.
Improved Yard
Perf. "B" 21.1 Hrs. 23.7 Hrs. 5,527 Hrs. 5,582 Hrs.
As T50 approximates average processing time, average yard time data in Figure 4.11
indirectly demonstrate that cars will dwell at Nashville around 12 hours longer than
required for processing regardless of the yard performance level, with some variation. A
yard time exactly 12 hours longer than required for processing at all performance levels
implies a uniform distribution of train-to-train connection times. Differences in yard time
beyond those which can be explained by variations in processing capability imply that
more connections fall in some time buckets than in others during a 24-hour period.
In the absence of individual train schedules and connection volumes, a simple model
for determining average yard time may be used. If T50 represents the time required for
classification, then:
AVG. YARD TIME = T50 + SLACK TIME*
For each set of PMAKE parameters used in this analysis, solving the equation above for
slack time yields a result near 12 hours. In the base case, T50 = 18 and average yard time
is 29.7 hours, yielding slack time of 11.7 hours. Using the "A" parameters, T50 = 6,
average yard time is 17.5 hours, and slack time is 11.5 hours. Using the "B" parameters,
average yard time and slack time increase slightly. T50 = 10, average yard time is
approximately 23.7 hours, yielding slack time of 13.7 hours.
These results suggest that the number of first possible connections in the 6-hour to 10-
hour time bucket is slightly greater than in other time buckets, with implications for the
"A" and "B" parameter settings used in this analysis. The longer slack time demonstrated
by the "B" parameters suggests that improving processing to a point where T50 = 10
would not be fully effective given the base case train schedules. In other words,
improvements in processing speed up to the "B" level would be rewarded with less than
proportionate decreases in car hours spent at Nashville. An eight-hour decrease in T50
from the base case to the "B" level causes only a 6-hour decrease in average yard time
given the base case schedules. On the other hand, improvement to the "A" level causes a
Slack time is yard dwell time beyond that required for processing.
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slightly greater than proportionate decrease in yard time, as a 12-hour decrease in T50
from the base case to the "A" level causes a 12.2 hour decrease in average yard time given
the base case schedules.
These results suggest an important reliaionship between processing performance and
train schedules into and out of a yard. Decreases in time required for processing will yield
scant results if no connections are scheduled during the time bucket which benefits from
the change. Whether it is possible to slide train schedules to increase the effectiveness of
an improvement in processing performance is not known, as previous efforts have given
conflicting results.
4.2.3 Implementation Issues
That traffic connects to earlier outbound trains if processing performance improves is
almost a non-issue in the evaluation of the Improved Yard Performance strategy. By far
the largest issues in assessing the promise of the Improved Yard Performance strategy
concern the cost of achieving a level of performance, the implications of "benchmark
performance" as represented by PMAKE functions on car schedule adherence, and the
long-term influences of yard performance on car routing and train scheduling.
4.2.3.1 Resources Required to Change Performance
The benefits that would result from improving processing performance at Nashville are
known, while the costs of attaining the increased levels of performance assumed in this
analysis remain unknown. It is beyond the scope of this research to engage in the
simulation of Nashville yard necessary to determine what if any resource increases would
be required to achieve the assumed levels of performance. However, because the yard
classification plan at Nashville is central to assumptions of processing performance and car
time savings, a consideration of aggregate Nashville yard resources is in order.
Dong (1994:2) reported that during the Nashville yard study period in September
1993, typical staffing levels called for four to five inbound inspectors, one to two hump
crews, three to four assembly crews, and four to six outbound inspectors on each shift.
These figures are consistent with the transportation budget for the period, which also
called for roughly two hostlers, two retarder operators, three clerks, three utility men, and
four yardmasters per shift.
For all of 1993, labor and fringe outlays for all transportation employees at Nashville
totaled $11,400,000. At $0.75 per car hour, the "B" parameters saved $1,528,000
annually at Nashville, or 13% of total transportation labor and fringe costs, while the "A"
parameters saved $2,900,000 annually, or 25% of transportation labor and fringe costs. If
transportation staffing at Nashville was increased due to the desire to improve
performance, a net savings would still result if transportation labor costs increased by less
than 13% for "B" performance and 25% for "A" performance.
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Although other major sources of cost are ignored, the data point represented by
transportation labor costs puts car time savings achieved by Improved Yard Performance
at Nashville in perspective. For example, if car hire costs consumed at the yard were
proportionately greater than staffing costs at the yard, one could conclude using only
financial data that queues caused by inadequate staffing were driving yard times up.
In terms of economic production theory, the capital/labor ratio would be too high. In this
case, if car time savings due to improved performance could pay for, say, up to a 75%
increase in transportation labor, little further analysis would be required to back up a
recommendation that resources be added at Nashville until yard times decreased.
But because car time savings due to Improved Yard Performance appear to justify
relatively small increases in yard resources, then focus on the means of achieving improved
performance should turn to better utilization of present resources. Duffy (1994) found
that cars processed at Nashville incurred major wait times between arrival and inspection,
inspection and humping, humping and assembly, assembly and inspection, and inspection
and departure. Average time spent waiting between processes excluding time spent in the
bowl was approximately equal to average time required for yard processing. These
findings suggest that significant yard time decreases can be achieved merely by more
effective work scheduling within the yard.
At the planning level, a shift in focus from scheduling work to fit the available
resources to scheduling resources to fit the required work would be a useful first step
toward eliminating intraprocess wait times. At the hour-to-hour level, decision support
for matching inspectors and crews to tasks would increase the effectiveness of work hours
already committed. Decision-support tools of this type have been envisioned both within
the CSXT Operations Group and at MIT by Dong (1994:1) and Armacost (1995).
4.2.3.2 Yard Throughput vs. Car Schedule Adherence
Larry Shughart of CSXT Operations Research once made the point that, by itself,
lowering average yard time was a misguided goal. Yard managers, he argued, well knew
how to decrease average yard time-by "hemorrhaging" traffic from the yard on the next
available outbound train in the right general direction, regardless of whether additional
downstream classification would result from the action.
In light of the negative consequences of this practice, CSXT has focused on a measure
made possible by the advent of the car scheduling system. The "right-car-right-train"
measure compares a car's schedule and its actual movement through a yard. A car
scheduled into Nashville, for example, on Q595 of the 13th and out of the yard on R533
of the 14th, would have to follow that exact path in order to be considered a "make". If
the car missed its connection and departed Nashville on R533 of the 15th, the result would
be an obvious miss. But if Q595 arrived in Nashville 7 hours early, and the car departed
on R533 of the 13th, this would also be a miss, as R533 would have departed Nashville
with different cars, and possibly more cars, than downstream managers could anticipate by
examining car schedules and advance lineups. Advanced cars obviously do not always
create problems at downstream yards and pickup points, and may help yard operations if
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the effect of advancement is to moderate peak loads. However, advancement at the
discretion of individual yard managers erodes the effectiveness of centralized control over
train and yard volumes and power movements.
To some extent, achievement of benchmark performance as represented by the "A"
parameters is predicated on the idea that cars should depart Nashville on the right train
symbol and in the right block, but that early departure is at least as good if not better than
scheduled departure, if the scheduled departure is not the first possible. If time between
scheduled arrival and first possible departure is greater than 10 hours, the "A" and "B"
parameters will produce identically perfect connection performance, given PMAX = 100.
What differentiates the "A" parameters from the "B" parameters used in the study is that,
when first possible connection time is less than 10 hours, the "A" parameters provide for a
probability between 0 and 1 that cars make the first possible connection, and distribute trip
time accordingly, while "B" parameters cause the traffic to connect to the following train.
The necessity of advancing traffic to first possible connections suggests that "A" level
performance and 100% right car/right train performance may be incompatible where traffic
has first possible connections of less than 10 hours.
Using the above example, if the yard were performing at the benchmark, "A"
parameter level, it would be expected that on "good days" (subject to some definition
related to train performance) some traffic would depart on the same-day R533, but on
"bad days" that same traffic would depart on the following day's R533. Conversely, in
order to attain performance whose representative PMAKE parameters were the "A"
parameters, yard managers would have to take every opportunity to advance traffic whose
first possible connection times were less than 10 hours. This forces a choice between the
adherence to cars' original schedules necessary for right car/right train performance and
maintaining a single cutoff at the yard for all connections, rather than a yard cutoff for
each connection.
Although cutoffs for individual connections could theoretically reconcile the drive for
"A" level yard performance and the drive for 100% right car/right train performance, to
maintain cutoffs for individual connections increases information processing requirements
exponentially, and accuracy has been shown to be extremely difficult to maintain, even
when train schedules and yard performance change relatively infrequently.
A uniform ten-hour cutoff has often been cited as an ambitious but attainable goal for
Nashville, whose cutoff for most connections in November 1993 when the base case
PMAKE parameters were calibrated was 20 hours. Assuming adequate yard crew, road
power and road crew levels, achieving performance equivalent to a ten-hour cutoff could
happen through attention to simple rules, such as ensuring that all trains are humped no
more than four hours after arrival, and no trains are assembled more than six hours before
departure. Significantly, these rules do not call for dangerously quick activity within the
yard, as they are consistent with the inspection, hump, and assembly times measured for
the Nashville yard study. Achievement of this goal seems to be more a matter of resource
scheduling and elimination of interprocess dwell times than actually speeding up
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inspection, humping, or assembly. Without advancing traffic, "B" level performance could
be achieved, with moderate car hour savings.
However, if car hour savings commensurate with "A" performance are to be achieved
while yard managers attend to right car/right train performance, then the representative
PMAKE parameters are 6/0/100, representing a uniform six-hour cutoff, and not 6/4/100,
representing a ten-hour cutoff with scheduled connections less than 10 hours advanced
with probabilities related to scheduled connection time. To put in place a six-hour cutoff
appears to be a more complicated task, as the sum of the average inbound inspection,
hump, assembly, outbound inspection, and brake test times in the Nashville yard study was
more than seven hours. A six-hour cutoff requires that some yard processes simply go
faster, over and above the assumption that inspectors and yard engines will be in place to
process cars with no interprocess dwell time. Within the constraints represented by these
yard process times, "A" level performance and car schedule adherence do not appear to be
consistent.
In light of this inconsistency, three options are possible. To alter the right car/right
train measure to make early movement acceptable under some circumstances would
retreat from corporate efforts emphasizing strict adherence to the operating plan, and
might reintroduce the negative effects that the run-to-plan initiative was intended to
eliminate. To rule out attaining "A" level yard performance would be an equally bitter pill
to swallow. The third option, reorganizing yard operations to drive down the time
required for processing, is the least understood and may be the most complicated of the
options, but would still be preferable to giving up the emphasis on running to plan or the
hope of attaining benchmark-level performance. A first step toward changing yard
operations may be a review of inspection procedures. The inbound and outbound
inspection processes together account for half of required processing time, and are
therefore major sources of potential time savings.
4.2.3.3 Related Changes to the Operating Plan
If steps were taken to improve yard performance at Nashville, a later phase of
implementation would involve changes to train schedules and car routings in response to
faster processing capability.
Traffic should flow through Nashville if expedited processing there would reduce trip
time without imposing major additional mileage costs. Once Nashville's performance
demonstrably exceeded that of alternate yards, new car routings forcing traffic through
Nashville could be generated quickly using a shortest-path-based decision support tool
such as the ABM. The problem to be solved in making such operating plan changes is that
routing new traffic via Nashville can cause congestion, negating the benefits of classifying
traffic at Nashville that originally drove the operating plan changes.
A better overall option that improving performance at Nashville would be to improve
performance at the system yards that perform major through classification activity,
including hump yards and large flat yards. If a group of yards improves at roughly the
138
same rate, the likelihood that traffic will oscillate between routes in successive minimum-
path trials will be lessened, and the operating plan changes accompanying such oscillations
will be reduced as well.
As noted in discussion of the Terminal Complex [Section 3.2.5] and ABM-Generated
Routing [Section 4.1.3] strategies, use of the ABM to generate car routes is not an
immediately available option because of model calibration and lack of an interface to live
control systems. However, use of the ABM is by no means crucial to reducing car hours
through improved yard performance. The need for further work to refine the ABM should
not be considered a barrier to immediate action on the Improved Yard Performance
strategy.
Choosing the traffic that takes advantage of Nashville's or other yards' fast processing
may involve market factors as well as geographic characteristics. As shown in Figure 3.18
[Section 3.2.4], the CSXT blocking network includes many parallel routes between two
points which require the same number of classifications. Fast classification at Nashville
would likely cause a shortest-path based network model to choose routes via Nashville
over similar parallel routes. If Nashville or any high-performance yard becomes
overburdened, service contracts or car expense can be used to select a subset of traffic for
fast processing.
Train schedules are based in part on yards' ability to process cars. Service planners
pursue several goals when writing train schedules, including minimizing meet/pass delays,
motive power and crew requirements, and also minimizing trip time by eliminating car
time spent in yards over and above the time required for classification. As yard
performance improves, the time required for classification drops. Train schedules should
change correspondingly, eliminating dwell time rendered excess by the improvement in
yard performance subject to the other constraints listed above.
Schedule sliding is not central to the Improved Yard Performance strategy, and its
omission will not erode the benefits demonstrated here. But, as for other strategies such
as Local Pre-Blocking, schedule sliding seems to be a means of achieving additional
benefits, again subject to the considerations of other train scheduling and data quality
issues.
4.2.4 Conclusions for the Improved Yard Performance Strategy
The Improved Yard Performance strategy offers modest trip time savings, which
would be achieved by rescheduling traffic through the yard one day faster as Nashville's
cutoff time decreases. The magnitude of cost savings due to "B" level performance is
one-third to one-half that of the Local Pre-Blocking, Terminal Complex, or ABM-
Generated Routing Strategies, while cost savings due to "A" level performance are of the
same magnitude as ABM-Generated Routing and slightly below the Local Pre-Blocking
and Terminal Complex strategies. The Improved Yard Performance strategy is unique
among the strategies examined in this thesis in that it caused no increase in trip time,
mileage, or handlings for any traffic flow. While other strategies caused both
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improvement and deterioration with positive net effects, the Improved Yard Performance
strategy caused only improvements.
No system-level operating plan changes such as car routing or train schedule changes
are required to implement the Improved Yard Performance strategy. Changes to the
Nashville yard operating plan are assumed but not explicitly estimated. Achievement of
"B" level performance appears to face few barriers to implementation, as average process
times measured in the Nashville yard study (Duffy, 1994) support the claim that a ten-hour
cutoff is feasible. The Nashville yard study suggests that the primary issue in decreasing
the cutoff at Nashville is scheduling of yard processes and resources to eliminate dwell
time before classification and between processes.
In light of the benefits offered by the strategy, the lack of negative impacts to any
traffic flow, and the lack of network-level changes that have to be made and monitored,
achieving "B" level performance at Nashville should be pursued without delay. As with
the other strategies examined in this thesis, full-scale implementation, or immediate
adoption of a ten-hour cutoff is not recommended because understanding of the changes
that must take place remains limited. Nevertheless, the option of reducing the cutoff by an
hour at a time is readily available and poses no analytical problems from a network
perspective.
Changes intended to ultimately provide a means of achieving "A" level performance
should be studied as well, and implemented as soon as they are developed. Even if
performance has not yet reached the "B" level, improvements in operational efficiency can
only help in reaching that intermediate goal.
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5 Summary of the Thesis
5.1 Background and Methodology
This thesis has presented research into the effects of operating plan design on railroad
performance. The research was motivated by railroads' desire to achieve high service
levels for carload traffic, and the recognition that design and execution of the operating
plan jointly determine railroad performance. The research has addressed the question: Is
it possible for some or all merchandise traffic to achieve large improvements in trip time
and reliability through adoption of a significantly more complex operating plan, which
stipulates new roles for some yards and train crews?
The research examined five alternative operating strategies in detail, applying them to
CSX Transportation's Chicago-Nashville corridor. Operating plans embodying each
strategy were created for the Chicago-Nashville corridor using manual analysis and the
ABM/TSS/SPM family of decision support tools were used to create operating plans
embodying each strategy. Alternative plans were then compared to a base case
representing CSXT's November 1993 merchandise operating plan. Alternative strategies
were evaluated on the following criteria:
* Impact on network performance, including changes in O/D reliability, car hours,
car miles, and car handlings. Performance changes experienced by traffic targeted
for improvement by each strategy were reported, converted to annual cost savings,
and extrapolated to the entire CSXT merchandise network, based on costs of
$0.75 per car hour, $0.50 per car mile, and $3.00 per car handling.
* Impacts on performance of individual traffic flows. Positive, indifferent, and
negative effects on individual flow performance as well as idiosyncratic flow
routings were reported and interpreted.
* Implementation considerations. Plan complexity issues, performance requirements
faced by operating officers, and operating plan design and maintenance issues
faced by service planners are discussed.
5.2 Discussion of Individual Strategies
Three of the alternative strategies were developed from ideas expressed at an October
1993 meeting between MIT researchers and service design personnel representing CSXT
and Burlington Northern. They incorporate unconventional operating concepts, in the
hope that new operating paradigms would cause major performance improvements. The
strategies attempt to eliminate car handlings in yards, and render remaining yard activity
more effective. The strategies would achieve this goal by reorganizing required
classification activity across facilities and in time, in an attempt to exploit critical traffic
flow densities or unused classification capacity, embodied in both trains and yards.
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The Local Pre-Blocking strategy calls for local trains to pre-block originating
traffic. Pre-blocked traffic would be blockswapped directly to through trains,
avoiding classification at the origin serving yard. Coordination of through and
local train schedules ("Schedule Sliding") would eliminate excess dwell time at the
origin serving yard, reducing trip times. The strategy's potential to increase local
train duty time is a drawback. The Local Pre-Blocking strategy was modeled for
22 trains at nine locations in and near the Chicago-Nashville corridor.
The desired effects of Local Pre-Blocking are demonstrated by the Mt. Vernon, In
to Bittinger, PA traffic flow, whose trip time decreased from 195 to 187 hours and
reliability increased from 56% to 73% as a result of blockswapping at the origin
yard and schedule sliding. Overall impacts of Local Pre-Blocking on 461 cars per
day are shown in Figure 5.1, and annual cost savings extrapolated to the CSXT
network are shown in Figure 5.2. Implementation considerations associated with
the Local Pre-Blocking strategy are listed in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.1: Changes in Trip Time, Reliability, and Activity due to Local Pre-
Blocking, With and Without Schedule Sliding
% of Cars Car Car Car
Average Arriving Within Handlings Hours Miles
Dock-Dock +/- 24 Hours of Saved Per Saved Saved
Strategy Trip Time Average Day Per Day Per Day
Base Case 94 Hrs. 79% 0 0 0
Pre-Blocking Alone 92 Hrs. 80% 147 864 4020
Pre-Blocking with
Schedule Sliding 90 Hrs. 82% 147 1639 4020
Figure 5.2: Annual Cost Savings due to Local Pre-Blocking
Pre-Blocking without Pre-Blocking with
Schedule Sliding Schedule Sliding
Targeted Extrapolation to Targeted Extrapolation to
Traffic Only Entire Network Traffic Only Entire Network
Annual Value
of Saved Car $161 K $2.9 M $161 K $2.9 M
Handlings
Annual Value
of Saved Car $237 K $4.2 M $449 K $8.0 M
Hours
Annual Value
of Saved Car $734 K $13.0 M $734 K $13.0 M
Miles
Annual Total $1.1 M $2). M $1.3 M $23.8 M
Figures do not sum due to rounding.
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Figure 5.3: Implementation Considerations Associated with the Local Pre-
Blocking Strategy
The Terminal Complex strategy calls for a yard to process groups of trains as at
an airline hub. Closely spaced groups of four inbound trains would arrive twice
per day. Each group would be classified on a tight, coordinated schedule. The
resulting blocks would be assembled into outbound trains, which would depart at
close intervals. Expedited classification of the two daily groups of trains
("complex trains") would occur on the same set of bowl tracks, freeing some bowl
tracks for other uses. The strategy's primary drawbacks include the requirement
that blocks built in the complex receive traffic only from complex trains, causing
other traffic to be rerouted, and the necessity of extremely reliable train and yard
operation. The Terminal Complex strategy was modeled at Nashville.
The desired effects of the Terminal Complex strategy are demonstrated by the Mt.
Vernon, IN to Memphis traffic flow, whose trip time decreased from 71 to 53
hours and reliability increased from 80% to 93% as a result of classification in the
complex. Another type of desired effect was experienced by the Chicago to
Montgomery, AL flow, which saved a classifications and 23 hours and increased in
reliability from 63% to 73% as a result of moving on a new block created on a
bowl track freed by the complex. Overall impacts of the Terminal Complex
strategy on 1422 cars per day are shown in Figure 5.4, and annual cost savings
extrapolated to the CSXT network are shown in Figure 5.5. Implementation
considerations associated with the Terminal Complex strategy are listed in Figure
5.6.
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Strategy Operating Plan Development Issues Field Execution Issues
Local Pre- Few major problems. Local trains must have time to
Blocking switch customers, make pre-
Alone Incremental addition of blocks blocks, put away train on several
decreases need for automated car serving yard tracks.
routing, as could be provided by a
calibrated ABM. This capability can Yard switchers may be called on to
be added later while implementation switch traffic left unblocked by
proceeds. heavy or off-schedule local trains.
Local Pre- As above. As above.
Blocking +
Schedule Schedule sliding will require large Elimination of excess dwell time by
Sliding analytical and data entry effort if done schedule sliding increases pressure
on a regional or network basis. on local trains to maintain
schedule.
Figure 5.4: Changes in Trip Time, Reliability, and Activity due to the Terminal
Complex at Nashville
Average % of Cars Car Car Car
Dock-to- Arriving Within Handlings Hours Miles
Strategy Dock +/- 24 Hours of Saved Saved Saved
Trip Time Average Per DayPer Da Per Day
Base Case 123 80% 0 0 0
Terminal
Complex 118 82% 204 7977 7730
Figure 5.5: Annual Cost Savings due to the Terminal Complex
Targeted Traffic Only Extrapolation to Entire Network
Value of
Saved Car $0.2 M $1.2 M
Handlings
Value of
Saved Car $2.1 M $12.5 M
Hours
Value of
Saved Car $1.4 M $8.1 M
Miles
Annual Total $3.8 M $21.9 M
Figure 5.6: Implementation Considerations Associated with the Terminal
Complex Strategy
Operating Plan Development Issues Field Execution Issues
Large amount of rerouted traffic calls for Schedule adherence of complex trains
automated car routing. and complex yard processing functions
is crucial to smooth operation.
Good cost and network data crucial in creating
reroutes around the complex. Volume fluctuations on complex trains
may cause problems in yard, require
Schedule sliding to coordinate complex trains extra trains.
with connecting trains will require large
analytical and data entry effort.
Choice of the proper yard important.
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The Tandem Humping strategy calls for creation of a large-scale matrix
switching operation across two hump yards, building a very large number of small,
finely classified blocks, each destined for an individual local train. Matrix blocks
would be pulled from the bowl in groups and assembled into trains, and swapped
repeatedly until each block connected to its terminating local train. Because the
two stages of matrix switching would each be performed at a separate yard, traffic
processed in the matrix would have to travel to both yards, but would benefit by
moving directly from the second stage of the matrix to its terminating local train
without further classification. The strategy's chief drawbacks include its
complexity, the requirement that blocks be eliminated to make room for the matrix
in the bowl, causing rerouting, and the requirement that traffic processed in the
matrix travel to both matrix yards, increasing car mileage. The Tandem Humping
strategy was modeled using Nashville and Louisville as matrix yards.
The desired effects of the Tandem Humping strategy can be seen in the Memphis
to Port Huron, MI flow, whose trip time decreased from 144 to 118 hours and
reliability increased from 75% to 97% as a result of movement on a direct matrix
block, which saved one classification. Impacts of the Tandem Humping strategy
on 92 cars per day are shown in Figure 5.7. Because of the increase in car mileage
caused by movement to both matrix yards, the Tandem Humping strategy did not
generate net cost reductions relative to the ABM-Generated Routing strategy,
discussed below. Implementation considerations associated with the Tandem
Humping strategy are shown in Figure 5.8.
Figure 5.7: Performance Changes due to the Tandem Humping Strategy
% of Cars
Change in Arriving Car
Average Within +/- Car Hours Car Miles Handlings
Dock-Dock 24 Hours of Saved Saved Saved
Strategy Trip Time Average Per Day Per Day Per Day
ABM-Gen. 153 Hrs. 77% )0 0
Tand. Hum. 152 Hrs. 79% 196 (3,400) 48
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Implementation Considerations Associated with the Tandem
Humping Strategy
Operating Plan Development Issues Field Execution Issues
Elements of plan hinge on existence of Yard managers and train crews must keep
individual traffic flows. straight large matrix and blockswapping
requirements.
Plan entirely developed within ABM/ SPM
modeling environment. Out-of-order matrix blocks may require
blocks to be individually ordered by yard
Automated car routing crucial to strategy crews, causing yard congestion.
development.
Train makeup rules may cause problems
Representation of matrix blocks in real-time during assembly and lengthen time
control system may be difficult. required for blockswapping.
After reviewing the results of the three unconventional strategies, two additional,
conventional strategies were developed. These strategies presume no change in
operational paradigms, but instead focus on the effects of decision support on the
operating plan, and the effects of yard performance on network reliability:
The ABM-Generated Routing strategy changes the means by which
classification tables are generated. Classification tables, which determine the
blocks used by traffic flows, ordinarily were generated by service planners using
manual analysis to determine the best route for each flow. The ABM generates
classification tables using a cost-minimizing shortest-path algorithm, using route
mileage and yard performance data and car hour, car mile, and car handling costs.
Cars would benefit by traversing shorter routes, avoiding classifications, or
substituting classification at fast-processing yards for classification at slow-
processing yards. The ABM-Generated Routing strategy was modeled on CSXT's
entire merchandise network.
The desired effects of the ABM-Generated Routing strategy can be seen in the
Nucor, IN to Mt. Vernon, IN traffic flow, whose trip time drops from 66 to 37
hours and trip mileage decreases from 246 to 188 miles as a result of a new
routing generated by the ABM. Although this traffic flow also avoids one
classification on its new route, reliability is nearly unchanged. Overall impacts of
the ABM-Generated Routing strategy on the entire set of modeled flows, 8172
cars per day, are shown in Figure 5.9, and annual cost savings due to the changes
are shown in Figure 5.10. No aspects of field operations would change as a result
of implementing ABM-Generated Routing. Therefore, implementation
considerations are limited to issues of operating plan design: if the ABM is to be
used to generate classification tables, it must be calibrated to reflect real-world
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Figure 5.8:
costs and constraints, input and output data must be checked for accuracy and
completeness, and an interface between the ABM and real-time control systems
must be built to handle the volume of information generated by the model.
Figure 5.9: Changes in Car Hours, Miles, Handlings, and Reliability due to
ABM-Generated Routing Strategy
% of Cars
Arriving Car Car Car
Average Within Handlings Hours Miles
Dock-Dock +/- 24 Hours Saved Per Saved Saved
Strategy Trip Time of Average Day Per Day Per Day
Base Case 86 Hrs. 84% 0 0 0
ABM-Generated
Routing 85 Hrs. 85% 608 8,254 78,400
Figure 5.10: Annual Cost Savings due to the ABM-Generated Routing Strategy
Value of Value of Value of
Saved Car Saved Car Saved Car
Period Handlings Hours Miles Total
Per Day $1.8 K $6.2 K $39.2 K $47.2 K
Per Year $0.7 M $2.3 M $14.3 M $17.3 M
The Improved Yard Performance strategy calls for faster classification,
represented in the models by PMAKE parameters. Two sets of altered PMAKE
parameters were tested. "A" parameters represented attainment of benchmark-
quality performance, while "B" parameters represented a moderate performance
improvement. In each case, a portion of the cars classified at the improved yard
would connect to earlier trains as a result of faster processing. The Improved
Yard Performance strategy differs from the other strategies investigated in this
thesis in that it calls for improved execution of the operating plan with no changes
in design. The Improved Yard Performance strategy was modeled at Nashville.
A flow exhibiting "ideal" effects of Improved Yard Performance, a 24-hour
decrease in trip time, was hard to find because of the PMAKE function's
representation of variability. Flows which exhibited effects close to the desired
effects include the Mt. Vernon, IN to Memphis flow, whose trip time decreased
from 71 to 61 hours as a result of both "A" and "B" processing, and the Chicago
to Bruceton, TN flow, whose trip time decreased from 64 to 55 hours as a result
of the "A" parameters only. Both flows exhibited slight decreases in reliability
when processed with the "A" parameters, a result strongly influenced by the flows'
individual scheduled connection times. Overall impacts of the Improved Yard
Performance strategy are shown in Figure 5.11, and annual cost savings
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extrapolated to the CSXT network are shown in Figure 5.12. Implementation
considerations associated with the Improved Yard Performance Strategy are listed
in Figure 5.13.
Figure 5.11: Performance Changes due to Improved Yard Performance at
Nashville
Average % of Cars Arriving Car Hours
Dock-Dock Within +/- 24 Hours of Saved Per
Strategy Trip Time Average Day
Base Case 123 Hrs. 80 % 0
Improved Yard Performance "A" 116 Hrs. 81 % 10610
Improved Yard Performance "B" 119 Hrs. 83 % 5582
Figure 5.12: Annual Cost Savings due to Improved Yard Performance
Improved Yard Performance "A" Improved Yard Performance "B"
Targeted Extrapolation to Targeted Extrapolation to
Traffic Only Entire Network Traffic Only Entire Network
Annual Value
of Saved Car $2.9 M $16.7 M $1.5 M $8.8 M
Hours
Figures rounded.
Figure 5.13: Implementation Considerations Associated with the Improved Yard
Performance Strategy
Operating Plan Development Issues Field Execution Issues
Short-term, a yard operating plan to improve performance Benefits of strategy hinge
must be developed. on decreasing yard times.
There is little latitude to add resources to the yard in order to Pressure to perform is on
boost performance. yard management.
Long-term, altered yard costs and performance may drive Yard management must
major traffic rerouting, necessitating automated car routing reconcile right car/right
and train schedule analysis. train and yard time goals.
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5.3 Issues Common to All Strategies
5.3.1 Network Performance
The four successful strategies caused only minor improvements in O/D trip time and
reliability and reductions in operating costs. In fact, most railroad executives reviewing
these results would probably conclude that it is not possible for some or all merchandise
traffic to achieve large improvements in trip time and reliability through adoption of a
significantly more complex operating plan, which stipulates new roles.for some yards and
train crews. Although not small in absolute terms, in proportion to aggregate service
levels and total operating costs, the changes caused by the alternatives were not "large,"
nor were they even entirely due to the alternative plans' added complexity and new roles
for trains and yard crews.
However, there is reason to believe that predicted performance changes and cost
reductions were unrealistically small. Reasons for this are related to the modeling process,
to the strategies themselves, and to the characteristics of CSXT's merchandise network.
The modeling process caused performance changes to be smaller than expected for the
following reasons:
* Subsets of traffic targeted by each strategy included extra flows not affected by the
strategies. The set of traffic flows targeted by the Local Pre-Blocking strategy
contained traffic originated by local trains in reality but not in the modeling
environment. Node aggregation caused this traffic to originate at serving yards
rather than at outlying points served by local trains, eliminating the representation
of classification between local pickup and movement on through trains.
The set of traffic flows targeted by Terminal Complex and Improved Yard
Performance strategies included traffic not classified at Nashville. The set of
traffic flows included all traffic passing through Nashville as part of its shortest
route. Some of this traffic passed through Nashville on bypass blocks such as
Louisville-Birmingham or Chicago-Waycross, and was not classified. Evidence of
the diluting effect of the extra traffic flows can be seen in the fact that the average
yard time at Nashville dropped by 12.2 hours between the base case and Improved
Yard Performance "A". If all targeted traffic flows were classified at Nashville, the
corresponding drop in average O/D trip time would also have been 12.2 hours,
while the models showed a drop of only 7 hours.
The ABM-Generated Routing and Tandem Humping strategies were not affected
by this issue.
* The research modeled a subset of the merchandise traffic flows, rather than all
merchandise traffic flows. Because of idiosyncrasies in input data, some traffic
flows were excluded from the modeled flow file. The exact percentage of
November 1993 merchandise traffic captured by the input data generation process
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is not known, but is thought to be between 65% and 85%. It is likely that a higher
than average percentage of corridor traffic was captured, lowering the multiplier
used when extrapolating benefits to the entire network.
* Increases in network reliability caused by the Improved Yard Performance strategy
were smaller than expected because the improvement was modeled at a single yard
rather than at all network yards. Because most traffic passes through several
yards, variability is introduced at several points over the course of a trip. To
improve yard performance at only one yard eliminates only one of several sources
of variability.
* Some increases in car mileage caused by the Tandem Humping strategy could have
been avoided by returning increased-mileage cars to their base case routes. This
would have required performance of every traffic flow to be compared and every
flow route manually altered. No single-stage process for routing cars over matrix
blocks was available.
Characteristics and requirements of the strategies themselves also caused performance
improvements to be smaller than expected:
* All strategies except the Improved Yard Performance strategy involved routing
some traffic with the ABM. Cars routed by the ABM in each alternative strategy
were subject to the ABM's tendency to minimize car miles at the expense of trip
time and reliability. For example, using the ABM's costs of $0.50 per car mile and
$0.75 per car hour, a reduction of 150 car miles would allow trip time to increase
by as much as 100 hours without a net increase in cost.
* All strategies except for Improved Yard Performance caused some O/D flows to
move slower and less reliably as well as faster and more reliably. Every strategy
except Improved Yard Performance involved complex operating changes intended
to improve network performance on an overall basis, resulting in some O/D flows
deteriorating in performance while others improved. Figure 5.13 describes groups
of traffic affected positively and negatively by each strategy.
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Positive and Negative Effects of Alternative Operating Strategies on
Traffic Flows
Strategy Traffic Improved by the Strategy Traffic Made Worse by the
Strategy
Local Pre- Traffic pre-blocked on the Chicago- Some pre-blocked traffic
Blocking Nashville corridor connecting to different outbound
Alone trains moved more slowly because
of changed connection times
Local Pre- Traffic pre-blocked on the Chicago- As above, plus a minority of
Blocking + Nashville corridor, some overhead overhead flows on trains with slid
Schedule corridor traffic which moved faster schedules had slower trip times and
Sliding because of schedule sliding decreased connection performance
Terminal Traffic classified in the complex at Some traffic on non-complex trains
Complexes Nashville in the base case was rerouted
around Nashville and forced onto
longer routes
Tandem Traffic classified in the matrices Traffic forced from blocks
Humping with no increase in mileage eliminated at Nashville moved more
slowly, was classified more often
ABM- Traffic routed by the ABM on Some traffic was routed by the
Generated shorter or faster routes ABM to save car miles at the
Routing expense of trip time, reliability, and
additional classification
Improved Traffic classified at Nashville None
Yard
Performance
The dimensions and complexity of the CSXT network also resulted in lower benefits
than might have been expected:
Out-of-route mileage generates costs which are hard to justify. Results from the
Local Pre-Blocking, ABM-Generated Car Routing, and Tandem Humping
strategies demonstrated that, given current relationships between handling, time,
and mileage costs, the mileage costs of out-of-route movement seldom outweigh
the costs of time and handling avoided by such movement. If long trip times and
frequent classification called for by a direct route are unacceptable, creation of
direct blocks to avoid excess classification should be considered as an alternative
to out-of-route movement if at all possible. East St. Louis-bound traffic




* The benefits of blockswapping as an alternative to classification are not
guaranteed. Substitution of a blockswap for a classification may improve
reliability of a movement, but may not decrease trip time if the time available for
blockswapping is as great as was available for classification. This finding points
out the importance of schedule sliding in reducing excess dwell time for
blockswapped cars.
Schedule sliding to shorten connection time and blockswap location choice
influence the likelihood that a blockswap actually replaces a classification. For
instance, if a blockswap replaces a classification at a major yard, and the schedules
of the connecting trains are not brought closer together, the "blockswap" will
functionally remain a classification, with no real car handling savings, as the block
will be shuttled between the inbound train and the outbound train via the hump and
the bowl to preserve yard fluidity. This circumstance suggests that, although
blockswapping can definitely improve the performance of traffic by eliminating
classification, blockswapping as an alternative to classification should not dilute an
intense focus on improving yard performance.
5.3.2 Implementation of Alternative Strategies
As noted in discussions of individual strategies, all strategies evaluated here faced at
least minor barriers to immediate implementation. The post common barriers were: e \. 
· The necessity of further analysis on unaddressed issues such as development of a , e
yard classification plan, or even complete regeneration of the operating plan
because of faulty data. - ' ,
* The ABM's lack of calibration and an interface to real-time control systems. The 
extent to which the ABM is used to generate car routes determines the seriousness ' '' c
of the barrier to implementation.
Issues of plan complexity and present performance levels affected only the Terminal
Complex and Tandem Humping strategies, of which only the Terminal Complex strategy
is a serious candidate for implementation. Phased or incremental implementation was
anticipated to ease potential implementation problems of all strategies except ABM-
Generated Routing. These findings are encouraging, suggesting that revisiting the
relatively simple items listed above could allow most of the benefits offered by each
alternative to be captured.
The success of sophisticated strategies like Local Pre-Blocking and Terminal
Complexes requires field officers across the system to know and understand the plan. As
an alternative plan is implemented, communication of the actual operating changes and
also their anticipated effects should be carried out. For instance, particular attention
should be paid to schedule adherence of trains processed in the terminal complex and
trains connecting to pre-blocking local trains. However, at yards far from the complex or
pre-blocking yards, the additional positive consequences of good schedule maintenance
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and bad consequences of non-adherence may not be readily apparent to busy terminal
managers facing many demands. Explanation of the plan to all field officers who play a
role in its execution, will be a major factor in smooth and successful implementation.
5.3.3 Data, Service Design, and Decision Support
The research presented in this thesis represented a major effort at "from-the-ground-
up" operating plan development. The analysis diverged from present methods of
operating plan development and maintenance, which are largely incremental and driven by
seasonal or track maintenance factors. In this respect, the analysis provided a glimpse of
the future, in which decision support tools will be integral to the service design process,
and in which wholesale changes to the operating plan can be generated, communicated,
and implemented on a repeated basis in response to evolving critical volumes and other
network economies, and yard and line capacity and performance.
Development of alternative operating plans used data from different CSXT data
sources at different levels of specificity, from waybill data (most detailed) to
ABM/TSS/SPM model input data (most condensed). Although it would be preferable to
use a single, detailed data source to avoid problems with reconciliation or condensation,
there are several reasons why the use of several data sources for plan design is likely to
remain the norm:
* Using a single, detailed data source such as CSXT's WMS waybill file is very slow
and computationally expensive. It is for this very reason that the QBASE
condensation of waybill data was created.
* Model input files would have to be generated using an interface program, no
matter what the source of raw data. Using a single, detailed data source would not
ease the modeling process, because large files of raw data are not in a model-ready
format. The problem of maintaining an interface between the raw data source and
the model would not go away, regardless of the data source.
* In order to keep a network-wide model within the bounds of computing
capabilities, some abstraction of the network and traffic flows is necessary. It
would be impossible to model every car from customer to customer.
* Modeling data cannot be used as the sole input to the operating plan because it is
not detailed enough. For instance, at least six blocks built at Nashville for points
between Nashville and Memphis were consolidated into two modeled blocks
because of node aggregation, and yard and local blocks for points within the
Nashville node aggregation area were lost entirely in the model. To omit such
large operational elements from the plan would decrease rather than increase the
specificity of the plan, leaving field managers to act at their discretion in ways that
could diminish service or increase costs simply because of a lack of knowledge.
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Given the infeasibility of consolidating analysis in support of plan changes into a single
database, it will be necessary to frequently affirm that car move and train activity data
stored in the most detailed databases is effectively translated to more condensed forms.
While the data reconciliation process is very important to the quality of operating plan
analysis and design, it is time consuming and requires a detailed knowledge of the
railroad, and therefore has often been ignored or scapegoated as a "non-core" activity.
When condensed car move and model input data was only being used for relatively
broad strategic studies, the data reconciliation process in fact was a non-core activity.
But, as operating plans become more sophisticated and utilize more analysis and decision
support in their creation, the data reconciliation process will become a core element of the
service design process.
Full automation of the process of creating alternative operating plans faces two major
obstacles. First, the service design process will continue to use of many data sources
which often do not directly correspond in format or meaning. Second, even if a single data
source could have been used, the analysis performed in creating the alternative operating
plans left many decisions up to the service planner's discretion, such as the determination
of number of pre-blocks built by local trains sharing a common serving yard.
Nevertheless, creation of alternative operating plans would be made much easier if the
design process were automated between decision points. Automation of the plan design
process would not necessarily entail creation of decision support tools from the ground
up, but would often require only the creation of simple mechanisms of information
presentation tools, as have already been completed for the Local Pre-Blocking strategy.
Developers of such information presentation routines will face a tradeoff between the
desire to make the routines broad, containing many user-specified parameter options and
therefore presumably applicable to more situations in the long run, and the necessity that
routines be created quickly and tested thoroughly. It is my view that routines should be as
sufficiently flexible to be used in a series of analyses, in order to speed the plan
development process by substituting regular use of a tool for handcrafted analyses.
If some plan design decisions will always be made manually, and if information
presentation tools will be used to perform much of the analysis between these decisions,
what, then will be the future role of decision support in service design?
The short answer is that the future role decision support in service design will be much
like its role in this research, with several notable expansions. Major potential uses of
decision support tools include:
* Generation of car-to-block assignments, as was done using the ABM in this
research.
* Generation of block-to-train assignments, as was done using the Shan/Rinker
model in this research.
154
* Generation of block destination lists, which would require a new model with the
capability to incorporate the requirements of alternative strategies such as Local
Pre-Blocking or Terminal Complexes in the decision.
* Generation of train routes and schedules, which could be done using the TSS
assisted by data manipulation routines or by a new model.
* Generation or simply prediction or information presentation on elements of the
plan not addressed in this research, such as crew-to-train and locomotive-to-train
assignment and the meet/pass plan.
The primary differences between the current planning environment and the future
environment are that decision support tools would be:
* Used regularly to generate routine information
* Increasingly integrated and capable of determining several major aspects of the
plan simultaneously as computing power increased
* Calibrated and supported by representatives of several departments
* Linked directly to real-time control systems.
More specific ideas to be incorporated in a new generation of decision support tools
are discussed in more detail in Section 5.4. It should be emphasized that many of the
information presentation routines which would automate plan generation for alternative
strategies would actually be shell-like user interfaces masking interaction with one or
several of new decision support systems.
As an example of the use of an automated routine which called on decision support
systems, consider a routine designed to create a Terminal Complex operating plan at a
yard. The user would specify the yard at which the complex was to operate, and a list of
parameters describing yard process times. The routine would then query the block
destination list and traffic flows at that yard and use the Yard Stringline Model and Factor
Model [see Appendix 1], and block destination generator (future decision support tool) to
generate recommendations for complex blocks and trains and new block destinations and
present them to the user. After review, the routine would flow traffic over the new blocks
and present yard, train, and block volume shifts. After a second review, the routine would
change schedules of affected trains and present performance changes for affected traffic.
After adjustments were made to ensure that service-committed traffic was not jeopardized
by the new plan, and the plan was reviewed to ensure that no distortions resulted from
node aggregation, several more keystrokes would notify the field of the new plan, and
would load the plan into real-time control systems. While this hypothetical process might
seem arduous and time-consuming, it would represent a major advance over the methods
used to generate the Terminal Complex operating plan evaluated in this research.
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5.3.4 Additional Observations
Although the five strategies were intended to improve performance in different ways,
they held several aspects in common. The first two common aspects described below are
favorable characteristics of the alternative operating strategies, while the third and fourth
are simply observations, which could lead to additional research or generation of
alternative strategies.
In general, the alternative strategies did not call for significant increases in train,
yard, or line costs, although several strategies left minor questions about exact
resource requirements unanswered, such as the number of yard crew starts
eliminated by Local Pre-Blocking that are actually converted to local train starts.
No strategy as modeled calls for an increase in train starts or train miles. Each
strategy that calls for an increase in blocks built does so only under controlled
circumstances, and does not simply pass the task of determining how new blocks
would be built to yard managers. No strategy explicitly calls for an expansion of
any facility, although further analysis may indicate that improving yard
performance to benchmark levels requires alleviation of physical bottlenecks.
If implemented together, benefits from several strategies would be additive, while
others would overlap. It would be nearly impossible to implement both the
Terminal Complex and Tandem Humping strategies at a single yard at the same
time. Likewise, the Terminal Complex strategy calls for high-performance
classification of the complex trains and blocks, while Improved Yard Performance
calls for high-performance classification of all traffic, suggesting that benefits of
the two strategies would largely overlap if implemented at a single facility. In
addition, effects of the ABM's routing of traffic are present in every strategy in
which the ABM was used, causing some overlap in benefits reported by those
strategies. Apart from those considerations, however, it is reasonable to expect
that two operating strategies implemented together would provide benefits close to
the sum of the benefits provided by each strategy separately.
* Alternative operating strategies affected the performance of individual flows
because of network or geographic rather than market factors. Critical volumes,
rather than contribution per car dictated operating plan changes like designation of
a local pre-block or complex block. Although not rate-related, high-volume
shippers would still be favored over incidental shippers because of the synergies
that arise from regular, high-volume shipment.
* The strategies examined in this thesis targeted subsets of traffic with very different
average lengths-of-haul. Average base case velocity increased slightly with length
of haul, as shown in Figure 5.15, indicating the increased impact of classification
on total trip time for short-haul flows, and suggesting that a strategy based on
separate networks for short- and long-distance flows might yield benefits. A
research question which arises concerns the geographic characteristics or critical
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volumes that prevent-or could enable-short-distance flows from moving at the
same speed as their long-distance counterparts.
Figure 5.15: Size, Length of Haul, and Velocity of Traffic Subsets Targeted by
Each Strategy
Targeted Average Base Case Average Base Case
Strategy Cars Per Day Length of Haul Velocity
Local Pre-Blocking 461 407 Mi. 4.3 MPH
Terminal Complexes 1422 666 Mi. 5.4 MPH
Tandem Humping 92 753 Mi. 4.9 MPH
ABM-Generated Routing 8172 358 Mi. 4.2 MPH
Improved Yard Performance 1422 666 Mi. 5.4 MPH
5.4 Next Steps
Next steps in several areas arise from the research presented in this thesis, including
implementation of alternatives and audit of results, adoption of decision support tools for
service design, and consideration of research questions that arose during the research.
Recommendations for implementation of alternative strategies include:
* Implement Local Pre-Blocking. The combination of Local Pre-Blocking and
Schedule Sliding offers the greatest benefits of any alternative operating strategy,
and faces the fewest barriers to operating plan creation and implementation. Local
Pre-Blocking is conceptually straightforward and has been successfully instituted
on CSX Transportation and other major railroads. Local Pre-Blocking alone may
be implemented incrementally, as a demonstration project, and gradually expanded
throughout the system, while the capability to slide schedules quickly and easily is
being developed. The strategy is highly promising, but, like many recently
documented leaps forward in freight transportation and logistics, requires
commitment on the part of the railroad and close relationships with its customers.
* Implement a Terminal Complex at an appropriate yard. The Terminal
Complex strategy was almost guaranteed to have a major impact at Nashville
because of the heavy volumes classified there. That major impact was represented
not only in substantial decreases in yard time for traffic classified at Nashville, but
also in the large volumes of traffic rerouted around Nashville because of the
complex. If implemented immediately, a Terminal Complex at Nashville could
cause major disruption. The car-flow shifts that would result are not fully
understood, train schedule and car routing changes would take man-months to
generate, and no yard operating plan which addresses both the yard's complex and
non-complex classification commitments yet exists.
An alternative yard would lessen many of the problems cited above. A yard whose
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trains came and went from two or three directions rather than five would require
much less rerouting. A smaller yard could include a higher percentage of its
classification commitments in the complex. A superficial glance at the CSXT map
suggests that yards at Evansville, Grand Rapids, Cumberland, Mobile, Wauhatchie,
or Rocky Mount might be better locations at which to launch the original terminal
complex.
Improve yard performance. CSXT has already begun efforts to lower cutoffs
and speed cars through Nashville, and preliminary indications are that the changes
have been successful. Continued focus on good yard performance on a network
basis could yield benefits nearly equivalent to complex, network oriented
strategies, and the Improved Yard Performance strategy has the added advantage
that it causes no traffic flow to perform worse than in the base case. Evidence
from the Nashville yard study and CSXT's reengineering effort suggests that
minimal additional resources would be required to achieve at least "B" level
performance. Savings generated by the improvement from base case to "B" level
performance could fund any additional resources required to achieve "A" level
performance, while analysis of yard processes generates recommendations to
eliminate time required for classification.
* Audit actual performance changes following from implementation. The
research presented in this thesis would be made much more relevant if it were
followed by a sequel documenting actual operating changes made in implementing
the strategies mentioned above, and the individual and network performance
changes that resulted.
Several short and long term actions should be taken to incorporate decision support in
the operating development and maintenance process. In the short term, the following
actions should be taken:
* Calibrate the ABM/TSS/SPM suite of models by revising the input file creation
process, reviewing all network costs, and having service planners approve the
network representation. The Local Pre-Blocking, Terminal Complex, Tandem
Humping, and ABM-Generated Car Routing strategies raised the possibility that
bad data influenced the dimensions of an operating plan created using the models.
If decision support tools are to be incorporated into the service planning process,
they must have the support of service planners.
* Use the ABM to generate car routes. While it has not been CSXT's intent to use
the ABM/TSS/SPM suite of models in roles directly supporting service planning,
the ABM could have an immediate impact, both by simplifying and speeding the
process of regenerating car routing tables at a yard as the block destination list
changes, and by ensuring that each car is routed over its minimum cost path,
assuming that the network is calibrated. The true impact of the ABM on network
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traffic flows, though, is still subject to some conjecture because of model
calibration issues discussed above and effects of empty car flows discussed below.
In the long term, a new generation of decision support systems should supersede the
ABM/TSS/SPM suite of models:
Develop a next generation of decision support tools for the operating plan.
Although I call for a rejuvenation of the ABM/TSS/SPM suite of models in above,
these models will always face certain drawbacks, such as their difficulty of use,
tremendous file storage requirements, limitations on simulation size, and
conceptual rigidity. While the first two of these can be overcome with effort spent
to train users and money spent to buy storage, growth of the CSXT network and
complexity of the operating plan will make continued use of these models for
whole-network analysis untenable. Furthermore, the effort spent to model even
one of the unconventional alternatives described in this thesis makes the
ABM/TSS/SPM suite's success as timely scenario comparison tools unlikely.
A new generation of decision support tools should contain two new interfaces.
First is a bi-directional interface with real-time control systems. In one direction,
real time control systems could provide more timely traffic flow data, and could
render blocks, trains, and car routes, good or bad, in the model exactly as they are
expressed to the executors of the plan. The second interface is a user interface
which enables sweeping changes to be specified and reviewed with little effort.
Creation of the operating plans reviewed in this thesis required manual editing of
ABM/TSS/SPM input files, a lengthy and error-prone process aided only to a
small degree by sorting and batch programming. Automated operating plan editing
mechanisms would speed the creation of new plans significantly.
Another significant element of the next generation of decision support tool is a
hierarchical representation of the railroad network, operating plan, and traffic
flows. The modeling performed for this thesis encountered problems caused both
by node aggregation, the distortion of pickup and delivery activity, and by node
disaggregation, the large simulation size and many low-volume O/D flows.
Reconciliation of issues demanding more and less detailed network representations
requires the ability to pivot between two representations depending on the design
task at hand.
It is important that a new decision support tool used for car routing and blocking
plan generation overcome the ABM's three major modeling shortcomings. These
are the use of link mileage to approximate block mileage, the use of averages
rather than actual connection schedules to determine expected yard time, and the
ABM's inability to determine which block destinations should be maintained.
Increasing the specificity of cost information, such as assigning each traffic flow a
unique car hour cost based on market considerations and car type, is less important
than overcoming the shortcomings listed above. However, if such information can
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be generated quickly and easily from cost and rate data, it would be a first step
toward service differentiation, as block and train capacity could be allocated in
constrained situations to the most service sensitive traffic.
At the heart of a new decision support system, advanced optimization techniques
are less important at this juncture than the ability to quickly and clearly estimate
the effects of changes in car routes, blocks, or train routes and schedules on
diverse elements of the plan such as locomotive and crew requirements, yard
processing schedules, and the meet-pass plan. A single system need not, and
indeed cannot at this time optimize all elements of the plan development process.
However, to even be able to illustrate crew-to-train coverage or a potential meet-
pass plan as train schedules change would be a major advance.
In addition to the plan development work needed to ready the alternative strategies for
implementation, further analytical work is needed to answer questions raised by this
research. These research questions are not immediately pressing, and it is doubtful that a
particular answer would change the interpretation of the results of this analysis. However,
as railroad service planning and operating plan development become more sophisticated,
research in these areas will be increasingly relevant.
* Determine whether the empty-car distribution patterns create the appearance
of excess classification in the network modeling environment, the reality of excess
classification in the field, or both. In all strategies in which a substantial number of
cars were routed by the ABM, significant reduction in car miles and car handlings
resulted. Empty O/D flows are represented no differently than loaded flows in the
modeling environment, although an actual empty O/D move may be the
amalgamation of several moves under uncertainty to empty car gathering points
before the car is assigned to a customer. In a pathological case, eliminated miles
and handlings "found" by the ABM for common empty types such as covered
hoppers would only be achievable if advance information on customer car ordering
patterns were available.
Moreover, empty flows contribute to "critical densities" which give rise to such
operating plan elements as local pre-blocks and complex blocks, even when empty
car distribution patterns may change significantly from month to month. In many
cases, empty flow patterns can be counted on, at least on a yard-to-yard if not on
an O/D basis, but distribution patterns sometimes gyrate too randomly to serve as
a basis for proactive service planning. Further consideration should be given to the
effects of empty car movements on operating plan design.
* Determine the value of an additional point of reliability for different traffic
types and O/D pairs. The service design process is fraught with tradeoffs between
reliability and cost. Should a set of customer switching be covered by two daily
assignments or three'? Should a switch be added in the throat of this yard? Many
such decisions have local effects and do not require network models to determine
the effects on reliability and operating costs.
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As the service design process and operating options become more sophisticated,
however, knowledge of the margin must improve. For instance, at Nashville, the
Terminal Complex and Improved Yard Performance strategies are mutually
exclusive. Both improve the performance of a set of O/D flows. The Terminal
Complex strategy achieves potentially greater benefits for a subset of traffic in
selected lanes, while disrupting movement patterns for other traffic. The Improved
Yard Performance strategy offers improved processing performance for traffic in
all lanes which moves to earlier connections as a result of the change. Assuming
for a moment that network-level performance and complexity are equal, how
should the best option be selected?
Devise additional alternative operating strategies. Local Pre-Blocking,
Terminal Complexes, and Tandem Humping do not represent the last word in
alternative operating strategies by any means. Further examination of network and
market characteristics of traffic flows may lead to additional ideas on how to
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Appendix 1: Spreadsheet Models for Developing Terminal Complex Operating
Plans
The two models described here address two preliminary issues associated with
creating a Terminal Complex operating plan.
* The Yard Stringline Model uses measured or estimated process times for yard
functions such as inspection, humping, and assembly to determine a feasible size
for a complex in each direction at a yard, predict train-to-train connection times,
and create a processing schedule for the inbound and outbound complex trains.
* The Factor Model helps a user choose the "best" set of trains and blocks to
schedule for processing in the complex, given the number of trains and blocks the
complex. The Factor model simplifies the tradeoff between maximizing the
volume of traffic processed in the complex and minimizing the disruption to
preexisting routes caused by the constraint that all traffic which is included in an
outbound block in the complex must arrive on one of the inbound trains in the
complex.
Al.1 The Yard Stringline Model
The Yard Stringline model was developed to support the design of a Terminal
Complex operating plan. The Yard Stringline Model uses user-input parameters to
generate the following information:
* The maximum feasible size for a complex at a yard, based on bowl track
occupancy, time requirements for internal processes, and resources devoted to the
complex
* Yard processing schedules, train arrival and departure times, engine and crew
work schedules, track occupancy schedules, and expected train-to-train connection
times for all trains in the complex
A processing schedule generated by the Yard Stringline Model was used as the basis
for design of the Terminal Complex operating plan analyzed in this thesis, discussed in
Section 3.2. A diagram of the processing schedule is illustrated in Figure 3.9.
Using the Yard Stringline Model
The user enters desired attributes of a terminal complex, including:
· Number of inbound and outbound trains
· Number of inbound and outbound inspectors working at one time
· Number of hump and trim engine crews working at one time
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· Departure time of the first outbound train
The user also enters design and performance characteristics of the yard at which the
complex will operate, including:
· Effective capacity of the trim end, i.e. number of trains that can be built at one time
· Required times for internal processes including inspection, hump, and trim
operations
Defaults may be used for any of the inputs. The defaults in the model represent
measured times and resource levels from the Nashville yard study [see Duffy 1994].
The model then produces the following information:
* Inspection and hump start/end times for all inbound trains, in timetable and
graphical form
* Trim, inspection, and brake test start/end times for all outbound trains, in timetable
and graphical form
* Total time that the bowl holds the complex
* Scheduled yard times, including:
- Yard time for each train-to-train connection
- Average yard time
- Average yard time weighted by train-to-train connection volume
* Activity schedules for each hump and trim engine and inspector crew
* (Implicit) Occupancy schedules for each receiving and departure track
Variations in manpower and yard engines have been accounted for in the schedule-
building equations. There will never be a situation in which an individual inspector crew
or yard engine must be in two places at once. Likewise, the processing schedule is built
with as little slack as possible, given available resources, in order to minimize total time in
the yard and total bowl occupancy.
Additional documentation appears on the spreadsheet itself.
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Figure A1.1: The Yard Stringline Model
Yard Stringline Model, by Marty Schlenker, MIT Rail Group
This model will demonstrate the processing schedule at a yard
which operates a terminal complex.
The model creates the schedule for a single complex.
If two complexes are desired, (for example, a northbound and a
southbound complex each day) several options are possible.
If the two complexes include the same number of trains and blocks, then the
bowl occupancy period of each complex must be less than 12 hours,
including any time between processing of the two complexes. Output of one run
of the model may be used as the basis for all complex schedules. The two
directions' schedules will be identical, but staggered by 12 hours.
If the two desired complexes are not the same size, (for example, a
complex of five trains northbound and three trains southbound each day)
then each complex should be scheduled using a separate run of the model.
The sum of the bowl occupancy periods of the two complexes must not
exceed 24 hours.
Necessary input includes the average time required for yard processes
(defaults or expert opinion may be used in the absence of a specific study)
and also the desired size of the terminal complex, as described by the
number of inbound and outbound trains processed, and also the number
of blocks per outbound train.
ENTER INPUT BELOW
Time variables are in hours:minutes.









21Number of inspector teams assigned to receiving yard
(set to 8 to ignore this parameter)
| 2:001Average time required for inbound inspection of 120-car train
1:00 Average time required to hump 120-car train
2 Number of hump engines per shift
0:1 5Time required to shove a train from receiving yard to crest
0:30 Average time between cuts for a hump engine (relevant if there
is a single hump engine per shift, or if the time between cuts is
longer than hump_time)
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TRIMMING (BUILDING OUTBOUND TRAINS)
trimengines 2 Number of trim engines per shift
trimcapacity 21Number of outbound trains that can efficiently be built at one time
trimpenalty 0:30 Time penalty per outbound train for building more outbound
trains than normal, presumably congesting the throat
between the bowl and departure yard
pulltime 0:25 Average time required to pull one bowl track to departure yard
trim_return_time 0:1 1Average time required for a trim engine to return to bowl
for next pull
OUTBOUND INSPECTION
out_inspectors 21Number of inspector teams assigned to departure yard
(set to 8 to ignore this parameter)
out_inspjime 1:30lAverage time required to outbound-inspect 120-car train
BRAKE TEST
brake_test 0:301Average time required to perform the outbound brake test
INTERIM TIME
interim_time | 0:00 Desired time between complexes
(time when all complex bowl tracks are free)
DIMENSIONS OF THE COMPLEX
inbound_trains Number of desired inbound trains in the complex (max 8)
outboundtrains 4 Number of desired outbound trains in the complex (max 8)
blocksperobtr Average number of blocks per outbound train
TIME
departtime | 14:00 Desired departure time of first outbound train
MOVE THE CURSOR UP AND TO THE RIGHT TO VIEW:
- PROCESSING SCHEDULE
- BOWL OCCUPANCY
- EXPECTED YARD TIMES
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INBOUND TRAIN SCHEDULE
Trains must be in receiving yard ready for inspection by
the scheduled start of inspection.
Begin End
Inbound Train Inspection Inspection Inspector
1 3:20 AM 5:20 AM 1
2 4:20 AM 6:20 AM 2
3 5:20 AM 7:20 AM 1






Hump Engine Humping Humping Hump
Inbound Train Couples On Begins Complete Engine
1 5:20 AM 5:35 AM 6:35 AM 1
2 6:20 AM 6:35 AM 7:35 AM 2
3 7:20 AM 7:35 AM 8:35 AM 1






Pull First Ready For Trim
Outbound Train Bowl Track OB Inspection Engine
1 9:35 AM 12:00 PM 1
2 9:35 AM 12:00 PM 2
3 12:15 PM 2:40 PM 1







Outbound Train Inspection Inspection Inspector
1 12:00 PM 1:30 PM 1
2 12:00 PM 1:30 PM 2
3 2:40 PM 4:10 PM 1






Trains may depart immediately upon completion of brake test.
Outbound Train Begin End
1 1:30 PM 2:00 PM
2 1:30 PM 2:00 PM
3 4:10 PM 4:40 PM







MATRIX OF TRAIN-TO-TRAIN CONNECTION TIMES IN THE COMPLEX






OPTIONAL INPUT: NUMBER OF CARS MAKING EACH TRAIN-TO-TRAIN CONNECTION
Outbound 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 TOTAL
Inbound
1 50 5 7 50 0 0 0 0 112
2 20 9 7 2 0 0 0 0 38
3 5 7 5 3 0 0 0 0 20
4 3 6 80 5 0 0 0 0 94
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 78 27 99 60 0 0 0 0 264
TOTAL CARS PER DAY 264
MAXIMUM CARS ON A SINGLE TRAIN-TO-TRAIN CONNECTION 80
MINIMUM CARS ON A SINGLE TRAIN-TO-TRAIN CONNECTION 2
CAR HOURS PER DAY EXPENDED IN EACH TRAIN-TO-TRAIN CONNECTION
Outbound 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 TOTAL
Inbound
1 533 53 93 667 1347
2 193 87 86 25 391
3 43 61 57 34 195





TOTAL ____ 793 247 1063 777 0 0 0 0 2880







Outbound 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Inbound
1 10:40 10:40 13:20 13:20
2 9:40 9:40 12:20 12:20
3 8:40 8:40 11:20 11:20




























5:30 Hump Insp Insp
5:45 Hump Insp Insp
6:00 Hump Insp Insp
6:15 Hump Insp Insp
6:30 Hump Hump Insp Insp
6:45 Hump Insp Insp
7:00 Hump Insp Insp
7:15 Hump Insp Insp


















































































































A1.2 The Factor Model
The Factor Model is used to choose the best inbound trains and outbound blocks to be
included in a terminal complex, based on train-to-block connection volumes and total
outbound block volume.
In the case study of CSXT's Radnor Yard in Nashville, for which the model was
developed, several approaches to choosing the traffic targeted for expedited processing in
the complex were examined. The method which yielded the best results involved sorting
all cars processed at the yard by their inbound train and outbound block. High-volume
inbound-train-to-outbound-block combinations are good candidates for processing in the
complex.
This sorting method yields a group of inbound complex trains, and a group of
outbound blocks to be built in the complex, and assigned to the outbound complex trains.
Some outbound blocks may need to be reassigned to outbound complex trains. Likewise,
existing blocks assigned to the outbound complex trains may need to be reassigned to
non-complex outbound trains in order to avoid overloading the outbound complex trains.
One drawback of targeting high-volume inbound-train-to-outbound-block
combinations for processing in the complex is the fact some very high volume blocks may
receive many cars both from complex and non-complex inbound trains. Although these
blocks receive many cars from the complex inbound trains, a high percentage of their total
volume must be rescheduled either to the complex inbound trains (so that the traffic is
processed in the complex and can move on its original outbound block, which would be
built in the complex) or to a different outbound block (because it may not be classified into
a complex block if it does not arrive on a complex inbound train).
Rerouting cars typically decreases efficiency and performance and should be avoided.
However, avoiding rerouting often causes fewer cars to be processed in the complex. In
order to achieve sufficient volume on the outbound complex blocks, a tradeoff must be
made. Some high-volume blocks must be included in the set of outbound complex blocks,
even though inclusion of these blocks may cause more cars to be rerouted. The user
specifies the degree to which car rerouting should be accepted in exchange for greater
volume through the complex by adjusting the Factor, as described below.
Unlike the Yard Stringline Model, the Factor Model is "data-driven" rather than
"parameter-driven". In order to use the Factor Model for a new terminal, a large data set
specific to that terminal must be input, and the spreadsheet must be built from scratch.
While it may seem arduous to have to create the Factor Model spreadsheet from scratch, it
can be done very quickly, especially if the input data set exists or is easily generated. The
data required by the model is maintained by most railroads, does not require manual input,
and is manipulated using spreadsheet commands.
Figure A1.2 shows the finished Factor Model spreadsheet created for Nashville.
Below is and a step-by-step guide to creating a Factor Model spreadsheet for a different
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terminal, including data requirements and spreadsheet commands. The commands are
based on Microsoft Excel 4.0 for Windows, although it is likely that the process would
work on other versions of Excel. Because the Factor Model uses both horizontal and
vertical sorting and requires initial production of a crosstab report, the Factor Model may
not be transferable to early versions of Lotus 1-2-3. CSXT's version of Lotus 1-2-3 did
not have these capabilities.
In order to create a Factor Model spreadsheet, the following steps are necessary:
Step 1: Prepare a data set for the terminal which will operate the complex. This data set
should be based on all cars processed at the terminal during a typically busy
month, such as October or November. The data should be arranged in columns,
as shown below:
Inbound Train ID Outbound Block ID Car Volume
Step 2: Parse Data into columns in Microsoft Excel if necessary.
Step 3: Create column headings such as "Inbound Train", "Outbound Block", and
"Volume".
Step 4: Highlight the entire dataset and choose "Set Database" from the "Data"
pulldown menu.
Step 5: From the same menu, choose "Crosstab". As prompted, choose to put "Inbound
Train" on the vertical axis of the report, "Outbound Block" on the horizontal axis
of the report, and "Volume" as the calculated values in the interior of the report.
At this stage, the spreadsheet will contain a report which shows the volume connecting
from every inbound train to every outbound block. The report will be sorted
alphabetically by lowest to highest train and block ID. Inbound trains will be listed
vertically on the left side of the spreadsheet, while outbound blocks will be listed
horizontally across the top of the spreadsheet. The task now is to choose the set of
inbound trains and outbound blocks which maximizes the number of cars processed in the
complex without causing an excessive number of cars to be rescheduled out of non-
complex inbound trains and complex outbound blocks. This is accomplished by sorting
the report, using the Factor as a sorting criterion.
Step 6: The "Total" column to the right of the crosstab report shows the total number of
cars that arrived on each inbound train. To the right of the "total" column, set
up a column which demonstrates the number of cars which depart on the left-
most n blocks, where n is the number of outbound blocks in the complex.
Create a column to the right of that column which shows the percentage of the
total cars carried by each train ID that departed on the leftmost n blocks.
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Step 7: The "Total" row below the crosstab report shows the total number of cars which
departed on each outbound block. Set up a row below the "Total" row which
shows the number cars which connected from the top m trains, where m is the
number of inbound trains in the complex. Set up an additional column which
contains the percentage of all cars on the block which arrived on the top mn
trains.
Step 8: Using the "Sort" functions in the "Data" pulldown menu, sort the horizontal
rows from highest to lowest, using the column containing the number of cars in
the top n blocks as the sort key. Then, sort the vertical columns, highest on the
left and lowest on the right, using row containing the number of cars arriving on
the top m trains as the sort key. If the IDs of the top m trains change as a result
of sorting the blocks, or vice versa, re-sort until the top volume trains and blocks
are stable. This should not take more than three sorts.
At this point, the upper left hand 1i by n region of the spreadsheet contain the train-to-
block connections which collectively allow the most cars to be processed in the complex.
Assess the preliminary results. It is easy to calculate the number of cars which would
move in each block in the complex, the total number of cars processed in the complex, and
the total number of cars which would require rerouting if the complex were implemented.
No further analysis needs to be performed here if the resulting set of inbound trains
and outbound blocks appears satisfactory. However, it is very likely that this result
requires a large percentage of cars to change from their original inbound train to outbound
block routing. Cars would change from their original inbound train to outbound block
routings if they previously entered the yard on a non-complex train, but departed on a
complex block. The Factor addresses this problem.
The Factor is an index of the desirability of including the block in the complex. It
balances the number of cars that would be included in the complex with the number of
cars which must be rerouted.
Sorting the blocks using the Factor, rather than the number of cars that arrived on the
top in trains, as the sort key, results in a different set of outbound blocks in the complex.
These blocks will contain fewer cars than the set of blocks that was chosen purely on the
basis of block volume, but the new blocks will have a higher percentage of cars in the
complex, and thus fewer cars will have to be rerouted.
Outbound blocks fed by more inbound trains will have lower Factor values. They are
less desirable for the complex, regardless of high volume, because a lower percentage of
the cars which previously departed on the block arrived on the top mi inbound trains.
Step 9: Create another row at the bottom of the spreadsheet. This row will contain the
Factor. The Factor is the produlct of the number of cars in an outbound block
that arrived on the top in trains and the percentage of total outbound block
volume that arlived on the top in trains. Both of these figures exist in the
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spreadsheet already, making the row that contains the Factor easy to generate.
To increase the relative importance of avoiding reroutes, square or cube the
percentage of total block volume which arrived on the top in trains within the
Factor. Note that this weighting factor decreases in effectiveness when the
power to which the percentage is raised increases beyond 4 or 5.
Step 10: Re-sort the columns, using the Factor as the sort key. The number of cars
processed in the complex will drop, but the number of cars which must be
rerouted will drop by a larger degree. It is possible that sorting by Factor may
change the inbound trains selected for the complex. If this happens, re-sort the
rows and proceed.
Step 11: Assess the results. Was the drop in rerouted cars vs. the drop in cars processed
in the complex satisfactory? If not, increase or decrease the relative weight of
the percentage of cars arriving on the top in trains in the Factor and re-sort.
If the results still are not satisfactory, either because too little volume is being
processed in the complex or because a large number of cars must be rerouted, consider
dispatching one or more of the highest-volume blocks from both "directions" of the
complex.
In the case of Radnor Yard, creation of northbound and southbound complexes would
have required the rerouting of many cars to and from Memphis, because Memphis is west
of Nashville and the Nashville-to-Memphis blocks receive cars from both northbound and
southbound trains. Furthermore, blocks destined to CSXT's Memphis interchange
partners have high volume, and would otherwise have been selected for the complex.
To dispatch large blocks from both complexes allows each block to occupy a single
bowl track throughout the day. This cuts down greatly on the number of rerouted cars
because the block may now receive cars from any inbound train, instead of receiving cars
from only the in inbound trains in the complex.
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Figure A1.2: The Factor Model
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Appendix 2: Network Node Names
CSX Transportation's modeling network consists of 537 network nodes. Network
nodes are defined for major and minor yards or junction points, and to recognize
agglomerations of customer sites. Figure 2. illustrated CSXT's modeling network, with
node numbers. Following is a list of node names and interchange partners. Names are
abbreviated to nine letters, and names with multiple words are abbreviated using the first













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































February 1995 SPM simulation of historical operations. This figure is calculated
based on the storage size of the report files, rather than the data contained therein.
Because some information is redundant and many of the reports are stored inefficiently,
the storage space consumed by the reports may be 10 times as great as necessary.
Nevertheless, even 10 MB of SPM output data would be difficult for an individual to
monitor effectively.
2 Not all cars originating at nodes served by pre-blocking local trains were reflowed by
the ABM over the system blocks. There are two reasons for this, one related to actual
operations, and one related to use of the models.
As an operational example, some traffic originating at node 168, Evansville, IN, is
picked up by Evansville local trains, and therefore may be pre-blocked, receiving the
attendant benefits of earlier availability and fewer actors in the process of moving it
through the serving yard. Other traffic originating at node 168 is picked up by Evansville
yard switchers, because of placement of yard limits. While yard switchers could still pick
up these cars in block order, the benefits of earlier availability would probably not be as
great because yard switchers could switch this traffic immediately after returning to the
yard, even if no attempt was made to pick up in block order. Because traffic picked up by
yard switchers and traffic picked up by local trains within a single node is indistinguishable
m the modeling environment, no traffic originating at nodes containing the actual serving
yards was reflowed.
In addition to the operational concerns, traffic originating at nodes containing serving
yards poses modeling problems. For example, traffic originating at node 191, Woodlawn,
IL, is picked up by Evansville local trains and set off at Evansville for switching. To
represent pre-blocking of this traffic, the modeler is required only to create blocks
originating at node 191 and terminating at the pre-blocking destinations. These newly
created pre-blocks are assigned to Evansville local trains for the trip from Woodlawn to
Evansville. At Evansville, the pre-blocks are swapped to through trains, and the benefit to
triptime and reliability is expressed in the substitution of a blockswap for a classification
at Evansville for all cars in the block.
However, pre-blocking of traffic originating at or near Evansville proper (within node
168) cannot be represented as described above. If traffic originating at node 168 is picked
up by a local train, switched at Evansville yard, node 168, and finally departs node 168 on
a through train, this activity is expressed not by explicit representation of the blocking and
classification activity, but rather in the time distribution describing the traffic flow's entry
into the system. While it is possible to alter the arrival distribution of the traffic to
approximate pre-blocking, this representation would not necessarily reflect actual activity
any more accurately than if the distribution were not changed.
Traffic originating at nodes containing serving yards represents a large proportion of
all traffic targeted for pre-blocking. In the case of cars originating on Evansville local
trains, 69 cars per day in 56 O/D pairs originate at node 168, while only 44 cars per day in
45 O/D pairs originate at outlying nodes 166, 190, 192, and 193. Although much traffic
originating at node 168 is handled by yard switchers, benefits due to Local Pre-Blocking
are understated, as some moves on local train are not subject to improvement in the
model, and, for those traffic flows in the model which do traverse two nodes before
reaching the a through train, the results are under-extrapolated at the network level.
3 Train R532 moved an average of 127 cars per day between Bruceton and Nashville,
while train R590 moved an average of 123 cars per day from Nashville to Evansville. On
the balance of their routes, R532 and R590 carried less than 90 cars per day. No other
complex trains exceeded 100 cars per day on any route segments.
183
4 Train symbols listed are current as of May 1995, and are different from those used
during November 1993.
5 A recent list of classifications maintained at Nashville had 58 separate class codes,
not including distinctions between local blocks on the same local train. Of these, 31 were
represented m the base case block file. At Louisville, the classification list contained 52
class codes not including local train distinctions. Of these, 37 were represented in the base
case block file.
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